CAG drops a bombshell on DRDO
December 17, 1999
Josy Joseph in New Delhi
Finally, it is the turn of the Defence Research and
Development Organisation, the cash-rich developer of
military technology and weapon systems, to answer some
embarrassing questions.
An extensive audit of some of the important DRDO
projects undertaken by the Comptroller and Auditor
General of India for period ending March, 1988 has
brought to light investments running into billions that
are unlikely to yield desired results. Hidden away from
the media glare and public scrutiny in the name of
national interest, projects of DRDO have always been
carried out in utmost secrecy.
Consider these findings of the audit:
* Though the DRDO has spent almost Rs 20 billion on the
ambitious Light Combat Aircraft project, the Indian Air
Force is currently looking for foreign alternatives. The
Indian Navy too, having lost all hopes of getting a
naval version of the LCA, is planning to acquire MiG-29s
for a new aircraft carrier that is being built at
Cochin.
* After spending several billions of rupees on building
an Air Surveillance Platform and other related systems,
the project is on the verge of being rendered redundant
as the IAF and the navy are importing their own Airborne
Warning and Control System.
* Development of the multi-barrel rocket launcher system
(Pinaka) too has failed to meet the defence requirements
and the time frame specified. A disgusted army is
proposing to acquire Russian manufactured MBRL system.
* Add to this yet another humiliating failure: a
two-decade old project to develop the Indian Army's main
battle tank 'Arjun' has almost been shelved. The army is
now planning to buy T-90s from Russia.
While the Arjun tank shame was already out, the CAG
audit has thrown up several fresh questions about the
achievements of DRDO.
True, in missile technology the organisation has made
credible progress. Its achievements in nuclear
technology too are well acknowledged. But then, it is a
well documented fact that missile technology is among
the most common and simplest of military technologies.
In fact, Indian scientists were ready for the next round
of tests in 1974.
According to the report, which was tabled in Parliament
on December 14, the government has pumped in close to Rs
20 billion in the development of the Light Combat
Aircraft without any major breakthrough.
"The LCA, which was scheduled to replace the ageing
Indian Airforce fleet in nineties, is still at the
development stage and is facing many uncertainties," the
CAG has said. The LCA development at the Aeronautical
Development Agency (ADA), Banglore, a subsidiary of DRDO
"has been beset with delays for almost every vital
component of the aircraft," the report says.
The project, initiated in 1983 is behind the schedule by
almost a decade, and "as per present indications and the
ministry's optimism, the LCA can not be expected to be
inducted, if at all, before 2005."
Pointing out that a frustrated air force has lost all
hope of inducting the LCA into its fleet, the CAG has
said the IAF is seeking interim "measures to cover the
shortfall in force level by upgrading the MiG Bis with
the help of a foreign firm at Rs 2,135 crore."
The reports also points out that the development of
airframe by ADA; multi-mode radar by HAL and Electronics
and Radar Development Establishment; flight control
system by Aeronautical Development Establishment; Kaveri
engine by Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE); and
digital electronic engine control jointly by HAL and
GTRE "are all lagging behind the schedule with no amount
of certainty about their expected date of satisfactory
development and final cost of development."
Any of these "falling further behind or failing to meet
the required quality is likely to jeopardise the LCA
programme in terms of time costs."
The air frame model that the ADA is presently working on
is "heavier than what has been specified in the air
staff requirements and the aerodynamic configuration too
is not acceptable to the air force. These (factors) are
likely to affect the performance of the aircraft with
reference to the qualitative requirements."
The cost too has overshot several times. The original
estimate of Rs 5.6 billion has "overshot approximately
four times to Rs 21.88 billion for the first phase of
the project. Phase II is yet to be sanctioned."
The report says that the delay in the LCA programme has
"compelled the air force to exercise other options to
fill the gap in the force level. The Defence Ministry
concluded a contract for upgradation of 125 MiG Bis with
their manufacturer at a cost of US $ 626 million,"
A contract was also concluded in November 1996 for
import of 40 Sukhoi-30s from Russia at a cost of Rs
61.30 billion to "minimise the adverse impact of delay
in development of LCA on the combat force level of the
Air Force."
The development of an Air Surveillance Platform, which
would be capable of providing continuous, comprehensive
and long-range air defence cover against low-level
attacks, began 1985 with when a feasibility study was
carried out. The study was completed in 1991 and the
same year the government kicked off the ASP programme.
