WCII: Microsoft/WinStar to Deliver Broadband Services--Reiterate STRONG BUY Deutsche Banc Alex. Brown - US Equities Bo Fifer,Jeffrey L. Hines
HIGHLIGHTS: -- WinStar announced (15-Dec) a convertible preferred investment of $900 million by a Microsoft-led group. Deal highlights value of fixed wireless in driving high bandwidth to the masses, and the new applications that will ride over the new high speed network.
-- WinStar gains valuable strategic partner (perhaps the one element lacking from the Win Star story until now), and the ability to co- brand its local services with Microsoft. We view WinStar as a clear leader in the CLEC arena, and wonder how long the market's extreme discount relative to its peers can last.
-- Management expects "only" approximately $20M of revenue in 2000 from this new relationship, but we have now identified approximately $50M of revenue incremental to management's guidance of $650M (in line with our $700M estimate).
-- Office.com and international operations remain SIGNIFICANT hidden assets.
-- NET-NET: We are raising our 12-month price objective on WCII to $81/share from $73/share, based on our DCF. Maintain STRONG BUY rating.
DETAILS: Almost one year to the day after WinStar announced its ground-breaking deal with Williams for long haul fiber, today (15-Dec) Win Star announced a $900M investment from a group led by Microsoft. Microsoft will invest $250 million, along with approximately $150 million from Bill Gates' investment vehicle, Cascade Investments, and other financial investors.
We have raised our 12-month price objective for WCII by $8 to $81/share based on our DCF. Generally, we expect the opportunity for greater bandwidth services to result in greater revenue per sub and overcome the dilutive effects of the deal.
Investment Details The preferred carries a 5.75% coupon, paid in-kind, common, or cash at Win Star's discretion (they'll pay in-kind, at least for now). The stock is non-callable for 3 years and the investment group at day one will own 13% of Win Star's fully diluted shares (and growing), including approximately 6% by Microsoft/Gates.
The convertible preferred stock carriers a $67.50 strike price representing a 25% premium to WinStar's 30-day moving average (and in line with other recent wireless CLEC deals). Two of the financial investors will receive board seats. We are unaware of any board-level participation from Microsoft or Cascade.
Why Microsoft Makes Sense? We have long considered software companies to be among the five industries likely to have a strategic interest in the wireless access carriers (WACs) such as WinStar. Driving broadband access to the mass market (as Win Star and the other WACs are doing) should lead to an explosion in the demand for new applications that make use of that bandwidth. Who better to capture that demand than the world's largest software manufacturer?
Moreover, we believe this deal, on top of Microsoft's recent investment in Teligent, signifies a strong desire on the part of Microsoft to crack the new applications market by pushing bandwidth further out to the edge of the network. Under such conditions, Microsoft--and their carrier partners-- benefit from a new generation of distributed applications. We still believe, however, that wireless carriers remain attractive assets to at least four other groups, including long distance carriers, CLECs, ISPs, and foreign telcos, and nothing in this deal with Microsoft would preclude another company from acquiring/partnering with Win Star.
Wireless is important because running a 10 Mbps LAN and serving applications remotely (off-site) only makes sense if the user can extend that 10 Mbps pipe out to where the applications reside. In other words, a small/medium business with dial-up access (or even, say T1 access at 1.544 Mbps) will not be able to access the applications without delay relative to the current LAN model. The internal 10 Mbps pipe is connected to an external 1.5 Mbps pipe, which is over 6 times slower (and over 66 times slower than popular Fast Ethernet technology!).
Because we believe WinStar can drive broadband access to the largest segment of the business market at speeds of up to 155 Mbps today (55% faster even than Fast Ethernet), we believe the network computing model may in fact be DEPENDENT on wireless in buildings unserved by fiber or other high speed media (into which category the overwhelming majority of buildings fall).
