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To: Shivram Hala who wrote (8507)10/18/1999 4:08:00 PM
From: Shivram Hala  Respond to of 12475
 
On February 22, 1996, Dr. John Deutch, the Director of Central Intelligence , testified before the Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence . Director Deutch confirmed earlier reports that Pakistan had taken delivery of sensitive nuclear technology
used to develop weapons-grade uranium. He also confirmed that Pakistan had received M-11 ballistic missiles from China.

209.207.236.112

Also has the Wash.Times artice by Bill Gertz.

CHINESE NUCLEAR MISSILES IN PAKISTAN (Senate - June 12, 1996)

[Page: S6139]

Mr. PRESSLER. Mr. President, last year the Clinton administration asked Congress for the authority to allow United States
military equipment to be delivered to Pakistan. Since 1990, such deliveries were not allowed because of a 1985 law known as
the Pressler amendment, which prohibited any United States Assistance to Pakistan if the President failed to certify Pakistan
was not in possession of a nuclear explosive device. My colleagues may recall that we debated this issue quite extensively. It
was very controversial. In the end, despite strong opposition from this Senator and many of my colleagues, the Senate
approved the so-called Brown amendment, which authorized the transfer of military equipment and repealed the Pressler
amendment's prohibitions on nonmilitary aid to Pakistan. The Brown amendment became law earlier this year.

To bolster the Clinton administration's request, Under Secretary of State Peter Tarnoff sent a letter to Members of Congress
on August 3, 1995, when the Senate first debated the Brown amendment. Secretary Tarnoff attempted to assure Senators that
the administration's support of the Brown amendment would be conditional on `no significant change on nuclear and missile
non-proliferation issues of concern to the United States.'

Mr. President, that was then.

On February 22, 1996, Dr. John Deutch, the Director of Central Intelligence , testified before the Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence . Director Deutch confirmed earlier reports that Pakistan had taken delivery of sensitive nuclear technology
used to develop weapons-grade uranium. He also confirmed that Pakistan had received M-11 ballistic missiles from China. My
colleagues will recall that when we debated the Brown amendment, there was some dispute over whether Pakistan had in fact
taken delivery of the M-11 missiles. Director Deutch's testimony was the first time a Clinton administration official publicly
confirmed the existence of the M-11s. In my view, this development should have halted the delivery of the military equipment to
Pakistan. Unfortunately, the Clinton Administration did not consider the acquisition of this nuclear technology to be, in
Secretary Tarnoff's words, a `significant change on nuclear and missile non-proliferation issues of concern to the United States.'

Mr. President, this morning's Washington Times reveals that Pakistan has done more than just take possession of the M-11's.
The Times reported that the M-11 missiles in Pakistan are operational and nuclear capable. If this account is accurate, and I
have no reason to doubt it, Pakistan now has a complete, modern, nuclear weapons delivery system.

Mr. President, first of all, in spite of a string of pious promises and written agreements to the United States, China has
demonstrated a severe lack of international responsibility. By providing both nuclear technology and the means to deliver
nuclear weapons, Chinese Government-owned companies have contributed to a vast escalation of tensions between Pakistan
and India. Director Deutch has pointed to the Indian subcontinent as the most worrisome area in the world. He's right.

The more immediate question, Mr. President, is what is the United States going to do? At the time the Senate approved the
Brown amendment, we were of the belief that Pakistan did not possess both the technology to produce weapons-grade
uranium, and an

operational nuclear weapons delivery system. That was then. This is now. I do not believe the Senate would have approved the
Brown amendment had we known then what we know now.

The Washington Times also reported that State Department officials attempted to water down or alter the intelligence reports
regarding the M-11's, and also tried to prevent these reports from moving through normal intelligence channels. Apparently
this was done to prevent sanctions from being enforced. This is a very serious allegation. In effect, Federal officials are being
accused of blocking the law from being enforced.

