Russia: The Pendulum of Democracy Swings Away From the West
Summary
Historically, russia has vacillated between two extremes. At one
extreme, russia enclosed itself, separating itself from the rest of
europe on every level. At the other extreme, russia opened itself
to the west, absorbing everything western as superior to anything
russian. Russia has found it very hard to find the middle ground
between the two extremes. Each cycle of westernization hollowed out
russian self-confidence. Each cycle of anti-westernism liquidated
the westernizers, sometimes physically. Russia spent the last
decade in the most extreme spasm of westernization ever experienced
in its history. We would expect the inevitable reaction to be
equally severe. We expect that reaction in the coming decade.
Analysis
It is important to understand that Russia literally turned itself
inside out during the last decade. It is not simply a matter of
learning from the West. For a time, Russian decision-makers gave
more credibility to a Harvard economics professor than to all the
Russian economists. Russians sought to adopt Western party
politics, in spite of the fact that Russia had not been genuinely
democratic in its history. Russia abandoned an empire that had
taken centuries to build, including the spoils of a world war in
which it lost tens of millions of Russians, expecting in return
Western-style prosperity and integration into Western civilization.
The list is endless.
The results are not. Russia achieved, in return, less than nothing.
Where in 1980 it was a poor but feared superpower, in 2000 it is
substantially poorer, weaker and internationally marginalized. The
question of why this happened is entirely academic at this point.
We expect scholars to debate for centuries why Westernization
failed and who was responsible. For us, it is sufficient to note
that the latest Westernization experimentation has failed, and that
this failure is in keeping with what happened in all previous
Westernizing experiments. They always fail. The more extreme the
embrace of the West, the more extreme the later rejection of the
West, and the harsher the fate of Russian Westernizers. The issue
now is to try to map the consequences of this failure.
Gorbachev attempted to initiate a massive reform intended to save
the Communist Party system. He and those Soviets familiar with the
evolution of technology in the West, particularly those charged
with this within the KGB, were painfully aware that the Soviet
Union was slipping hopelessly behind. They also understood that in
order to reverse the situation, the Soviet Union needed a massive
influx of technology from the West.
Gorbachev knew two things. First, while the Cold War raged,
investment and technology transfer were unlikely. Second, unless
there was major reform in Soviet institutions, no amount of capital
or technology could be absorbed. Gorbachev therefore needed to end
the Cold War, convince the West that fundamental reforms were
underway that would prevent the resurrection of the Cold War and
reform Soviet institutions so that the Soviet Union could take
advantage of investment and technology.
Neither Gorbachev nor the relatively sophisticated bureaucrats who
gravitated to him intended to dismantle communism or the party
apparatus. Certainly none of them expected to be forced to withdraw
from Eastern Europe. The thought of the Soviet Union disintegrating
was the farthest thing from their minds. They badly underestimated
the weakness of their own system. They failed to understand that
liberalization of an ossified system creates uncontrollable forces.
By 1989, the situation had spun out of control, and both the party
and the empire collapsed.
Still, there was no revolution - a critical fact missed by most
Western observers. The Soviet Union disintegrated into its
constituent republics with the loss of only the highest tier of
officials. The old guard retained control of the Russian government
and the perestroika economy, and even held the leash of the extreme
pro-Western reformers. With the old system intact, there could be
no sweeping change. Without a revolution, the "new" Russia was
doomed from the start.
The collapse of the Soviet Union and its institutions opened the
door not so much for reform as for theft. In a country that had no
system of private property, no system of legal documentation for
ownership, no impartial judiciary for adjudicating disputes,
property was suddenly "privatized," whatever that meant.
Opportunists seized control. Some were political opportunists, like
Boris Yeltsin. Others were economic opportunists like Boris
Berezovsky. Ultimately, the two classes of opportunists merged into
one. The result was catastrophic.
Westerners completely missed the situation. Most had no idea
whatsoever what was going on, focusing on grand theories of
liberalization based on a foundation of air. Others participated in
the systematic looting of both the Russian economy and Western
investment. In Russia, the distinction between liberalization and
theft became difficult to define, as was the difference between
liberal and thief.
The opposition to all of this was an unimaginative coalition of
Brezhnevites, Stalinists and fascists. An advantage of incompetent
democracy is that the opposition is as ineffective as the
government. Lacking his own political currency, President Yeltsin
approached Russia's problems on a tactical level, appointing a
series of disposable prime ministers appropriate to the crisis of
the moment, as Russia sank deeper and deeper into the morass. The
basic outlines of the opposition remained intact. However, over
time, a new governing ideology emerged to replace the discredited
liberalism.
