China's New Naval Strategy
Summary
In the first exercise of its kind, the Chinese People's Liberation
Army/Navy (PLAN) conducted maneuvers involving several small
missile craft more than 250 nautical miles from the Chinese
mainland. Although the PLAN has openly aspired to develop an ocean-
going capacity, most of its efforts have focused on acquiring a
larger number of major surface vessels capable of long-range
deployments. It seems that now, faced with an unstable security
environment and an uncertain economy making it difficult to
purchase new major surface combatants, the PLAN may have found a
way to utilize its fleet of small attack craft as an effective and
less costly - though less capable - interim solution.
Analysis
A formation of Chinese light combat vessels recently engaged in a
combined naval exercise more than 250 nautical miles from the
country's coast, reported the Jiefangjun Bao newspaper Jan. 17. It
was the first time these types of vessels - including fast guided-
missile ships, escort vessels, submarine chasers and corvettes -
had conducted exercises outside coastal waters.
To understand Chinese naval strategy, it is important to have a
general understanding of naval strategy. The primary strategic aim
of a navy is to defend a nation's shores. As economic and strategic
interests increase, the navy's role expands to include power
projection capabilities. The evolution of the PLAN has followed
this pattern almost exactly. It has been, and still is, limited to
a coastal defense role. However, it has slowly enlarged its ocean-
going capability. This is a function of a new strategic focus for
the Chinese military.
In the late 1990s, the Chinese military shifted from a doctrine
concerned with a defensive ground war to a doctrine based on a more
balanced, flexible and smaller military able to operate outside of
territorial waters. This new doctrine concentrates on force and
force projection rather than simply on national defense. The
centerpiece of this emerging doctrine has been the PLAN, which in
the past had been regarded as the least important among all the
services.
Several factors contributed to this strategic shift. Paramount
among them is a sense of unease throughout region, including
economic fluctuations, an unclear picture of the U.S. commitment to
the area and uncertainty over the emerging Japanese role in the
region. A second factor affecting China's military strategy is
energy security. China is the largest consumer of oil outside of
the United States. China will need to rely more on imported oil to
sustain its economic growth. Much of this oil is transported by
sea, thus the increased importance of safeguarding sea lines of
communication (SLOC). A third factor is an inherent need for China
to achieve regional military supremacy to assert authority over
neighboring states. Two classic examples are the breakaway province
of Taiwan and the strategic and potentially mineral rich Spratly
Islands.
China's ability to address the above factors hinges on the PLAN's
force structure. The PLAN has over 1,100 warships, more than three
times the number of ships in the U.S. Navy. However, unlike the
U.S. Navy, the PLAN, aside from its submarine force, is more geared
toward a coastal defensive role. It consists of only 54 major
combatants, such as destroyers, frigates and submarines
[http://www.stratfor.com/services/giu2000/012600b.ASP], accounting
for only 5 percent of the total number of ships. The rest of the
navy consists of patrol craft, mine-warfare vessels and a small
amphibious force.
In the short term, the PLAN is developing a "green water"
capability, meaning the ability to operate out to the first island
chain - all areas to the west of a line running from Japan, the
Senkaku islands, Taiwan and the west coast of Borneo. By 2020, the
PLAN aims to have the ability to expand this force into a "blue
water" capable navy, a force able to assert control over the second
island chain, including areas west of the Kuril Islands down to the
Mariana islands and Papua New Guinea.
[http://www.stratfor.com/services/giu2000/012600a.ASP]
Inside the green water line, PLAN strategy would need to focus on
controlling and interdicting sea lanes. Out to the blue water line,
the PLAN would need to expand its air defense and anti-submarine
capabilities as the capacity increases for the United States or
another navy to concentrate and cut off the PLAN from the mainland.
To move from a green line to blue line strategy, the PLAN is
procuring major surface combatants. It is steadily increasing
domestic warship production and importing sophisticated vessels and
armaments from Russia. China is constructing a new 6,000-ton
destroyer to succeed its largest current warship. In November 1997,
China signed a contract with Russia to purchase two Sovremenny-
class destroyers with an option for a third. China has reportedly
begun an aircraft carrier program. It could build its own carrier
or modify two existing mothballed carriers, the Ukrainian Varyag
carrier and the Russian Minsk bought by Chinese companies for non-
military purposes.
However, with China's uncertain financial situation, coupled with
the rapidly deteriorating security situation in the region, China
may not be able to wait until these new capital ships are fully
mission capable. This may have been the main driving force behind
the small vessel exercises. It gives China the ability to project
forces out to the first island chain. In particular, most of the
PLAN's newest small attack craft are being assigned to the East Sea
Fleet, which has operational responsibility for the seas around
Taiwan. This means that not only does the PLAN demonstrate it has
the ability to extend its reach, it also demonstrates that the PLAN
is developing its sea interdiction in the event of future
interventions by the U.S. Navy around Taiwan.
Still, for small warships to be effective in future wars at sea,
they must have the logistical support to enable them to move to and
sustain themselves in the open sea. This means that, as was the
major focus of this recent exercise, the fast attack fleet needed
to conduct re-supply, repair and refueling methods at sea. It
leaves the fleet virtually anchored to the mainland by a long
tether of extremely vulnerable lightly armed or unarmed re-supply
vessels. In this scenario, the tactical realities of a long supply
tail may outweigh the strategic necessity of the PLAN to extend its
reach.
Nevertheless, in utilizing the small vessels, the PLAN has created
a model for an interim solution to power projection. Even though
the PLAN may have demonstrated its ability to operate out to the
first island chain, it still lacks the ability to directly engage
any sizable ocean-going force while operating at such a distance.
Until its major warship production or procurement is increased, the
PLAN is still tied to the mainland.
(c) 2000, Stratfor, Inc. stratfor.com
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