Strategic Backing Secure The one area in which WinStar was arguably NOT a market leader was on the strategic front (unless you consider the efficient wireless assets to be strategically important, as we do). With Microsoft as a strategic partner, that is no longer the case. Nextlink has Craig McCaw/Forstmann Little, Teligent has Microsoft, Advanced Radio has Qwest, and now Win Star has Microsoft.
In addition to WinStar's strong strategic partner, the Company is very strong financially with well over $2.5 billion of available capital to build out the domestic and international networks, or to restructure the (admittedly messy) balance sheet. We believe WinStar now has sufficient CASH to last well into 2001 and more than enough capital inclusive of the Lucent facility to fund operations to free cash flow sometime in 2002.
We should also emphasize that WinStar retains the right to co-brand its offering with Microsoft, which could potentially lead to greater subscriber growth. Also, as new broadband services get deployed, the demand for broadband access should grow and revenue per customer should accelerate.
Recognizing The Value WinStar has built a "blueprint" off of which we believe other successful nationwide CLECs will run their own operations. WinStar has assembled the various components of a nationwide local network--wireless access, local access fiber, local backhaul fiber, long distance fiber, and now a global presence--which should enable the Company to drive on-net performance (and gross margins). Yet WCII has historically traded at a discount to the CLEC group, which generally has a LESS well-developed network/customer base. With investors beginning to reward management, strategic, and financial differentiation, we believe WinStar will ultimately be recognized as an industry leader.
Company/Group EV/Access Line EV/Gross PP&E EV/2000E Revenue WinStar $15,400 5.0x 11.7x Nextlink $38,600 12.2x 27.4x CLEC Group $17,300 6.9x 13.2x Source: Company data, Deutsche Banc Alex. Brown.
Even after the $1.5 billion of market capitalization added to the Company post today's announcement, WinStar continues to trade at a discount to its peer group, despite its clear leadership position.
Will Voice Or Data Drive These Models? No question in our mind: data. Today we (and we believe the Street) have a voice-centric model that tracks access line growth. Moving forward, we believe data services will be the key driver of this (and the other wireless CLEC) stocks. More important will be the average bandwidth demand per customer and average revenue per customer. Bundled services will likely include local, long distance, data, and maybe multimedia, but delivered over a much different network. We look forward to incorporating the data opportunity more appropriately into our model, but for now view these services as largely incremental to our model (and our targets!)
"Hidden Assets" Perhaps Deserve Some Attention We have identified Office.com as a potentially significant source of upside potential to our model. It is interesting to note that Office.com's closest comparable (VerticalNet) trades at a $4 billion-plus market capitalization. A similar valuation on Office.com--which we expect Win Star to take public early in 2000 as market conditions permit--would imply $16/share of INCREMENTAL potential upside to our target even AFTER taking a 40% tax haircut.
Of course, basing private Internet company valuations on public market levels may not be appropriate, but whatever the value, we are confident it is higher than the $0 in our model!
WinStar's international operations also represent $0 of value in our model (although we suspect the Street has built some impact from this business into the stock price). We expect to explicitly account for international operations in 2000 in advance of what we believe could be a significant ramp in 2001.
NET-NET Management indicated that the Microsoft relationship could account for perhaps $20M of revenue in 2000--or only a 3% boost to management's $650M guidance. However, we continue to believe our estimate of $700M is well within reach, given the recently signed deals with Cignal and Microsoft, and a favorable outlook for Office.com advertising revenue--which we believe account for $50M of incremental revenue to the official guidance. That alone would get us to $700M.
We have adjusted our model in two ways: we have increased our out-year (2002 and beyond) revenue per subscriber forecasts as a result of greater bandwidth demand associated with new applications. We also believe that the Microsoft brand, if implemented, could result in higher sales but we have not explicitly accounted for this potential. We have also incorporated the (fairly significant) dilution from the convertible preferred shares. We have assumed conversion after 3 years, for a total of 15.6 million new, dilutive shares. We have not made significant changes to our model in 2000 or 2001.
The net effect of the deal is to raise our 12-month price objective by $8 to $81/share. We are maintaining our STRONG BUY rating.
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