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To: afrayem onigwecher who wrote (446)12/22/1999 10:50:00 PM
From: StockDung  Respond to of 924
 
MILBERG WEISS BERSHAD
HYNES & LERACH LLP
WILLIAM S. LERACH (68581)
DARREN J. ROBBINS (168593)
600 West Broadway, Suite 1800
San Diego, CA 92101
Telephone: 619/231-1058
619/231-7423 (fax)

SPECTOR & ROSEMAN, P.C.
ROBERT M. ROSEMAN
2000 Market Street
12th Floor
Philadelphia, PA 19103
Telephone: 215/864-2400
215/864-2424 (fax)
- and -
ELLEN GUSIKOFF STEWART (144892)
DIANE P. DOHERTY (175350)
600 West Broadway, Suite 1800
San Diego, CA 92101
Telephone: 619/338-4514
619/231-7423 (fax)

Attorneys for Plaintiff

[Additional counsel appear on signature page.]

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WESTERN DIVISION

STEVEN T. MOORE, On Behalf of ) No. [SACV98-400 AHS(EEx)]
Himself and All Others Similarly ) [filed May 6, 1998]
Situated, ) CLASS ACTION
)
Plaintiff, )
) COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATIONS OF
vs. ) THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT
) OF 1934
SHOPPING.COM, INC., ROBERT J. )
McNULTY, DOUGLAS HAY, WALDRON & CO. )
and CERY PERLE, )
)
Defendants. ) Plaintiff Demands A
___________________________________ ) Trial By Jury

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INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

1. This is a securities fraud class action on behalf of all

persons who purchased the common stock of Shopping.com, Inc.,

("IBUY" or the "Company") between November 25, 1997 and March 26,

1998, inclusive (the "Class Period"), alleging violations of the

anti-fraud provision of the federal securities laws against IBUY,

its senior executives and the investment banking firm which

together with IBUY's senior executives manipulated the trading

price of IBUY's shares.

2. IBUY holds itself out as an innovative Internet-based

electronic retailer that markets an immense selection of brand name

consumer and commercial products at low prices via its website

using state-of-the-art proprietary technology. During the Class

Period, the defendants, including IBUY, its senior-most officers

and directors and its underwriter Waldron & Co. ("Waldron"),

participated in a scheme and wrongful course of business to

manipulate the price of IBUY stock, which scheme included: (i)

defendant Waldron's refusal to execute sell orders; (ii) the use of

illegal stock parking; (iii) the use of illegal above-market buy-

ins to intimidate and dissuade potential short sellers from selling

IBUY stock short; (iv) the sale of IBUY shares to discretionary

accounts without regard to suitability; and (v) the dissemination

of materially false and misleading statements about IBUY's

operating performance and its future prospects. The defendants'

scheme in connection with and subsequent to the Company's November

1997 initial public offering ("IPO"), enabled the defendants to

raise $11.7 million by selling 1.3 million IBUY shares to the

public at $9 per share and thereafter drive the price of IBUY's

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stock to an all time high of over $32 per share in March 1998. The

defendants engaged in this illegal scheme in order to bring IBUY

public and thereafter avoid a total collapse in the price of IBUY

stock as the truth about the Company's misconduct came to light.

3. As part of defendants' scheme to avert a collapse in

IBUY's stock price, once the Company became public, Waldron

employed various illegal tactics which included fraudulent refusals

to execute customers' sales orders, stock parking and forced buy-

ins at prices more than 50% above IBUY's trading price. The effect

of these illegal practices was to stimulate artificial activity in

the stock and manipulate its price. As a result of this

coordinated manipulation by the defendants, the market

capitalization for IBUY, a company with minimal sales and a

history of losses, came to exceed $200 million.

4. In order to successfully complete IBUY's IPO, the

defendants needed to prime the market about IBUY's success prior to

and in connection with the issuance of the prospectus for IBUY's

IPO. To this end, IBUY secretly arranged to sell $250,000 of

product to Waldron as part of defendants' effort to have IBUY post

revenue growth prior to IBUY's planned IPO. IBUY also made a

series of announcements of hires and the execution of agreements

with several companies to help promote the Company. Each of the

very positive statements which accompanied these announcements were

designed to foment interest in the Company and its planned IPO.