Frankly, Mr. President, the Washington Times story is astounding. It is no secret that I am an outspoken critic of the Clinton
administration's nuclear nonproliferation policy, or lack thereof. Before today, I never thought the administration's credibility
regarding nonproliferation goals in South Asia could get worse. I was wrong.

I have written to President Clinton, asking that he enforce the nonproliferation laws he has sworn to uphold. I also have asked
the President to withhold delivery of any military equipment authorized by the Brown amendment. Clearly, the conditions the
Clinton administration made to Pakistan for its support of the Brown amendment have been violated to a degree unimaginable. I
also intend to contact the chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence , Senator Specter, to request that the
committee conduct a full investigation on the allegations raised involving the blocking or altering of intelligence reports by State
Department officials. Finally, I intend to continue seeking the support of my colleagues to repeal the Brown amendment, and
may offer an amendment to do just that in the near future. I think we have more than enough evidence to demonstrate why the
Brown amendment should not have been passed. In my view, Congress was badly misled last year relative to Pakistan's
nuclear arms development and delivery capability. My bill, which already has several cosponsors, would restore the supremacy
of our nuclear nonproliferation laws.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that my letter of today to President Clinton and a Washington Times article by Bill
Gertz be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC, June 12, 1996.

The President,
The White House,
Washington, DC.

[Page: S6140]

Dear Mr. President: A story in today's Washington Times reported that the U.S. intelligence community has determined
that Pakistan obtained M-11 ballistic missiles from the People's Republic of China (PRC) as part of an illegal conspiracy to
evade national international arms control agreements. Even more disturbing, the Times reported that these nuclear capable
missiles have been deployed by Pakistan.

If these reports are true, I strongly urge you to enforce the law and impose sanctions on both countries to the fullest extent of
the law. Further, I urge you to withhold from delivering to Pakistan any U.S. equipment as provided in the so-called Brown
amendment to the Fiscal Year 1996 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act.

As you know, the United States has sought for a number of years to put an end to illegal missile transfers originating in the
PRC. As you well know, sanctions were imposed on China just three years ago for transferring M-11 components in violation
of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Those sanctions were lifted in 1994, after the PRC pledged not to make
future deliveries of missiles or related components listed under the MTCR.

Last year, the New York Times and Defense News reported that Pakistan had received M-11 missiles from the PRC. This
was confirmed by Central Intelligence Agency Director John Deutch in his testimony before the Senate Intelligence
Committee on February 22, 1996.

These are troubling developments. We face a situation in which the PRC has violated both a multinational missile control
agreement as well as a written non-proliferation agreement with the United States. As a result of these violations, Pakistan now
has for the first time a strategic nuclear delivery capability.

Again, if the reports are true, I see no recourse but to impose sanctions on both Pakistan and the PRC. Our own credibility as
a world leader in nuclear non-proliferation requires no less.

Our credibility also requires that we take additional action: the withholding of any U.S. military equipment authorized for
delivery under the so-called Brown amendment. Last August, when
the Brown amendment was first considered in the Senate, Under Secretary of State Peter Tarnoff stated that your
Administration's support for the Brown amendment would be conditional on `no significant change on nuclear and missile
non-proliferation issues of concern to the United States.'

At the time Secretary Tarnoff made this statement, Congress and the Administration were of the belief that Pakistan did not
have both the nuclear technology capable of processing enriched uranium, and an operational system of ballistic missiles
capable of delivering a nuclear payload. Clearly, the conditions set by your Administration have been violated by Pakistan to a
degree unimaginable.

Finally, I believe Congress was misled badly last year relative to Pakistan's arms development and delivery capability. Earlier
this year, I wrote to you expressing my concern that members of your Administration knew that Pakistan was obtaining illicit
nuclear technology from the PRC while the Brown amendment was pending. I am equally concerned with allegations raised in
the Washington Times article that members of your Administration may have attempted to alter the content or the processing of
intelligence reports in order to avoid sanctions. This is a very serious allegation, and I have requested that the Senate
Intelligence Committee conduct a thorough review of this matter.