"ASP programme undertaken at a cost of Rs 6,080 million
is running behind schedule by over three years and will
be ready for demonstration only by the turn of the
century. The main attributes of the technology
demonstrator ASP being developed have fallen short of
the projected requirements of the services in the area
of endurance, speed, altitude and detection range," the
CAG report has said.
"The ASP being developed is based on the rotodome
approach, while the AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control
System) which the government proposes to acquire soon,
use array approach. The advanced technology of the
imported system would render ASP being developed
redundant," the audit has warned.
While the air force had pointed as early as in 1992 that
the specifications meant for ASP were not likely to meet
the air staff requirements, the defence ministry in
February 1999 claimed the ASP "was not meant to meet the
requirements of users but was aimed at demonstrating the
technology by utilising the only viable platform."
However, the CAG report points out that the ASP
"development programme was taken up as a first step
towards the development of full fledged AWACS, the need
for which was projected by the services in early 1980s."
Since 22 months would be required for the first
demonstration of ASP after the primary radar was fully
developed "the ASP would be ready for demonstration only
by the end of 2000, provided all the sub-systems are
ready by 1998." Even if developed, the ASP would "fall
short of the qualitative requirements projected by the
services way back in 1984. Moroever, the qualitative
requirement of the services based on which the ASP
programme had been launched would be outdated due to
technological advancements in the field."
The air force had in 1996 finalised the import of first
batch AWACS with technology transfer package leading to
indigenous development of subsequent systems. The AWACS
is "based on different platform which uses phased array
inside a fixed rotodome," which is different from the
platform of ASP. This too can render the ASP redundant.
The CAG has also termed "questionable" the wisdom of
DRDO top brass to sanction the development of a second
sub-system for ASP programme based on rotodome
technology on HS-748 aircraft in May 1997 at a cost of
Rs 100 million, when the IAF had already contracted
AWACS for a different technology.
The story of multi barrel rocket launcher system
(Pinaka) too is not very different. The Defence Ministry
had in 1981 decided to induct regiments equipped with
this launcher from 1994, but it still remains a distant
possibility.
"Far from reaching the production stage, DRDO is yet to
develop the various critical components of the system
despite an expenditure of Rs 420 million against the
original sanction of Rs 260 million and revised sanction
of Rs 4,040 million. The re-revised expected date of
completion of development is end 2000 with re-revised
cost of around Rs 800 million," the report says.
Only seven out of the 29 general staff qualitative
requirements had been met in the trials. Some of the
qualitative requirements, which had not been fully met,
viz range, area that can be neutralised, fire power,
loading time of salvo and deployment time are crucial
for the desired level of performance, the CAG has said.
While the development and selection of the launcher
vehicle for the system is yet to be completed, the
loader-cum-replenishment also yet to be approved despite
splitting it into two separate vehicles. "The combined
vehicle took up to 40 minutes to load one salvo in place
of the designed four-five minutes," the report points
out.
Further, the development of the command-post vehicle has
also been delayed due to selection of an inappropriate
chassis, which "did not match the mobility of the
launcher vehicle." Thus, all the three important
vehicles, necessary for launching the rockets, loading
and replenishment and command had not been developed
more than 11 years after the project was sanctioned.
Though there was a requirement of eight types of
warheads for the rockets, the Armament Research and
Development Establishment and High Energy Material
Laboratory had developed only three. "Even out of these,
one was not acceptable to the army," the report says.
If the army had Pinaka with it during Kargil, the
casualties among the Indian soldiers could have been
much lower, army sources believe. They said MBRL systems
can pulverise an area of 500 sq metres in no time.
In the wake of Kargil, the army is reportedly going
ahead with the purchase of MRBL systems from Russia.
This could spell doom for Pinaka.
The story of MBT 'Arjun' is no different either. The
controversy had hit headlines a couple of years back,
and today the army is all set to finalise the contract
for purchasing T-90 tanks from Russia.
Though no body in DRDO is ready to comment on the audit
report, a senior defence ministry bureaucrat said: "They
are trying to build from nothing. It will take too much
of labour, too much of money, and may be a lot of time."
He said CAG audit is a "very simplified way of looking
at the complex set up of DRDO." |
