India's obdurate stance
By M.H. Askari
THE prospects of political stability in South Asia have been placed in jeopardy with India
adopting an intensely negative attitude towards Pakistan after the military takeover. This is
also manifest in New Delhi having thwarted the convening of the SAARC summit, as
scheduled in Kathmandu later this month.
The change in Pakistan is entirely the country's internal matter and so far it has had
virtually no impact on the country's foreign policy. There is substance in Gen Pervez
Musharraf's repeated assertion that the army felt compelled to move in at a time when
Pakistan had been virtually driven to the brink of chaos. That should have no bearing on
relations with India. Nothing that the General has so far said would suggest that he does
not regard the return to the normalization process with India as critical to Pakistan's larger
interests.
However, going by the reported reaction of many a seasoned Pakistan-watcher in India,
the perceptions across the border seem to have little to do with reality. It is generally
theorized that, extremely bitter at the "humiliation" that he suffered at the hands of Nawaz
Sharif over the Kargil affair, Gen Musharraf "plotted" to overthrow the PML government
and the takeover on October 12 was the ultimate result.
From the information that has since become available, it seems more reasonable to
believe that it was Nawaz Sharif who had actually "plotted" against the army chief, aiming
to remove him as COAS as he had done in the case of Gen Jahangir Karamat, the
previous incumbent of the office. Gen Musharraf later spoke of it as an attempted "coup".
However, since the former prime minister went about it in a restless spirit, without due
consideration for the implications, his plan misfired. Therefore, what happened was, in the
words of Gen Musharraf, in effect a "counter-coup."
Sections of the Indian media themselves have acknowledged that the army's lack of faith
in Nawaz Sharif became evident even before the Kargil operation, earlier than the sacking
of the then chief of army staff, Jahangir Karamat, in October last. A widely circulated
Indian news-weekly has said that "it is an indication of the reluctance with which the army
assumed power that it watched the emasculation of first the judiciary, then the presidency,
then party politics and finally the introduction of the Shariat Bill with all the exceptional
power that it granted to the prime minister." It was not unlikely that Nawaz Sharif would
then attempt to make the army subservient to his wishes like the other institutions of the
state. Gen Musharraf decided to act before that could happen.
In his statements to the media since his takeover, Gen Musharraf has made it known that
the talks with India must go on, although he also believes that without resolving the
Kashmir dispute, which is at the core of India-Pakistan relations, there can be no
meaningful progress.
Former ambassador to New Delhi, Abdul Sattar, who is foreign minister in the cabinet
nominated by Gen Musharraf, also maintains that Kashmir is central to India-Pakistan
relations and that the two countries should work together to resolve the issue so that the
other bilateral matters could also be resolved. He has even expressed the hope that with
the help of his many friends in India, he should succeed in establishing a tension-free
environment in the region. It is unfortunate that known hardliners in India, such as former
foreign secretary J.N. Dixit who continues to be close to the New Delhi establishment,
should believe that Gen Musharraf's offer of talks is just "a tactical move to reassure the
rest of the world that...things are getting back to normal." Dixit deliberately disregards
Gen Musharraf's statement to the CNN representative, Riz Khan, that he would "show
very good relations with the neighbouring country." Gen Musharraf even chose to ignore
the insinuation in Riz Khan's question: "Why should India want to do business with you
after what you did in Kargil?" Another general, like Ayub Khan, for instance, would have
lost his cool in a similar situation. However, Gen Musharraf remained unruffled and
assured his questioner that Pakistan wished to have good relations with India and that
Pakistan was sincere in wanting to resolve Kashmir and other issues.
It would make better sense for India to realize that Pakistan is much too preoccupied with
its own internal problems to want to risk some more by keeping up the tensions with
India. Its priority is the desperate economic situation and the ways and means to put it
back on a course of recovery will not be easy to achieve. P.R. Chari, director of India's
Institute of Peace and Conflict, is being realistic when he suggests that Gen Musharraf is
"as concerned as the next person about the country's collapsing economy, (and) he is
under the influence of the IMF loan and the Americans; so, it is highly unlikely that while
he goes around the world with a begging bowl, he will risk more global condemnation by
increasing 'terrorism' on different fronts. It does not make any sense."
