Zoltan, re the Gorbachev article: I don't see anything particularly surprising here, although I would have to take a look at the original documents to form a meaningful opinion. In 1989, Gorbachev still hoped Communist leaders could hang on to power by being "good guys," by making themselves popular. The following year, recognizing the inevitable, he presided over the Soviet Communist Party Congress that renounced the Party's constitutionally guaranteed "monopoly of power."
Here's my take on Gorbachev. Let me say I developed it gradually & cumulatively, watching him over the years, especially his performance at Party Congresses; reading his speeches; seeing him deal with people. It is of course a subjective take; we can never be the fly on the wall in someone else's brain, to mix up a metaphor. But it "feels" right to me.
Let me begin with a story. When Gorbachev first came to the States (I think it was in 1986), he gave a press conference for the Washington press corps, which I attended. He sat at this big long table on a stage, with a long row of dour advisors to his left, and another long row of grim advisors to his right. (What an ugly bunch!!) Having never given a Western-style press conference before, Gorbachev started it off by giving a one-hour monologue, hectoring us all about something or other (I forget). Only then could the questions begin, and he answered them in a fashion that I can only call overbearing. One thing I did like about it, though. He didn't know who the "big shots" in the press corps were -- that is, the ones that are used to being deferred to. And when Mary McGrory asked a stupid question, he told her it was a stupid question (hee, hee!).
In any event, Gorbachev then looked like just your typical General Secretary. Within a few years, he seemed a totally different person (and a much more cheerful one), bopping around in crowds, talking to the citizens one-on-one, etc. (Can you imagine Brezhnev doing that? Or Andropov?) The only bad public habit he retained was his tendency to talk too much <sigh>, which made people laugh at him, alas. I tell this story to illustrate the following points:
1) Gorbachev always showed an amazing capacity to develop, and to adapt, but it was always in service to a long-range goal, which he ultimately failed to achieve. That goal was to transform the Soviet Union into a first-rate modern economic power, and to improve the life of its citizens. From the outset, he made it clear that the USSR's traditional heavy investment in defense was an obstacle to achieving his goal. Furthermore, where his predecessors seemed to believe (or pretended to believe) that the West was a threat to the USSR, Gorbachev (who was a congenital optimist, IMO) thought the Western leaders were reasonable people with whom he could deal (to paraphrase Margaret Thatcher). I think he would probably have pursued more or less the same course with regard to the West, no matter who was the American President at the time. But I can't prove it, of course.
2) Another striking thing about Gorbachev was his willingness to take risks. One example -- his deliberate renunciation of many of his own powers. At every crucial turning, Gorbachev had a choice. In foreign policy, he generally made the right choice, at least from the point of view of the West. But they were high-risk choices, in that they made him a lot of enemies at home, especially in the Party. Gorbachev was a genius at out-maneuvering the Party hard-liners,-- up to a point. Many of them suspected Gorbachev was about to bolt the Party altogether, to form, or head, a new Social Democratic Party -- and maybe they were right.
3) Gorbachev's real weakness was that he did not know, or could not grasp, Crane Brinton's law of revolutions: revolutions do not occur when things are really awful, but when they are getting better. In my opinion, at least, Gorbachev truly believed in "glasnost'" and "The New Thinking" and "humanism" and all the rest of it. And he really thought that by giving people some of it, they would be happy. But, no, that's not the way it works: give people some freedom, and they want more...and more. For the most part, he went along with it, even though he got no gratitude for it. But the nationality problem really stumped him (as it would perhaps have stumped pratically anyone). And he ended up being blamed for the collapse of a country that he had hoped to strengthen and preserve.
4) Finally, you had to be there. Gorbachev's personal popularity evaporated pretty fast. But Moscow, in 1998-1990, reflected his personality, his mindset. And it was a much nicer place than it is today. Optimism was in the air; everybody seemed to be looking forward to a "better future." You'd go over to Pushkin Square, and there would be crowds of people standing around, discussing politics for hours on end! Little groups clustered all over the place. All kinds of samizdat newspapers being peddled everywhere. Everybody knew who the bad guys were (the Communists) and who the good guys were (the "Democrats"). The debates in the Supreme Soviet were televised -- and people actually watched them!
Now, what have you got? Sourness, cynicism, political gossip (who's got the goods on whom) rather than substantive political discussion, distrust, resentment, indifference....
Sad...
Joan |