Mr. President, you and I have not always agreed with the best course of action on nuclear non-proliferation, particularly in
South Asia. I am sure you will agree with me that if the Washington Times story is true, we have reached a very dangerous
stage in an already very unstable part of the world. It has always been our policy to other nations that nuclear proliferation
should carry a heavy price. It is imperative to the peace and security of all the peoples of South Asia that this policy be
enforced.

For these reasons, I strongly urge you to enforce fully our nation's non-proliferations laws, and honor the conditions set forth
last year by withholding any future implementation of the Brown amendment.

Thank you for your attention to this very critical nonproliferation issue.

Sincerely,

Larry Pressler,
U.S. Senator.



To: Shivram Hala who wrote (8507)10/18/1999 4:19:00 PM
From: JPR  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 12475
 
Pakistan Nuclear Weapons - A Chronology
As reported by pakistanis.
1960s

1965: Pakistani nuclear research reactor at Parr, Rawalpindi, starts functioning.

1968: Nonproliferation Treaty completed. Pakistan refuse to sign.

1970s

1974: India tests a device of up to 15 kilotons and calls the test a ``peaceful nuclear explosion.' Pakistani Prime minister
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto tells meeting of Pakistan's top scientists of intention to develop nuclear arms.

1974 -- Pakistan proposed to India the establishment of a nuclear weapons free zone in south Asia

1978 -- Pakistan proposed to India a joint Indo-Pakistan declaration renouncing the acquisition and manufacture of
nuclear weapons

1979 -- The United States cut off aid to Pakistan under section 669 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 FAA) after it
was learned that Pakistan had secretly begun construction of a uranium enrichment facility.

1979 -- Pakistan proposed to India mutual inspections by India and Pakistan of nuclear facilities

1979 -- Pakistan proposed to India simultaneous adherence to the NPT by India and Pakistan

1979 -- Pakistan proposed to India simultaneous acceptance of full-scope IAEA safeguards

1980s

Early 1980's--Multiple reports that Pakistan obtained a pre-tested, atomic bomb design from China.

Early 1980's--Multiple reports that Pakistan obtained bomb-grade enriched uranium from China.

1980

1980--U.S. Nuclear Export Control Violation: Reexport via Canada (components of inverters used in gas centrifuge
enrichment activities).

1981

1981--U.S. Nuclear Export Control Violation: New York, zirconium (nuclear fuel cladding material).

1981--AP story cites contents of reported US State Department cable stating `We have strong reason to believe that
Pakistan is seeking to develop a nuclear explosives capability * * * Pakistan is conducting a program for the design and
development of a triggering package for nuclear explosive devices.'

1981--Publication of book, Islamic Bomb, citing recent Pakistani efforts to construct a nuclear test site.

1982

1982/3--Several European press reports indicate that Pakistan was using Middle Eastern intermediaries to acquire
bomb parts (13-inch `steel spheres' and `steel petal shapes').

1983

1983--Declassified US government assessment concludes that `There is unambiguous evidence that Pakistan is actively
pursuing a nuclear weapons development program * * * We believe the ultimate application of the enriched uranium
produced at Kahuta, which is unsafeguarded, is clearly nuclear weapons.'

1984

1984--President Zia states that Pakistan has acquired a `very modest' uranium enrichment capability for `nothing but
peaceful purposes.'

1984--President Reagan reportedly warns Pakistan of `grave consequences' if it enriches uranium above 5%.

1985

1985--ABC News reports that US believes Pakistan has `successfully tested' a `firing mechanism' of an atomic bomb
by means of a non-nuclear explosion, and that US krytrons `have been acquired' by Pakistan.

1985--U.S. Nuclear Export Control Violation: Texas, krytrons (nuclear weapon triggers).

1985--U.S. Nuclear Export Control Violation: US cancelled license for export of flash x-ray camera to Pakistan
(nuclear weapon diagnostic uses) because of proliferation concerns.