It appears that there are elements in India who believe that the political situation in
Pakistan is the country's own concern and should not necessarily have a fallout on
bilateral relations. A journalist of long standing and at present head of India's Centre for
Policy Research, B.G. Verghese, takes a pragmatic view of the developments in Pakistan
and has reportedly advocated that "India should not forever wait for Pakistan's return to
democracy before resuming talks." He is quite emphatic that New Delhi should try and
promote a dialogue. A senior BJP official (who has not been named) has also been
quoted by a New Delhi news journal as saying that India should not rule out talks with
whoever is in power in Pakistan.
India does not have to be reminded that it has dealt with military governments in Pakistan
in the past, and nothing has happened to suggest that Gen Musharraf would not view the
prospects of normalization with India rationally. Some Indian analysts have also been
quoted as saying that, unlike the West, New Delhi should not demand a return to
democracy as a precondition for resuming the dialogue with Islamabad.
Almost throughout the 1980s, when Gen Zia-ul-Haq was in power in Pakistan, New
Delhi had no particular reservations about dealing with Islamabad. In fact, SAARC as
well as the joint India-Pakistan ministerial commission was the product of the period
when Zia was at the helm in Pakistan and Mrs Indira Gandhi had agreed to a series of
meetings with him aimed at improving relations between the two countries.
From a perusal of two leading Indian weekly news journals, The Outlook and India
Today, which carried cover stories on the takeover by Gen Musharraf in Pakistan, it is
obvious that New Delhi allows itself only too often to be misled by misperceptions or
myths of its own making. The Outlook in its write-up accepts, without questioning, the
sweeping generalization that "even the US, which knows of Musharraf's long-standing
links with several fundamentalist groups, is reluctant to isolate Pakistan at this juncture."
This assessment of Pakistan's army chief is not substantiated by whatever is known of his
professional service record and of his personal inclinations. He is generally regarded as a
liberal with no time for any sort of fanaticism. In an interview with a news agency the
other day, he explained his views on religion quite unambiguously. He said: "I am a devout
Muslim and so are we all." He believes that in religion there should be "moderation" and
"tolerance of views of others". He amplified his views further by saying that "Islam should
not be used for personal or political gains; if killings and terrorism were being done in the
name of Islam, they should be avoided as it has brought bad reputation to us as a nation
and harmed it."
A foreign correspondent Jason Burke, who was in Islamabad shortly after the army
takeover, writing for India Today has said that the two major concerns of India and the
West is that "Pakistan might lurch in the direction of hardline Islam and that the nuclear
capability might fall into the wrong hands." However, he categorically rules out both
possibilities. He believes that some senior military men in Pakistan might be devout
Muslims but they are not fanatics by any means. Burke also contends that it was Nawaz
Sharif's "swing towards the right-wing religious parties and his endorsement of the Shariat
Law (that) was one of the reasons for his dismissal by the army." The correspondent sees
no chance of either Pakistan moving towards "hard-line Islam" or the nuclear button falling
into the wrong hands.
To be sure, the US and other western powers continue to be concerned about a
timeframe for the end of military rule in Pakistan. Even while declaring that Washington
would continue to "engage with Pakistan, despite the takeover by the army", US officials
have told newsmen in Washington that the special Pakistani envoy, Sahabzada Yaqub
Khan, now touring various capitals, had been told that the US was eager to see a
timetable for the restoration of democracy and a schedule for national and provincial
elections. This is an issue on which Gen Musharraf might come under increasing pressure
not only from the US but even domestically.
For one thing, there is the question of credibility. While there is no reason to be sceptical
about Gen Musharraf's intention to restore the democratic process after the more critical
problems of economic stability and accountability have been satisfactorily dealt with, it
should not be surprising if the people this time become impatient with military rule sooner
than they did in the case of Ayub Khan and Zia. The political systems that emerged after
Ayub Khan and Zia respectively only left the country in disarray.
The people would not want that experience to be repeated. Gen Musharraf's declaration
that he would want people to be in a position to effectively control their own destiny and
manage according to their own choice their systems of education, medical facilities,
communications, etc, is certainly reassuring. However, too much time should not be lost
before the mechanism for giving a concrete shape to these assurances is put in place.
The dissensions and divisions with which society has been riven after fifty years of misrule
are still there beneath the surface and could be exploited by elements with vested interests
for their own ends if the present democratic deviation is unduly prolonged. The aim of
political parties such as the Pakistan Muslim League and Jamaat-e-Islami to present
themselves to the people as the most deserving wielders of political power is already quite
apparent. Parties such as these would lose no opportunity to be seen as something of the
political underdog. If a political vacuum is allowed to persist inordinately, they might have
their opportunity. |