Additionally, the defendants hoped that this would result in future

investors valuing IBUY as a "growth stock," allowing it to trade at

huge multiples of revenues. However, the defendants also realized

that they had to take IBUY public quickly as its existing business

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was weak and that IBUY was not and could not internally generate

the rate of growth needed to drive the Company's stock price once

it became public.1

5. On November 25, 1997, IBUY completed its IPO, selling 1.3

million shares at $9 per share, for proceeds of $11.7 million.

Following the IPO, the defendants continued to hype the Company and

its prospects, issuing false and misleading information about: (i)

IBUY's newly implemented marketing campaign, which purportedly was

attracting substantial additional traffic to the Company's website;

(ii) IBUY's implementation of a new business model which

purportedly would allow IBUY to "grow rapidly while maintaining no

physical inventories resulting in lower costs than traditional

retailers"; (iii) IBUY's execution of a marketing agreement which

would enable the Company to tap into the $120 billion a year

automotive after market; and (iv) the launch of IBUY's national

radio campaign. In conjunction with the issuance of the false and

misleading information by defendants, defendant Waldron and others

employed a sophisticated market manipulation scheme designed to

control transactions in IBUY stock in order to manipulate the

market price of IBUY so that it would continue to trade at

artificially inflated levels. As a result thereof, the defendants

were able to manipulate the price of IBUY as it rose from its IPO

____________________

1 To assist in preparing the Registration Statement, IBUY also
hired counsel who held tens of thousands of IBUY shares in order
to avoid having a thorough due-diligence investigation of IBUY
and its operations completed in connection with the Company's
IPO.

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price of $9 per share to over $32 per share in a little over three

months.2

6. However, contrary to defendants' positive statements

concerning IBUY's operations, customer base and prospects (and

despite the defendants' manipulation of IBUY's stock price), the

true facts began to emerge as the Securities and Exchange

Commission ("SEC") announced on March 25, 1998 the suspension of

trading of the Company's stock on suspicions of stock manipulation.

In a press release it was reported that:

On March 24, the Commission temporally suspended,

pursuant to Section 12(k) of the Securities Exchange Act

of 1934, over-the-counter trading of the securities of

IBUY, Inc. (IBUY), of Corona Del Mar, California. The

suspension is effective from 9:30 a.m. (E.S.T.) On March

24, 1998 to 11:59 p.m. (EDT) on April 6, 1998.

The Commission suspended trading, temporarily,

because of concerns that there was a lack of current and

accurate information regarding the securities of IBUY due

to recent market activity in the stock that may have been

the result of manipulative conduct. (Rel.34-39786)

7. On March 26, 1998, another bombshell was dropped on

IBUY's shareholders when Kristine Webster, the Company's Chief

Financial Officer, stunned investors, disclosing that 23% of the

____________________

2 The actual price of IBUY stock is subject to debate, as
Waldron has charged short sellers seeking to deliver borrowed
shares at prices that are 50% higher than the current trading
price of IBUY shares in the open market. This tactic has been
used to "punish" short sellers and intimidate potential short
sellers from even attempting to sell IBUY stock short. As of
April 13, 1998, quoted trading prices for IBUY shares are
illusory as no broker/dealer is willing and able to make a market
in IBUY stock.

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Company's revenues since the inception of its business had not been

obtained from the sale of product to third party customers, but

rather via Waldron's purchases of computer equipment and other

office equipment valued at more than $250,000! This was not

disclosed to the investing public in IBUY's Prospectus or any other

IBUY public filing. The reaction to these shocking revelations was

swift and severe. Despite defendants' continued efforts to

manipulate IBUY stock by refusing to sell shares for customers who

had ordered the sale of such shares, IBUY lost 30% of its value,

falling from $30 to $21.

8. Each of the positive statements about IBUY's business

made during the Class Period was materially false and misleading

when issued, and failed to disclose, inter alia, the following

adverse information which was then known only to defendants due to

their access to internal IBUY data:

(a) Since the inception of its business, 23% of the

Company's revenues had come via sales of computers and other office

equipment to Waldron, the primary underwriter of IBUY's IPO;

(b) IBUY began the IPO process with Waldron before it

had ever closed a sale. As part of the IPO underwriting

arrangement between defendant IBUY, its CEO and COO and Waldron,

Waldron secretly arranged to purchase $250,000 in product from

IBUY, thereby enabling IBUY to post substantial pre-IPO revenue

growth;

(c) The price of the Company's stock following the IPO

was being manipulated by defendants as a result of defendant

Waldron's utilization of fraudulent sales practices including

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refusals to execute customer's sales orders, stock parking and

other manipulative practices;

