John,
This whole frontal assault against jumbo Kohl and these rather pathetic allegations about bribery and corruption with CDU fund raisers are just a pretext.... What's really at stake is the future assertiveness of Germany vis-a-vis its European partners, an ailing euro, and Kohl's Euro-friendly legacy that must be disparaged by the rising neo-Junkers.
KOHL's wangles: the real story.....
A Tale of 2 Germanys: Assertiveness vs. Reserve
By John Vinocur International Herald Tribune
PARIS - These days, there are two Germanys again. One is the Germany of assertiveness, the Germany of Chrysler, of Rolls-Royce, of Random House. The other is the Germany of deference, of Chancellor Helmut Kohl's willingness to rein his country to a walk for what he sees as the sake of Europe. Fifty-three years after the end of World War II, this attitude of enforced reserve is still present, but it is no longer a certainty, a constant that reflects the universal instincts of the German people.
Both Germanys were visible during a remarkable week in which Daimler-Benz reached out to capture Chrysler, and Mr. Kohl, in order to avoid a blow-up between France and Germany, abandoned German goals on how to run the new European Central Bank.
For most of the world, the Daimler-Chrysler deal and the maneuvering between Volkswagen and Bayerische Motoren Werke for Rolls-Royce brought neither indignation nor dread. National symbols of two of the victorious powers of World War II were coming under the control of the once ancestral ogre, and whole industrial sectors being rearranged, but at the most elemental level it was all just business. In Stuttgart or Detroit or Crewe, England, the deals seemed like normal stuff, not aggression.
But there was another lesson entirely in the German reaction to the chancellor's about-face on the no-shortened-term formula he had said for months was needed to ensure the independence and respectability of the new bank. Here, German interests, according to German public opinion, had not been adequately defended; the economic giant/political dwarf juxtaposition no longer fit the times.
Mr. Kohl was accused in the German media of giving way, the German man-in-the-street's view about his decision appeared negative or embarrassed, France and President Jacques Chirac were cast as short-sighted villains, and the chancellor's already slim chances for re-election in September were further written off.
Just as much as the takeovers accurately reflected German business' assumption that they could be made without great stir in a world that now regards Germans without special heat, Mr. Kohl's decision appeared to misread Germany's mood in considering one more time that his country's case had to be subordinated to a greater notion of European cooperation.
A participant from a smaller country at the meeting, talking privately last week, said he felt that the chancellor had 'sacrificed himself for Europe.' But he added he did not fully understand why. He said Mr. Kohl had the support of almost every other delegation in the room and that no one could have regarded him, a founder of the single currency, as anything but a defender of the bank's autonomy if he had fought on.
In fact, Mr. Kohl had become caught between his own versions of basic truths.
First, he had signaled to Germany that electing Wim Duisenberg, a Dutchman, to an eight-year term as the bank's first president was the only certain way of getting the euro up and running under German rules, and keeping traditional German monetary policy running business in Europe. In a country that instinctively feels it has no good reason to give up the Deutsche mark, Mr. Kohl's essentially nationalistic promise relied on this notion: We will not be giving up control over our money. Besides, Germany was defending a narrow reading of the Maastricht treaty, not demanding Polish territory.
But when he collided with obstinate French opposition, Mr. Kohl had to choose between his own creeds. One is that Germany is now a normal place, with special historical obligations, but hardly encumbered to the point of being unable to project its national interests less vigorously than its partners. The other is that he is the spiritual heir of Konrad Adenauer and committed to melding Germany into a united Europe.
As it turned out, Mr. Kohl picked an old-style European solution, rejecting the normalcy of defending what he defined in the previous weeks as the national interest. Instead, he chose to allow France to win an important victory in limiting Mr. Duisenberg's term and designating Jean-Claude Trichet as his successor for eight years.
Either the chancellor judged German sentiment very poorly, and told the country in effect it was not yet normal enough to fight openly on Europe's future even when everyone except France was on its side; or he felt he should act in line with some personal notion of history. Whatever the explanation, his decision was not what Germany wanted to hear.
Now, the country appears increasingly likely to elect a new chancellor who appears totally at ease with the type of assertiveness that has brought American and British industrial treasures, their car manufacturers and publishers, to German buyers. Gerhard Schroeder, the Social Democratic candidate, not only has been a member of Volkswagen's supervisory board as premier of the state of Lower Saxony, and personally active in its international expansion, but he has made it clear that he would not be limited in running German foreign policy to Mr. Kohl's sense of the appropriate.
A deferential approach concerning Europe, and France in particular - now criticized so sharply by German public opinion that it has upset the French government - is just not the way Mr. Schroeder talks. 'I would like to see the policy that Mr. Kohl has represented, that we're Europeans because if we weren't the others will be afraid of us, run its course,' he says.
Mr. Schroeder acknowledges the French-German relationship as irreplaceable, but describes it as 'this policy that lives on in this obligatory way.' His assertiveness has led him to say that Britain should be part of a European leadership triangle. It is hard to see how much of a role outside the monetary union Britain can play in the Continent's internal skirmishing, but Mr. Schroeder may find close relations with Prime Minister Tony Blair an effective lever in decoupling German policy from situations like the one in which Mr. Kohl backed down in the face of Mr. Chirac's opposition.
As it turned out, Mr. Chirac may have gauged the chancellor correctly, but he totally missed the turn in the wider German attitude. When it comes to understanding Germany, according to Brigitte Sauzay, a former interpreter for President Francois Mitterrand and Mr. Kohl, France appears autistic, so deep can the separation be from the deepest currents of reality.
When he was asked what Mr. Kohl should have done instead of accepting a deal and confirming what he called 'the worst possible fears' about the new bank, Otto Graf Lambsdorff, a former German finance minister, appeared to touch the pulse best. 'Leave,' he said.
From:
iht.com |
