To: cody andre who wrote (15758 ) 1/15/2000 8:08:00 PM From: George Papadopoulos Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 17770
That is the reason he was there probably. I also heard the Albanian army has benn officialy renamed the Bloods (the Crips are in Kosovo)...LOL Trans-Balkan Pipeline Complicates U.S.-Turkey Relations 14 January 2000 Editor's note: This text has been corrected. The original said the pipeline would end in the Albanian port of Durres. SUMMARY U.S. relationships with Turkey and the Caucasus are now challenged by the United States reviving interest in a plan to construct an oil pipeline from Bulgaria to Albania. Implementation of this proposed pipeline would circumvent reliance on Turkey as a route for oil transport. In pursuing the economically advantageous trans-Balkan pipeline, the United States may be overlooking its strategic relationship with Turkey. ANALYSIS The United States is pursuing contradictory policies in the Caucasus, which could injure Washington?s carefully cultivated relationship with Turkey. The United States is reviving a plan from last summer to help finance preparations for a trans-Balkan oil pipeline that circumvents Turkey. Completion of the pipeline would expand U.S. influence in the Balkans by providing economic support while simultaneously avoiding expenses tied to a proposed oil pipeline through Turkey. Until this initiative, U.S. policy in the Caucasus has been clearly aimed at bolstering the region against Russia. The United States has consistently supported Georgia, albeit minimally, in order to maintain Western influence. However, now that Georgia is being drawn into issues surrounding Russia?s war against the Chechen rebels, the United States faces increased difficulty in retaining its power in the Caucasus without risking a total break with Moscow. The United States has relied on its NATO ally, Turkey, to help extend U.S. military and political interests into the Caucasus, especially in Georgia. By maintaining influence in this part of the world, the United States reaps economic and strategic advantages while securing the region?s loyalty to the West. Now that Georgia is threatened by Russia and the war in Chechnya the United States only can offer the country moral and fiscal support. It therefore needs Turkey to intervene, which has already begun to do so. For example, Turkish President Suleyman Demirel is scheduled to meet with Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze on Jan. 14, seemingly to guarantee that Georgia?s loyalties lie with the West in advance of the upcoming CIS summit in Moscow. Through decades of significant military, political and economic aid, the United States has fostered a mutually beneficial relationship with Turkey. In recent years, the United States has strongly supported the development of a Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline from the Caspian port city in Azerbaijan to a Mediterranean port in southern Turkey. Such a pipeline would benefit Turkey significantly, but the project has encountered many complications, preventing it from getting off the ground. The expense alone ? $3 billion and climbing ? is keeping oil companies away. On top of that, the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline would traverse undeveloped territory, with little pre-existing infrastructure to support its construction and operation. Potential investors have also worried about the possibility of a resurgence in Kurdish violence. While this project is delayed by lack of concrete financing, the United States has turned to more realistic pipeline projects, and a policy that could reduce Turkey?s incentive to further U.S. goals in the Caucasus. Interest for the trans-Balkan project was renewed in a Jan. 12 meeting of international oil investors, U.S. Eximbank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the World Bank and the U.S.-based Albanian-Macedonian-Bulgarian Oil Company (AMBO). The pipeline would begin in the Bulgarian Black Sea port city of Burgas, cross through Macedonia, and end in the Albanian Adriatic port of Vlore. An expert panel will convene in March to discuss a $980,000 feasibility study for the project. AMBO will pay $392,000 and the U.S. government, under the Trade and Development Agency?s leadership, will contribute the remaining $588,000. Despite existing U.S. commitments to Turkey and the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, the trans-Balkan pipeline, expected to cost $826 million, is by far a better investment. It would be built on territory that either already has infrastructure or plans on developing it regardless of the pipeline project. And, it would enable Central Asian and Caucasian oil to be transported all the way to Western Europe. By giving the Balkans an economic boost, this project would secure U.S. alliances and influence in the region. Finally, the trans-Balkan pipeline would avoid not only Russia, but also the environmental complications of transporting oil through Turkey?s Bosporus Strait. By following a policy that so contradicts the U.S. relationship with Turkey and the Caucasus, the United States is costing Turkey money and thereby taking away some of Turkey?s incentive to work together in the Caucasus. Attempting to win influence in the Caucasus through pipeline promises, the U.S. fails to realize that Turkey?s strategic importance is far more valuable than it was several years ago. While the United States is making an advantageous economic decision, it is overlooking its crucial strategic relationship with Turkey.