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The US dilemma in South Asia
By Afzal Mahmood
WHETHER the widely perceived US tilt towards India lacks substance or shows a paradigm
shift in American policies is a question of vital importance for the security and stability of
Pakistan. On account of its far-reaching implications for the future of the region, the issue
deserves to be studied dispassionately.
To start with, it is necessary to have a correct perception of the American interest in South
Asia. If we compare the US involvement in Middle East, South East Asia and Asia Pacific
with the one in the South Asian region, it becomes clear that the area starting from Myanmar
(Burma) to Afghanistan is of secondary importance to the United States. If one looks at the
index of a recently published book by the former US President George Bush and Brent
Scowcraft, named "A World Transformed," one finds that India appears only once and
Pakistan not at all. However, it is also true that the South Asian region is at present receiving a
higher level attention in Washington than it did in the past. Many reasons are responsible for
this increased American interest.
The most important factor is the danger of nuclear and missile proliferation in South Asia.
Since last year's nuclear testing by India, its first in 24 years, and the first ever by Pakistan, the
non-proliferation issue has become the principal focus of American approach and activities in
South Asia. Washington believes that an accelerated nuclear and missile competition between
Islamabad and New Delhi is capable of jeopardizing regional peace and stability.
Despite the Senate's rejection of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which
prohibits all nuclear testing, the Clinton administration's interest in the treaty remains
undiminished. As US Energy Secretary Bill Richardson made it clear during his recent visit to
New Delhi, Washington expects India to end production of nuclear bomb-making material,
restrain its missile programme and adhere to the CTBT. He went on to add that nuclear
proliferation was a "divisive" issue between India and the United States. The American
expectations from Pakistan on non-proliferation are the same as those from India.
The second American concern relates to the Kashmir dispute as it has the potential of
becoming a nuclear flashpoint in the region. Though the Kargil conflict has helped heighten the
American anxiety over Kashmir, Washington is not prepared to play the same proactive role
in South Asia that it has been playing in pushing a peace settlement between Israel and the
Palestinians. The presence of Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan and the alleged export of
terrorism from there to other parts of the world has been another reason for an enhanced
American interest in this region.
In recent months, there have been pronouncements from high-ranking US officials indicating
that American policies towards India and Pakistan are undergoing a change. There have been
even hints that the Americans would now let the balance of power develop naturally in South
Asia without any interference from their side, meaning thereby that the US will not oppose
India becoming a major power and achieving regional pre-eminence.
Lately, Washington Times has run a story, quoting US officials, analysts and business circles,
to the effect<v> that a major shift in American policy towards India is taking place. In its fullness it
will lead to a new realignment of US relations in South Asia. The newspaper's assertion that
the elections in India and the military takeover in Pakistan have played a decisive role in
bringing about a shift in Washington's South Asian policies is beside the point because the tilt
towards India became apparent during and after the Kargil conflict. Moreover, the history of
post-World War II era shows that the Americans, despite their commitment to democracy,
have not hesitated in cultivating close relations with military rulers in Pakistan and elsewhere
where their strategic interests so demanded.
The new pro-India tilt in South Asia is not a sudden development but the result of a gradual
convergence of interests between Washington and New Delhi which began after the end of
the cold war. The collapse of the Soviet Union not only diminished the importance of Pakistan
in the American global strategy; it also removed the only irritant in India-US relations. The
principal cause of American indifference to India during the cold war was Indo-Soviet special
relationship. But after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the paramount reason for friction
between Washington and New Delhi disappeared and it was only a matter of time for the
convergence of interests to bring the two countries closer to each other. The Indo-US amity
began to take shape in the early nineties during the prime ministership of Narasimha Rao who
initiated market economy reforms, paving the way for India emerging as one of the world's
largest markets and commercial opportunities.
The crucial question for Pakistan is the depth and dimension the growing Indo-US ties can
acquire. Even in India two different views are being expressed on this issue. One point of
view, being advocated by analysts led by former foreign secretary J.N. Dixit, is that although
the environment to improve Indo-US relations is positive at this juncture, Washington's
support for India on Kargil should not be interpreted as the beginning of "a creative and
positive period of Indo-US relations." The other school of thought, being led by the National
Security adviser Brajesh Mishra, is more enthusiastic about the prospects of Indo-US ties and
thinks that there has been a "paradigm shift" in US policies towards India.
After his recent visit to Washington where he had "intensive rounds of discussions" with
Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, acting national security adviser James Steinberg,
Commerce Secretary William Daley and other senior officials and prominent Congressmen,
Brajesh Mishra observed that there was a "sharper understanding of mutual concerns". He
saw the present and future bilateral discussions as "an opportunity to further develop our
relationship."
We have to judge the prospects of Indo-US relations in terms of the substantive issues
confronting them. Non-proliferation is likely to remain a major irritant. Even if India signs the
CTBT, it will not ratify it as long as China does not do so and Beijing will not oblige as long as
Washington does not ratify it. India's ambitious nuclear doctrine, which the Vajpayee
government will try to implement, may also stand in the way of Indo-US strategic
cooperation. Washington cannot encourage New Delhi's ambition to acquire extra-regional
nuclear capability which is the prime objective of India's new nuclear doctrine.
There is, however, strong Indo-US convergence on issues relating to liberalization,
restructuring and expansion of the Indian economy. As American economic involvement in
other parts of Asia, excluding China, is reaching a saturation point, India offers a potential
market of commercial and industrial opportunities. But the extent of US involvement in the
Indian market will depend on the success of Vajpayee's government in liberalizing the
economy. As a first step, it has opened the insurance sector to foreign investment, a
long-standing US demand.
In the coming years, the geostrategic interests of India and America may lead to an
arrangement under which India will assume some of the security functions now being
discharged by Washington. India has always nurtured the ambition of establishing its
hegemony over the Indian Ocean sea lanes, a matter of grave concern not only to Pakistan
but also to Saudi Arabia, Iran and the Gulf states.
Only recently, India's chief of naval staff, Admiral Sushil Kumar, addressing a seminar on
"Strategic imperatives for India in the next millennium" in Chennai, said that, with the close of
the 20th century, the focus has now shifted to the maritime dimension because in the coming
years "maritime dominance" will be the key to the destiny of nations. Claiming that India is
best suited to emerge as a maritime power, he pointed out that "the Indian peninsula
commands the most lucrative and vital oceanic expanse of the globe."
The most daunting challenge to Pakistan's foreign policy today is to ensure that the emerging
political and strategic understanding between New Delhi and Washington does not undermine
Pakistan's vital security and strategic interests. Even after the end of the cold war, Pakistan,
being a leading Islamic country, located in a volatile but strategically crucial area, continues to
be important to the US.
The dilemma confronting the US is that, while it is eager to add substance to its relations with
India, it does not want to lose a trustworthy ally of 45 years' standing. The military takeover in
Pakistan seems to have further complicated matters as it has widened the gulf between the
Indian and American perceptions of Pakistan. According to Indian press reports, New Delhi
has not been able to sell its assessment of the situation in Pakistan to Washington and is
dismayed at US stand towards the new regime in Islamabad. Pakistan should play its cards
skilfully. The best course under the circumstances will be that, while protecting its national and
strategic interests, it should be responsive to important US concerns. |