1985/6--Media cites production of highly enriched, bomb-grade uranium in violation of a commitment to the US.

1985 -- Pressler Amendment [section 620E(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act] requires a total cut-off of U.S. aid to
Islamabad unless the president can certify that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear weapon, and that continued US aid
will significantly decrease the probability of its developing one in the future.

1986

1986--Bob Woodward article in Washington Post cites alleged DIA report saying Pakistan `detonated a high explosive
test device between Sept. 18 and Sept. 21 as part of its continuing efforts to build an implosion-type nuclear weapon;'
says Pakistan has produced uranium enriched to a 93.5% level.

1986--Press reports cite U.S. `Special National Intelligence Estimate' concluding that Pakistan had produced
weapons-grade material.

1986--Commenting on Pakistan's nuclear capability, General Zia tells interviewer, `It is our right to obtain the
technology. And when we acquire this technology, the Islamic world will possess it with us.'

1986--Declassified memo to then-Secretary of State Henry Kissinger states, `Despite strong U.S. concern, Pakistan
continues to pursue a nuclear explosive capability * * * If operated at its nominal capacity, the Kahuta uranium
enrichment plant could produce enough weapons-grade material to build several nuclear devices per year.'

1987

1987 -- Pakistan proposed to India an agreement on a bilateral or regional nuclear test ban treaty

1987--U.S. Nuclear Export Control Violation: Pennsylvania, maraging steel & beryllium (used in centrifuge manufacture
and bomb components).

1987--London Financial Times reports US spy satellites have observed construction of second uranium enrichment plant
in Pakistan.

1987--Pakistan's leading nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan states in published interview that `what the CIA has been
saying about our possessing the bomb is correct.'

1987--West German official confirms that nuclear equipment recently seized on way to Pakistan was suitable for `at
least 93% enrichment' of uranium; blueprints of uranium enrichment plant also seized in Switzerland.

1987--U.S. Nuclear Export Control Violation: California, oscilloscopes, computer equipment (useful in nuclear weapon
R&D).

1987--According to photocopy of a reported German foreign ministry memo published in Paris in 1990, UK
government official tells German counterpart on European nonproliferation working group that he was `convinced that
Pakistan had `a few small' nuclear weapons.'

1987 -- China concluded a deal with Pakistan to sell M-11 missiles and launchers.

1988

1988--President Reagan waives an aid cutoff for Pakistan due to an export control violation; in his formal certification,
he confirmed that `material, equipment, or technology covered by that provision was to be used by Pakistan in the
manufacture of a nuclear explosive device.'

1988--Hedrick Smith article in New York Times reports US government sources believe Pakistan has produced
enough highly enriched uranium for 4-6 bombs.

1988--President Zia tells Carnegie Endowment delegation in interview that Pakistan has attained a nuclear capability
`that is good enough to create an impression of deterrence.'

1989

1989--Multiple reports of Pakistan modifying US-supplied F-16 aircraft for nuclear delivery purposes; wind tunnel tests
cited in document reportedly from West German intelligence service.

1989--Test launch of Hatf-2 missile: Payload (500 kilograms) and range (300 kilometers) meets `nuclear-capable'
standard under Missile Technology Control Regime.

1989--CIA Director Webster tells Senate Governmental Affairs Committee hearing that `Clearly Pakistan is engaged in
developing a nuclear capability.'

1989--Media claims that Pakistan acquired tritium gas and tritium facility from West Germany in mid-1980's.

1989--ACDA unclassified report cites Chinese assistance to missile program in Pakistan.

1989--UK press cites nuclear cooperation between Pakistan and Iraq.

1989--Article in Nuclear Fuel states that the United States has issued `about 100 specific communiques to the West
German Government related to planned exports to the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission and its affiliated
organizations;' exports reportedly included tritium and a tritium recovery facility.

1989--Article in Defense & Foreign Affairs Weekly states `sources close to the Pakistani nuclear program have
revealed that Pakistani scientists have now perfected detonation mechanisms for a nuclear device.'