(d) IBUY was, in fact, having difficulty attracting

customers and providing a high enough level of safety for them to

buy;

(e) IBUY was not generating sufficient revenue to

support the 1998 revenue numbers claimed by defendant Waldron in

connection with IBUY's IPO;

(f) IBUY's revenues were not meeting the Company's

business plan and, as a result, the Company was not achieving the

earnings which were projected in IBUY's planning reports;

(g) The Company's revenues are actually "pass-through"

in nature and post-costs of goods sold income more accurately

represents the Company's revenues. Therefore, net sales for the

nine months ended October 31, 1997 were $18,841 as opposed to the

$376,822 reported;

(h) As a result of the foregoing, defendants did not

believe that IBUY would continue to sustain sequential earnings

growth and defendants' publicly made forecasts that IBUY would

achieve sequential earnings per share increases in the fourth

quarter of 1997 and beyond were known by defendants to be false as

such earnings per share were impossible to achieve in light of

these undisclosed problems; and

(i) The publicly made forecasts of IBUY's sequential

earnings growth were false and were not genuinely believed by the

defendants, as they were aware of the adverse information set forth

above which contradicted these forecasts.

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JURISDICTION AND VENUE

9. Jurisdiction is conferred by õ27 of the Securities

Exchange Act of 1934 ("1934 Act"). The claims asserted herein

arise under õõ10(b) and 20(a) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5.

Venue is proper in this District pursuant to õ27 of the 1934 Act.

10. IBUY is a California corporation with executive offices

and its principal place of business located at 2101 East Coast

Highway in Corona Del Mar, California. Defendant Waldron has

offices in this District. The individual defendants reside in

and/or conduct business in this District. The defendants' acts

giving rise to the causes of action alleged herein occurred within

this District.

THE PARTIES

11. Plaintiff Steven T. Moore purchased 350 shares of IBUY

stock on March 17, 1998 at $23.21875 per share and was damaged

thereby.

12. Defendant IBUY is incorporated in the State of California

and maintains its principal place of business in Corona Del Mar,

California. IBUY began operations in February 1996, and commenced

selling on the Internet on July 11, 1997. The Company is an

Internet-based electronic wholesaler/retailer specializing in

retail marketing of a broad range of top brand-name consumer

products and services at wholesale prices to both consumer and

trade customers. Utilizing proprietary technology, the Company

designed a fully-scalable systems architecture for the Internet

shopping marketplace. The Company's strategy is to become a

dominant low-price leader in "wholetailing" on the Internet by

utilizing the warehousing, purchasing and distribution strengths of

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multiple manufacturers and distributors. As of January 9, 1998,

IBUY had approximately 4 million shares outstanding. During the

Class Period, IBUY shares were actively traded on the NASD OTC

Electronic Bulletin Board, even though it met NASDAQ OTC

requirements.

13. Defendant Robert J. McNulty ("McNulty") was, at all

relevant times, the President and Chief Executive Officer of IBUY

and a member of its Board of Directors. Because of his position

with IBUY, McNulty knew the adverse, non-public information about

its business, finances, products, markets and present and future

business prospects via access to internal corporate documents

(including IBUY's operating plans, budgets and forecasts and

reports of actual operations compared thereto), conversations and

connections with other corporate officers and employees, attendance

at management and Board of Directors' meetings and committees

thereof and via reports and other information provided to him in

connection therewith. McNulty knew or recklessly disregarded that

the statements particularized herein were false and misleading when

made and would affect trading in IBUY securities and/or would

create a false and misleading appearance with respect to the market

for IBUY securities before the truth about its products and

financial condition was revealed to the public. In October 1995,

McNulty settled an action brought by the SEC, consenting to a

judgment providing for a civil penalty, which included disgorgement

of his illegally obtained profits from a prior fraud. Defendant

McNulty participated in the fraud complained of herein despite the

injunction which prohibits him from violating the antifraud

provisions of the federal securities laws. In fact, because of

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defendant McNulty's prior shenanigans, Waldron was compelled to

sell IBUY shares only to certain qualified investors, i.e., those

who made certain threshold earnings and asset requirements and only

after having such persons execute required documentation.

Defendant McNulty prepared, reviewed and signed the false

Registration Statement and Prospectus.