The first representative of that new ideology was Prime Minister
Yevgeny Primakov, appointed to mollify the communist and
nationalist opposition in the wake of the failure of Sergei
Kiriyenko's economic reforms. Primakov turned against the
oligarchs, backing a series of investigations and indicting two of
the most prominent oligarchs for economic crimes, and he stiffened
Russia's opposition to Western politico-military pressure.
Primakov's political offensive was premature, and he fell victim to
the powerful oligarchs and to Yeltsin's need to secure further IMF
financing.
Primakov's successor, Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin, was the last
gasp of the Yeltsin Kremlin. The decision to sell out Russian
interests in Yugoslavia just to continue juggling IMF debt drew a
cry of "Enough!" from the Russian security apparatus. When future
histories of Russia are written, the Russian army's dash to
Pristina will mark the beginning of the new order - when
nationalists in the Russian military and intelligence community
seized control of the Russian foreign, and eventually domestic,
agenda. The sea change was complete when Stepashin, unwilling to
take appropriate steps to defend Russian territorial integrity in
Dagestan, was replaced by Federal Security Service Director and KGB
veteran Vladimir Putin.
Prime Minister Putin was tasked with one immediate mission: to
stabilize the Russian government and prevent its complete collapse.
Appointed in the wake of Russian humiliation in Kosovo, Putin
understood that two issues remained on the table. The first,
obviously, was the economy. The second was Russian national
security, or to put it more precisely, Russian patriotism. Putin
understood that he could do little about the economy, primarily
because the Yeltsin regime was so intimately tied to the Russian
economic oligarchs. Any attempt at cleaning house would quickly
bring him down. He therefore concentrated on the single area where
he had a degree of control: patriotism.
He launched a war in Chechnya that was designed to do two things.
First, it would draw a line in the sand, showing that Russian
disintegration would stop, no matter what the cost. Second, he
would move Russia into a more confrontational position with the
West, knowing that this strategy would increase his popularity in a
country tired of being treated with contempt. He therefore created
a situation in which he tried to co-opt Russian nationalism for
Yeltsin's regime, building popularity and thereby evading the
economic questions he could not answer.
Like Gorbachev before him, Putin tried to find a solution that
would stave off complete collapse without requiring fundamental
changes. In doing this, he has, like Gorbachev, unleashed forces
that he will not be able to control. The extraordinary popularity
of the war in Chechnya led his faction to a much greater victory
than expected in recent elections. But in unleashing Russian
nationalism, he triggered a process that took on a life of its own.
Russians are far more open to conspiracy theories than the complex
economic and social explanations that might be expected. This is
particularly true, because part of the explanation of events in
Russia can be traced to a conspiracy: the conspiracy of Russian
oligarchs working with Western banks and other institutions. The
theory that Russia lacked the preparation for capitalism does not
resonate nearly as well as the not completely untrue explanation
that foreign elements and their Russian agents combined to weaken,
rob and humiliate Russia. Throw more than a little anti-Semitism
into your explanation and you have a theory that is both satisfying
and, to some extent, true.
Putin, by tapping into Russian nationalism, is trying to stabilize
the political foundations of the regime. But in legitimizing
Russian nationalism at the level of the prime minister's office, he
generates not only a desire to end the disintegration of Russia,
but an inevitable backlash against the West, a backlash aided by
Western moralizing on Chechnya. Now, if the justification for
retaining Chechnya is that it is integral to Russia and is being
subverted by outsiders - with a broad hint that the outsiders are
not just Georgians, but the Georgian's American masters - then a
number of things follow.
First, it follows that if Georgia is the root of the infection,
something should be done about Georgia. Second, if Georgia is
merely the puppet of Washington, then something ought to be done
about Washington. Finally, if Moscow is doing something about
Washington in Chechnya, then Moscow should be doing something about
Washington wherever it is acting against Russian interests. That
obviously includes the other areas of the former Soviet Union where
Western influence is generating threats to Moscow. And it involves
those inside of Russia who have sold themselves to their Western
masters.
In other words, we feel that Russia is primed for another round of
anti-Western frenzy. It is not clear that this could have been
avoided under any circumstances. But Putin's attempt to co-opt
nationalism on behalf of the Yeltsin reformist government both
speeds up the process and guarantees that it will boomerang on him.
Gorbachev tried to save the Soviet Union with internationalism and
lost the Soviet Union. Putin is trying to save the reform
government of Russia with nationalism and will lose that too.
The issue is whether the current constitution will be able to
preside over the witch-hunt that is brewing in Russia over who sold
Russia to the West. We rather doubt it. The constitution has as
much legitimacy as Yeltsin: very little. Moreover, Westerners
confuse the holding of elections with democracy. Russians feel
completely powerless. In the countryside, outside of Moscow and St.
Petersburg, they feel completely alienated from the government,
which is regarded as, at best, irrelevant and at worst, harmful.
