To: the Chief who wrote (1685 ) 2/9/2000 12:14:00 AM From: CIMA Respond to of 1996
Drug Cartels Forced to Rethink Trafficking Routes Summary The recent seizure of 9.7 tons of cocaine in Chile, the third largest haul in history, has law enforcement officials focusing their interdiction efforts on the Southern Cone of South America. The additional scrutiny on new routes for shipping drugs means that the Southern Cone will likely experience an increase in drug- related violence and crime, and that the drug cartels will eventually look for new exit points from South America. These new routes could result in narcotics eventually flowing through countries less willing to cooperate in counter-narcotics efforts with the United States. Analysis On Jan. 16 law enforcement officials seized cocaine valued at about $500 million in the Chilean Pacific port of Arica. The bust in Chile is evidence of what anti-drug officials have suspected for some time now: Drug cartels are using Chile and Argentina as transit points for shipping narcotics to Europe and the United States. Although it costs more than using a direct route, traffickers believe it to be a less risky method of shipment. Traffickers have gravitated toward Chile because shipments with a Chilean inspection stamp arouse less suspicion and are less likely to be searched by customs agents. A 1999 State Department report said that Argentina and Chile are being used by drug cartels for transit points due to the clean reputations of those countries. The added cost of shipping narcotics via a less direct route is more than compensated for by the loss of fewer shipments, especially given the tremendous profit margins involved. The Arica seizure confirms that this is the cartels' new strategy for attempting to avoid law enforcement efforts. It is likely to cause law enforcement assets to focus more attention on the Southern Cone. Anti-drug agencies have already taken steps in that direction. In 1999 the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) began training an Argentine counter-narcotics unit known as the Northern Border Task Force. This elite unit is charged with intercepting drug shipments flowing through Argentina from Brazil, Paraguay, Peru and Colombia. The most immediate result of this additional pressure will be drug- related crime and violence. Stepped up enforcement activities will bring customs and anti-drug units in direct contact with traffickers. Faced with this eventuality, traffickers will react first by resorting to bribery and then using violence to protect their routes and shipments. Drug cartels often overcome legal entanglements by first offering money. If this is not enough to secure cooperation, then the threat of physical harm is used. As the cost of doing business in the Southern Cone increases, drug chieftains will likely look for less expensive routes - often, these are the ones that offer the least resistance. Using the Southern Cone demonstrates that cartels can easily afford the added cost of shipping drugs indirectly. Further, drug lords don't balk at the prospect of paying thousands of extra dollars in bribes to get drugs past customs. However, cartel chieftains cannot tolerate losing multi-million dollar shipments, the end result of more law enforcement activity in the Southern Cone. At some point the cartels will decide to cut their losses and adopt a new strategy. In part, this new strategy will undoubtedly entail avoiding - as much as possible - counter-narcotics activities of the United States in South America. U.S. assistance is an integral part of counter-narcotics efforts in Latin America. The United States has assets and funding that Latin American countries do not possess to fight the drug war. In order to avoid losses to law enforcement activities, traffickers are likely to shift activities to transit countries that are less cooperative with the United States, such as Venezuela. Relations between Washington and Caracas are certainly not openly hostile; however, there are signs of growing tension. Venezuelan Foreign Minister Jose Vicente Rangel recently criticized the U.S. ambassador over comments made by U.S. Under Secretary of State for Latin America Peter Romero directed against the administration of President Hugo Chavez. Immediately after Romero's inflammatory remarks, Chavez himself made pointed retorts Feb. 2 about the international community respecting Venezuela's sovereignty. An incident more directly related to poor counter-narcotics cooperation between the United States and Venezuela occurred last May when a U.S. counter-narcotics aircraft was denied access to Venezuelan airspace. Chavez was sending a message to the United States that Venezuela will be responsible for guarding its own borders without interference from Washington. This same sentiment was reflected recently when Chavez refused to allow U.S. troops on Venezuelan soil to aid in disaster relief operations. The government accepted material assistance, but declined the offer of U.S. soldiers to lend a helping hand in cleaning up after mudslides and flooding devastated parts of the country. Additional law enforcement activity in the Southern Cone region will cause cartels to re-think their trafficking routes. But this will not happen immediately. Until it does, Argentina and Chile will have to endure the problems associated with drug trafficking. Increased trafficking activity in the Southern Cone will bring the same corruption and violence that plague Colombia and other traditional transit countries. If drug lords stay true to form, they will undoubtedly seek the path of least resistance in transporting narcotics. With relations between the Washington and Caracas increasingly tense, Venezuela could become the next target country for shipping drugs out of South America. (c) 2000 WNI, Inc. stratfor.com __________________________________________________ SUBSCRIBE to FREE, DAILY GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE UPDATES by clicking onstratfor.com UNSUBSCRIBE FROM THE GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE UPDATES (GIU)stratfor.com or send your name, title, organization, address, phone number, and e-mail to alert@stratfor.com ___________________________________________________ STRATFOR.COM 504 Lavaca, Suite 1100 Austin, TX 78701 Phone: 512-583-5000 Fax: 512-583-5025 Internet: stratfor.com Email: info@stratfor.com ___________________________________________________