14. Defendant Douglas Hay ("Hay") was, at all relevant times,

the Chief Operating Officer of IBUY and a member of its Board of

Directors. Because of his position with IBUY, Hay knew the

adverse, non-public information about its business, finances,

products, markets and present and future business prospects via

access to internal corporate documents (including IBUY's operating

plans, budgets and forecasts and reports of actual operations

compared thereto), conversations and connections with other

corporate officers and employees, attendance at management and

Board of Directors' meetings and committees thereof and via reports

and other information provided to him in connection therewith. Hay

participated in the scheme complained of herein and knew that the

statements particularized herein were false and misleading when

made and would affect trading in IBUY securities and/or would

create a false and misleading appearance with respect to the market

for IBUY securities before the truth about its products and

financial condition was revealed to the public. Defendant Hay

prepared, reviewed and signed the false Registration Statement and

Prospectus.

15. Defendant Waldron purportedly was founded in 1939. In

fact, Waldron was a near-bankrupt shell when acquired by defendant

Cery Perle and his cohorts in 1996. Waldron is a California

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corporation, and was at all relevant times a securities

broker/dealer and purported NASD member with its principal place of

business located at 100 Bush Street, San Francisco, California.

Waldron claims to be a full service banking and brokerage firm,

focusing its corporate finance efforts in Southern California's

high technology community. Waldron maintains offices within this

District. Defendant Waldron was the lead underwriter for the

Company's IPO and issued analysts' reports on IBUY during the Class

Period.

16. Defendant Cery Perle ("Perle") is and was at all relevant

times the principal officer of defendant Waldron and a primary

participant in the scheme complained of herein. Defendant Perle

controlled Waldron in fact and was a control person of that firm

pursuant to õ20 of the 1934 Act.

17. During the Class Period, the defendants, individually and

in concert, directly and indirectly, engaged and willfully

participated in a fraudulent course of business to misrepresent the

results of IBUY's operations, and to conceal adverse material

information regarding IBUY as specified herein in order to sell 1.3

million IBUY shares in IBUY's November 1997 IPO. The defendants

employed devices, schemes, and artifices to defraud, and engaged in

acts, practices, and a course of conduct as herein alleged in an

effort to increase and maintain an artificially high market price

for IBUY shares. This included the formulation of, making, and/or

participation in the making of untrue statements of material facts,

and the omission to state material facts necessary in order to make

the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they

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were made, not misleading, which operated as a fraud and deceit

upon plaintiff and the other members of the Class.

DEFENDANTS' MOTIVE TO
PARTICIPATE IN THE SCHEME TO DEFRAUD

18. Each defendant had the opportunity to commit and

participate in the fraud. Defendants Hay and McNulty were the top

officers and/or directors of IBUY and they controlled its press

releases, corporate reports, SEC filings and its communications

with analysts. Thus, they controlled the public dissemination of,

and could falsify, the information about IBUY's business, products,

financial results and future prospects that reached the public and

impacted the price of its stock.

19. Each of the defendants also had the motive to commit and

participate in the fraud. Completing IBUY's IPO was extremely

important to defendants McNulty, Hay, Waldron and Perle because

prior to becoming a publicly traded company, these defendants had

received warrants and preferred stock so that they stood to obtain

huge benefits if the defendants could complete the IPO and keep the

price of IBUY stock inflated through 1998. These defendants also

participated in the scheme in order to cover up the problems with

and deterioration in IBUY's business to make it appear as if IBUY's

business was succeeding and achieving the strong growth they had

forecasted prior to the IPO, so that its stock would trade at

artificially high levels, high enough so that they could sell their

IBUY stock once the "lock-up" period expired. These defendants

also were motivated to conceal the serious problems IBUY was having

in attracting new customers in an attempt to maintain IBUY's

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competitive position in its markets, which was increasingly

impaired by aggressive competitors.

BACKGROUND TO CLASS PERIOD

20. On July 15, 1997, the Company announced through defendant

McNulty the hiring of Mark S. Winkler as Chief Information and

Technology Officer of the Company who would be responsible for the

management of the Company's proprietary computer systems and

ensuring that the web-based retailer "remains on the cutting edge"

of Internet commerce.

21. The Company announced on July 16, 1997 that it had

retained Waldron to assist the Company with financing, strategic

acquisitions and the management of a possible IPO.

22. In August of 1997, the Company issued Series B Preferred

stock. First it sold 8,333 shares of its Series B Preferred stock

in a private placement at a price of $3 per share to Webster (CFO

and Secretary). In connection with this offering, Webster was

issued five warrants to purchase 4,166 shares of common stock with

an exercise price of $3 per share as well as registration rights

providing for one demand and unlimited piggyback registration

rights.