1989--Reporting on a recent customs investigation, West German magazine Stern reports, `since the beginning of the
eighties over 70 [West German] enterprises have supplied sensitive goods to enterprises which for years have been
buying equipment for Pakistan's ambitious nuclear weapons program.'

1989--Gerard Smith, former US diplomat and senior arms control authority, claims US has turned a `blind eye' to
proliferation developments Pakistan in and Israel.

1989--Senator Glenn delivers two lengthy statements addressing Pakistan's violations of its uranium enrichment
commitment to the United States and the lack of progress on nonproliferation issues from Prime Minister Bhutto's
democratically elected government after a year in office; Glenn concluded, `There simply must be a cost to
non-compliance--when a solemn nuclear pledge is violated, the solution surely does not lie in voiding the pledge.'

1990

1989-1990--reports of secret construction of unsafeguard nuclear research reactor; components from Europe.

Spring 1990 -- Pakistan reportedly reacted to Indian Army war game maneuvers near its border by preparing to drop
one of seven weapons from a specially configured C-130 cargo plane. [02 December 1992 NBC News report]

1990--US News cites `western intelligence sources' claiming Pakistan recently `cold-tested' a nuclear device and is now
building a plutonium production reactor; article says Pakistan is engaged in nuclear cooperation with Iran.

1990--French magazine publishes photo of West German government document citing claim by UK official that British
government believes Pakistan already possesses `a few small' nuclear weapons; cites Ambassador Richard Kennedy
claim to UK diplomat that Pakistan has broken its pledge to the US not to enrich uranium over 5%.

1990--London Sunday Times cites growing U.S. and Soviet concerns about Pakistani nuclear program; paper claims
F-16 aircraft are being modified for nuclear delivery purposes; claims US spy satellites have observed `heavily armed
convoys' leaving Pakistan uranium enrichment complex at Kahuta and heading for military airfields.

1990--Pakistani biography of top nuclear scientist (Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan and the Islamic Bomb), claims US showed
`model' of Pakistani bomb to visiting Pakistani diplomat as part of unsuccessful nonproliferation effort.

1990--Defense & Foreign Affairs Weekly reports `US officials now believe that Pakistan has quite sufficient computing
power in country to run all the modeling necessary to adequately verify the viability of the country's nuclear weapons
technology.'

1990--Dr. A.Q. Khan, father of Pakistan's bomb, receives `Man of the Nation Award.'

1990--Washington Post documents 3 recent efforts by Pakistan to acquire special arc-melting furnaces with nuclear and
missile applications.

October 1990 -- President Bush announced that he could no longer provide Congress with Pressler Amendment
certification that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear weapon. Economic and military aid was duly terminated, though
the Bush administration continued to permit a limited number of commercial military sales to Pakistan. Pakistan handled
the cutoff with little public rancor and committed itself to freezing the nuclear program in an attempt to placate the United
States.

1991

1991 -- Pakistan proposed to India commencement of a multilateral conference on the nuclear proliferation in south Asia

1991--Wall Street Journal says Pakistan is buying nuclear-capable M-11 missile from China.

1991--Sen. Moynihan says in television interview, `Last July [1990] the Pakistanis machined 6 nuclear Pakistan
warheads. And they've still got them.'

1991--Time quotes businessman, `BCCI is functioning as the owners' representative for Pakistan's nuclear-bomb
project.'

1991--India and Pakistan enter agreement prohibiting attacks on each other's nuclear installations.

July 1991 - Reliable reports from Islamabad confirm that Pakistan had frozen production of HEU and halted the
manufacturing of nuclear weapons components.

1992

1992--Pakistani foreign secretary publicly discusses Pakistan's possession of `cores' of nuclear devices.

Late 1992 -- The US Government determines that China had transferred items controlled under the international Missile
Technology Control Regime to Pakistan.

