Silicon Investor (SI) -- The First Internet Community

STOCKTALK

We've detected that you're using an ad content blocking browser plug-in or feature. Ads provide a critical source of revenue to the continued operation of Silicon Investor. We ask that you disable ad blocking while on Silicon Investor in the best interests of our community. If you are not using an ad blocker but are still receiving this message, make sure your browser's tracking protection is set to the 'standard' level.

Strategies & Market Trends : India Coffee House -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: Nandu who wrote (8761)	10/22/1999 8:51:00 AM
From: Nandu	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 12475

timesofindia.com N-accident may occur anytime in India: Expert HYDERABAD: Former chief of the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) A Gopalakrishnan has warned that India is ''likely to face a serious nuclear accident in the not too distant future''. He was replying to a question whether an accident similar to the one that occurred in a uranium processing plant in Japan last month could occur in India. Mr Gopalakrishnan said a report prepared by AERB in 1995, which listed 130 defects in various nuclear installations, ''did include some identified problems related to reprocessing plants''. ''I am not permitted to discuss the specifics openly but suffice to say that the degree of automation and cross-checks on safety in our older plants are very minimal and one cannot assert at all that an accident like the one which occurred in Japan will not happen in India,'' he said. The Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) has so far not made the AERB report public in spite of legal pressure from the People's Union of Civil Liberties, and DAE officials were not available for comment on whether Indian fuel processing plants faced any risk as in Japan. The September accident at the Japanese facility in Tokaimura occurred when too much uranium was fed into a container, setting off an uncontrolled chain reaction. It continued for hours spewing radioactivity into the air leaving 49 people exposed to deadly radiation. Mr Gopalakrishnan said excessive secrecy in DAE and inability of AERB to function independently alone took care of the safety of nuclear installations in India. ''With a captive AERB from which the DAE can in effect withhold information as they wish, coupled with the shelter the DAE enjoys through invoking the national security bogey and the Official Secrets Act, we are likely to face a serious nuclear accident in the not too distant future,'' he said. ''But, with the prevailing cover of secrecy and lack of public awareness none of us may ever come to know that such an accident has happened unless the roof of a plant blows out or a visible fire rages there,'' he said. According to Mr Gopalakrishnan, the AERB report, among other things, had urgently called for modification of emergency core cooling systems (ECCS). Emergency cooling is vital to prevent melting of the reactor core in the event of breakdown in the circulation of primary coolant. India had two close calls, one in 1979 - when primary coolant pipe in Tarapur reactor burst. Luckily, the reactor was not operating at the time and so an accident was averted. In 1993, explosion of leaking hydrogen blew up the turbine building of the atomic plant at Narora and the resulting power blackout stopped the coolant pump. This time, the core melting was averted by whatever natural circulation that prevailed due to what is known as the ''thermosyphon'' effect. While the Narora fire ranked three in the international event scale of 1 to 7, DAE installations had experienced smaller incidents that had the potential to become serious, he said. These include cable fire in Rajasthan atomic power plant in 1985, escape of coolant heavy water in Madras station in June 1986 and as recently as in March 1999, six tonnes of heavy water gushed out exposing seven workers to radiation. While a fire gutted Kakrapar switch yard and flooded the turbine in 1994, the concrete dome of Kaiga atomic plant collapsed in May 1994 - an incident which would have been a disaster had it happened while the reactor was running. In an official statement in April 1999, the Nuclear Power Corporation (NPC) said the Narora fire was ''beyond the control of NPC as the fire happened in the turbines'', and that the Kaiga dome collapse was ''unfortunate''. In May 1987, a mistake during a routine refuelling operation resulted in a fuel assembly getting entangled with control rod forcing closure of the second unit of the Madras station for two years. Four tonnes of heavy water spilled out of Dhruva research reactor in 1985 because a valve did not close and in 1991, six vital valves in the ECCS of Dhruva were found to be in wrong positions. Another serious human error occurred in 1989, when a technician was locked inside the Dhruva vault as the reactor was being started. A recent DAE study had listed all possible accidents that could occur in Indian atomic power stations due to human error, but its findings, like the AERB report appear to be secret since efforts to obtain the report also failed. Information about the number of workers exposed to more than normal radiation was also not available. With so much secrecy, Mr Gopalakrishnan said he feared that the public would never know even if there was a serious nuclear accident in India. ''Anything which the DAE can hush up and sweep under the carpet, one can be sure they will cover up promptly,'' he said. ''Nuclear power is an unforgiving technology,'' cautioned B P Rastogi, a retired reactor designer. ''It allows no room for error. It requires perfection if one wants to prevent accidents,'' he said.(PTI)