23. Also in August 1997, 193,167 shares of Series B Preferred

Stock were issued. In connection therewith, five-year warrants

were issued to purchase 96,583 shares (including those issued to

Webster) of common stock with an exercise price of $3 per share as

well as registration rights providing for one demand and unlimited

piggyback registration rights. The Series A and Series B Preferred

Stock issued and outstanding prior to the Company's IPO were

converted into common stock in connection with the IPO.

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24. On August 26, 1997, the Company announced that it had

signed an agreement with CitySearch (which was co-founded by Bill

Gross who is Chairman of the Board of the Company), a market

innovator in providing community-based on-line information services

for the Web. The announcement stated that CitySearch would provide

"shopping cart" tools, customer credit authentication and

verification, coordination with the merchant that an order has been

placed, communication with the customer when the order will be

shipped, collection of payment from the user and disbursement of

payments to the merchant. CitySearch planned to develop, manage

and monitor the electronic commerce program, select customers for

participation in the pilot program, as well as market the program

through it's Austin CitySearch Website.

25. On September 15, 1997, En Pointe Technologies, Inc. ("En

Pointe") made an investment in the Company by purchasing $600,000

worth of subordinated notes. The Company issued 399,600 warrants

to purchase the Company's common stock at $2.25 per share. As a

result of these warrants being issued with an exercise price of

less than fair market value of similar warrants, the Company

announced it would recognize additional financing costs of $299,700

over the nine-month term of this subordinated note with the

unamortized portion at the closing of the IPO being expended

immediately.

26. On September 16, 1997, the Company announced through

defendant McNulty the hiring of Dr. Ogden M. Forbes as Chief

Knowledge and Research Officer of the Company, who would be

responsible for researching electronic commerce trends, tracking

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the competition and providing corporate representation to both the

media and the Government.

27. On September 29, 1997, the Company announced that it had

selected En Pointe to be its exclusive supplier for computer

hardware, software and peripherals under a five-year agreement.

Under the agreement, the Company would use the computing equipment

for their internal infrastructure as well as for resale to their

Internet customers. In exchange for the five-year license, the

Company gave En Pointe 250,000 shares of the Company's common stock

valued at $3 per share, and agreed to pay an annual maintenance and

upgrade fee of $100,000.

DEFENDANTS' FRAUDULENT SCHEME

28. On or about November 25, 1997, defendants completed

IBUY's IPO, selling 1.3 million shares of IBUY common stock at $9

per share, via a Registration Statement and Prospectus which was

prepared, reviewed and/or signed by defendants McNulty and Hay.3

All of the shares were being offered and sold via defendant

Waldron.

29. Concealing that almost 25% of IBUY's total revenue from

its inception had been obtained via the "sale" of product to

Waldron and claiming that the offering price of IBUY shares

reflected "the results of operations of the Company in recent

periods" as well as "estimates of the business potential of the

Company" the Registration Statement and Prospectus stated:

____________________

3 Following the IPO, IBUY had 4,002,000 shares outstanding.
This figure includes the conversion of Series A and B Preferred
Stock into 1,286,500 shares of common stock. The 1,286,000
shares are subject to a 12-month "lock-up" period following the
date of the IPO.

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The Company anticipates that sales from the Company's Web

Site will constitute substantially all of the Company's

sales.

30. The Prospectus also discussed the emergence of commerce

on the Internet and the potential positive impact on the Company.

It cited a report by International Data Corporation which estimates

that the number of users accessing the Web will grow from 28

million in 1996 to 175 million in 2001 and that the amount of

commerce conducted over the Web will increase from approximately

$2.6 billion in 1996 to $220 billion in 2001.

31. IBUY's Registration Statement and Prospectus were false

and misleading. The true facts were that IBUY had obtained much of

its pre-IPO revenue by arranging with Waldron, the underwriter of

IBUY's planned IPO, to buy $250,000 worth of equipment from IBUY as

part of defendants' efforts to cause IBUY to show revenue growth.