December 1992 -- The US Government asked Pakistan to return eight US Navy frigates and a supply ship that had
been leased to the Pakistan Navy, which accounted for more than half of Pakistan's major surface combatants.

01 December 1992 -- Senator Larry Pressler reportedly stated in a press interview that he had been told by the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) that Pakistan had assembled seven weapons and could air drop one in a matter of hours
[Dec. 1, 1992 NBC News broadcast].

1993

1993 -- Pakistan proposed to India creation of a missile-free zone in south Asia

25 August 1993 -- The United States imposed "Category Two" sanctions against certain Chinese and Pakistani entities
that were involved in an M-11 missile-related transfer, which is prohibited under US law.

Late 1993 -- The Clinton Administration, citing what it considered to be asymmetrical treatment accorded to Pakistan
and India over their respective nuclear programs, proposed revising the Pressler Amendment and certain
"country-specific" sections of the Foreign Assistance Act. The administration argued that by the time nuclear
nonproliferation provisions had been added to the Foreign Assistance Act, India had already acquired the capability to
build nuclear weapons and thus Pakistan had borne the brunt of most United States sanctions.

1994

Early 1994 -- The Clinton Administration withdrew its proposal to revise the amendment because of strong criticism
from a number of influential members of Congress, including Senator Pressler himself.

April 1994 - Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott visits Islamabad to propose a one-time sale of F-16 fighter
aircraft to Pakistan. Delivery of the planes would be contingent on specific commitments from Pakistan regarding its
nuclear program, including a verifiable cap on the production of fissile materials. Talbott states that there is "broad
agreement" between the United States and Pakistan on the goal of "first capping, then reducing, and eventually
eliminating weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles from South Asia."

1995

April 1995 -- Prime Minister Bhutto visits Washington.

September 1995 -- The Clinton Administration proposes revisions to the Pressler Amendment, citing the Amendment's
roadblocks to cooperation with Pakistan's Government in areas such as combatting terrorism and furthering US
commercial interests in Pakistan. Under the Brown Amendment, the US would not deliver the controversial F-16 aircraft
or resume an official military supply relationship with Pakistan, but the President decided to sell the F-16 aircraft to other
countries and return the proceeds to Pakistan.

1996

01 January 1996 -- India and Pakistan exchange lists of atomic installations which each side has pledged not to attack
under an over seven-year-old confidence-building agreement.

January 1996 -- The Brown amendment was signed into law to relieve some of the pressures created by the Pressler
sanctions, which had crippled parts of the Pakistani military, particularly the Air Force. The Brown amendment allowed
nearly $370 million of previously embargoed arms and spare parts to be delivered to Pakistan. It also permited limited
military assistance for the purposes of counter-terrorism, peacekeeping, anti-narcotics efforts, and some military training.

March 1996 -- Pakistan commissioned an unsafeguarded nuclear reactor, expected to become fully operational in the
late 1990s, that will provide it with a capability to produce weapons-grade plutonium.

Late 1996 -- Pakistan's main nuclear weapons laboratory, the A.Q. Khan Laboratory in Kahuta, purchased 5,000 ring
magnets from China. The ring magnets would allow Pakistan to effectively double its capacity to enrich uranium for
nuclear weapons production.

03 October 1996 -- Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto called for the convening of a South Asia security
conference that would deal with, among other things, Kashmir and the nuclear arms issue.

1997

04 July 1997 -- Pakistan confirms test-firing of new indigenous Hatf missile.

06 September 1997 -- Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif claims Pakistan possesses nuclear weapons, saying that:
"Pakistan's nuclear capability is now an established fact. Whatever we have, we have a right to keep it...."

1998

28 May 1998: Pakistan detonates five nuclear devices. Pakistan claimed that the five nuclear tests measured up to 5.0
on the Richter scale, with a reported yield of up to 40 KT (equivalent TNT).

30 May 1998 Pakistan tested one more nuclear warheads, with a yield of 12 kilotons, bringing the total number of
claimed tests to six.

Sources and Resources

Pakistan Special Weapons News