The institutional question is, however, irrelevant. Putin or
someone else, under this constitution or some other administrative
form, will have to pay for what was done to Russia. In no other
country could everything have gone to pieces as catastrophically,
without a day of reckoning. The idea that the regime, which
presided over this catastrophe, will continue to govern
indefinitely is preposterous. Now, it is possible that Putin, with
his roots in the KGB and his relations with the military, will be
able to preside over the complete reorientation of the Russian
state. But personalities notwithstanding, the reorientation is
underway.
We expect the reorientation to include a terror. Not only is this
fairly traditional in Russian recoils from the West, but there is
an institutional requirement in this case. Wealth and power is in
the hands of the oligarchs and the Mafia. No new regime can emerge
that does not liquidate these entities. Such liquidation is
impossible through legal means. Russia does not have the
institutions needed to arrest, try and expropriate the Mafia.
Indeed, the Mafia may turn out to be an extremely dangerous
opponent. Although, like all criminal groups they have the weakness
of being easily split by a brutal enemy. But a brutal enemy is the
only thing that will break the oligarchs and Mafia. Therefore,
there will be a terror that will focus on criminals, and then, in
grand Russian style, will sweep on to ensnare entire classes.
Putin, the Gorbachevite, is unlikely to preside over a terror. He
is more likely to engage in a series of partial, stabilizing
measures. The name is unknown of the man who will use Russian
nationalism and xenophobia to unite Russia and crush Westernizers
of all sorts. But he is out there and he will, fairly early in the
decade, make himself known. The complete failure of liberalism in
Russia, its very real victimizations at the hands of Western
schemers and dreamers, makes a massive house cleaning inevitable.
Along with this house-cleaning, of course, will come a new foreign
policy. The frontiers of Russia are irrational. Apart from pure
military geography, a century of empire has created economic
dependencies that were torn apart when the Soviet Union collapsed.
There was a rationale to the old Soviet borders. Now, there is no
doubt there is deep antipathy toward Moscow in many of the former
republics, and deep nationalism supporting a desire for
independence. But there are substantial, if minority, forces in
these countries that want reunification. The remnants of the
Russian security apparatus remain active enough in these countries
that with a powerful, even ferocious, government in Moscow,
resistance can be overcome, in many cases on a voluntary basis.
We do not think this will happen quickly. We expect Moscow to spend
most of the next generation simply trying to rebuild its empire to
the borders of the former Soviet Union. The task will be difficult
and in some cases bloody. Moscow will not become a superpower for
several decades, if by superpower one means the ability to project
forces globally. It will be hard enough to project forces into the
Baltics, Caucasus, Ukraine or Central Asia.
But this campaign holds out economic hope as well. Defense
expenditures can kick-start an economy. Germany went from a deep
depression to an expanding economy in five years between 1933 and
1938. Massive expenditures on defense had a great deal to do with
it. Defense spending, like all public works projects, can increase
economic activity. But defense spending, with its particular
emphasis on advanced technologies, can have sustaining effects on
the economy. At any rate, the Russian economy really has few other
options. Therefore, increased defense spending will probably have a
greater impact on Russia's economy than any other single cause.
Russia's attempt to reconstruct itself will inevitably face
opposition from the United States. A recreated Soviet Union,
however organized, is not in the American interest. The economic
interests pursued by United States in the post-Soviet power vacuum
in both the Caucasus and Central Asia have shown little financial
promise, but great strategic significance. The region's oil promise
may not be panning out, but the desire for Western investment is
serving to keep several countries in the region oriented away from
both Russia and Iran. However, the United States has relatively few
options in the region, particularly if the Russians were to attempt
to use direct force - as they have in Chechnya.
Nevertheless, American hostility to Russian aspirations, while it
may be useful in generating political support in Russia, poses a
problem that Russia will find difficult to deal with alone. The
process of building equilibrium in the international system is of
particular interest to the Russians, who will seek to build a
coalition to limit American power. The central player in that
coalition is China. China is, of course, somewhat more cautious in
allying with Russia, simply because it sees the threat of alliance
as useful in extracting concessions from the Americans.
Nevertheless, we foresee a serious attempt by the Russians to work
with the Chinese, an attempt that we think will be successful.
China has a particular interest in securing Xinjiang from Islamic
influences based in neighboring former Soviet Republics. It is
therefore quite interested in seeing increased Russian presence in
the region.
We can see clearly that Russia is utterly de-synchronized
economically from the rest of the world. It is also deeply involved
in coalition-building designed to limit U.S. strategic power. But
the most fascinating dimension of the next decade about Russia will
be watching it wrestle with its internal demons. The pendulum is
hurtling away from its love affair with the West. We expect the
other swing of the pendulum fairly early in the next decade. The
only question in our minds is how deep and how bloody the house-
cleaning will be.
(c) 1999, Stratfor, Inc.
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