32. On January 12, 1998, the Company announced that it had

entered into an 18-month agreement with @Home Network, the "leader"

in high-speed Internet services via cable, which, according to the

press release, "will give [the Company] a significant presence as

a shopping supplier, offering over one million brand name products

on the @Home service." The agreement consisted of a "broadband

strategic promotion of [the Company] across @Home Guide pages, Home

page and other areas on the @Home Network." The press release

further stated that:

"In addition to conventional Internet access, web

shoppers will soon have high-speed, direct access to

IBUY's Superstore through @Home service," stated Douglas

Hay, Chief Operating Officer at IBUY. "We are very

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excited about the @Home opportunity. During the first

three days of our promotional program on @Home, we

achieved more 'hits' from @Home to our site than we

received from customers using the AOL browser."

33. On February 3, 1998, the Company announced financial

results for the third quarter ended October 31, 1997, reporting net

sales of $321,281 as compared to $55,541 reported for the second

quarter ended July 31, 1997; a net loss of $1.3 million or $.19 per

share compared to a net loss in the quarter ended July 31, 1996 of

$726,000 or $.21 per share. Commenting on the results defendant

McNulty stated:

"We began selling products on our Web site on July

11, 1997, these results reflect the progress achieved

without significant advertising in the quest to capture

additional sales in the exploding Internet marketplace.

. . . Our business model allows us to grow rapidly while

maintaining no physical inventories resulting in lower

operating costs than traditional retailers. Since the

completion of our public offering in November, we have

implemented a marketing campaign to attract additional

traffic to our website, established more vendor

relationships, made key management additions and are

making IS improvements to handle substantially higher

volumes of sales orders."

34. On February 9, 1998, the Company announced that it had

signed an agreement with Profit Pro, Inc. for the use of that

company's cataloging software which will look up auto parts on

IBUY's website. The software will allow web shoppers to search for

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an auto part and receive a part number with a price. The press

release stated:

"We are pleased to be part of the $120 billion

automotive after-market as the agreement with Profit Pro,

Inc. gives our customers the convenience of shopping for

their auto parts on-line without the hassle of calling or

driving around to parts stores and enforces our goal of

being a one-step online shopping center to Web consumers.

We will continue to expand and strengthen our

relationship with vendors like Profit Pro Inc. to offer

even larger selection of merchandise," stated Bob

McNulty, Chief Executive Officer at IBUY.

35. On February 10, 1998, the Company announced that it had

signed a two-year marketing and distribution agreement with En

Pointe, a provider of information technologies and services. Under

the agreement, En Pointe'



To: afrayem onigwecher who wrote (446)12/22/1999 10:53:00 PM
From: StockDung  Respond to of 924
 
Word Search Results For: wall and broad Equities
Click the Red high-lighted links below to go to that section of the filing (or click HERE to go directly into filing.)

SHOPPING COM filed this 10QSB on 12/22/1998.

ons, convert the balance owed under the Secured Promissory Note, principal and interest, into shares of the Company's Common Stock. The warrants have an exercise price of $7.00 per share and a term of three years. DATE TITLE AMOUNT (23) (a) December 1998 Warrants to purchase 490,385 shares Common Stock (b) Wall & Broad Equities acted as a finder and will receive from the Company 2% of the total price per share paid by Swartz pursuant to the Regulation D Common Stock Private Equity Line Subscription Agreement (hereinafter referred to as "Private Equity Line of Common Stock and Warrants Pursuant to Regulation D"). (c) The warrants were issued to Swartz Private Equity, LLC ("Swartz") in considerati
nvert the balance owed under the Secured Promissory Note, principal and interest, into shares of the Company's Common Stock. The warrants have an exercise price of $7.00 per share and a term of three years. DATE TITLE AMOUNT (23) (a) December 1998 Warrants to purchase 490,385 shares Common Stock (b) Wall & Broad Equities acted as a finder and will receive from the Company 2% of the total price per share paid by Swartz pursuant to the Regulation D Common Stock Private Equity Line Subscription Agreement (hereinafter referred to as "Private Equity Line of Common Stock and Warrants Pursuant to Regulation D"). (c) The warrants were issued to Swartz Private Equity, LLC ("Swartz") in consideration for Swartz ent
e Market Price of the Common Stock" shall mean, for the relevant period, (x) the average closing bid price of a share of Common Stock, as reported by Bloomberg, LP or, if not so reported, as reported on the over-the-counter market or (y) if the Common Stock is listed on a stock exchange, the closing price on such exchange on the date indicated in the relevant provision hereof, as reported in The Wall Street Journal. 7. Transfer to Comply with the Securities Act; Registration Rights. --------------------------------------------------------------- (a) This Warrant has not been registered under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, (the "Act") and has been issued to the Holder for investment and not with a view to the distribution of either the Warrant or