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To: baystock who wrote (49060)2/15/2000 5:10:00 AM
From: d:oug  Respond to of 116759
 
Ram, I see two issues here, one small and one huge.

<<If Ashanti fails, there is a clause in the 1994 prospectus that
the mine's lease reverts back to the Ghanaian government.>>

Rather than an <<Ashanti fails>>, the Ghanaian government can identify
<<Goldman Sachs and its colleagues in conflict of interest, plunder, and fraud>>
and take NOT the path of nationalization, but cut lose any obligations
to Goldman Sachs et al and accept in another foreign party to join
into the mining of the land of their country.

But, <<Goldman Sachs, be left holding the bag from the Ashanti mess:>>
might have a big Sugar Daddy, called U.S.A. to prevent that thru having
the price of gold sink lower and lower and .....

The <<Ashanti mess>> is small potatoes to what is possible, as stated in the
follow past article. In my words, its that phrase "too big to let fail."
But that which is too big is not Goldman Sachs, but the USA dollar,
as in lose its world reserve status and become # 2 after the Euro.

THE GREATEST CON: THE RUBIN DOLLAR

By Reginald H. Howe
www.GoldenSextant.com
February 8, 2000

...the Rubin dollar was based not on real gold
but on a new creation of the Treasury Department's
Exchange Stabilization Fund: virtual gold.

gold banking - dangerous to facilitate too much gold lending.

gold banking on an ever-shrinking percentage of gold reserves.

It amounts to the exponential creation of virtual gold

... resurrection of gold could well spell the demise
of the currency built on -- and billed as -- virtual gold.

Broadly speaking, the ESF has misled everyone who holds
dollars as to their true value relative to gold. As a
result, the world is awash in dollars -- both dollar
currency and dollar-denominated debt. Should a rush to
convert all these dollars to gold ever begin, it is
unlikely to end until an expression known too well to
Alexander Hamilton and the other Founding Fathers takes
a new form: Not worth a Rubin.



To: baystock who wrote (49060)2/15/2000 12:09:00 PM
From: IngotWeTrust  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 116759
 
TY, Ram 4 URL. Pls add this to it: Fair Use, etc. Emphasis mine!
2000/02/9 [03:17 PM EST]
Ashanti undone by rogue shareholder

Ashanti Goldfields has seen its refinancing plans thrown into disarray after the Ghanaian High Court supported an application by rogue shareholder Adryx Mining & Metals for an exceptional general meeting (EGM), the effect of which could topple the Ashanti board. Adryx, headed by former Ashanti director Jean Claude Gandur, has expressed a vote of no confidence in Ashanti's current board which it blames for leading the group into near bankruptcy. Adryx has a 4% to 5% holding in Ashanti.

The $83/oz recovery in the gold price last year left Ashanti's hedge book some $570m under water. This was after 17 counter parties called in their margins on the group's forward sales. In addition, a working capital shortfall left Ashanti unable to post cash to realise the margins. To remedy this position, the company negotiated a deal in which it would trade margin free for a three-year period. In return, Ashanti offered a corporate restructuring plan aimed at securing the future viability of the company and the issue of five-year warrants over 15% of the company's shares. Meanwhile, Ashanti put into motion a $100m bridging loan to feed its working capital shortfall as well as the rollover of existing debt facilities.

In addition, the Ghanaian government (which has roughly a 20% stake in the company and a golden vote) pressed for the sale of 50% of Geita, Ashanti's prize gold prospect situated in Tanzania, to raise much needed capital. Barrick is thought to have been ready to buy Geita for about $200m (it has been valued at $400m) and may have put up a further $100m to finance development. However, this and other bids have been temporarily halted as the Ghanaians are prevented from selling its assets or raising additional finance until the EGM has been held, an event set to take place within three weeks.

The news is bound to disappoint a number of suitors for Geita thought to include South African gold producers Anglogold and Gold Fields as well as Canada's Placer Dome. However, Gold Fields chairman, Chris Thompson said the freezing of Ashanti's assets merely delayed the sale of Geita. He believed the Ghanaians were desperate for cash and would have to sell the mine "sooner or later". Ashanti's CEO Sam Jonah said at the Cape Town conference, "Investing in African Mining" [also held Feb 4, 2000 weekend] that binding ofers for Geita would be submitted by the month-end.

Ashanti confirmed the Ghanaian High Court had upheld the application but said it had not received a copy of the court order. "A further announcement will be made in due course once the Court order has been received," the company said yesterday.

Adryx welcomed the High Court ruling. Spokesman for the shareholder group, Michael Martineau, said: "The door remains open for Ashanti and we would be pleased to have further meetings with them.
However, we are determined to see change and see it quickly for the benefit of all stakeholders." The prospect of the EGM effectively halts Ashanti from exercising any influence over its own financial affairs.

These developments could have important implications for Ashanti's roll-over hedge position which will lapse before the EGM takes place. According to market speculation, Ashanti would then have to declare a force majeur over its affairs leaving main hedging counter party Goldmann Sachs to carry the can. It is thought that Goldmann Sachs recent foray into the physical gold market, inspiring the recent surge in the gold price, was prompted by this prospect.

So where does Ashanti go from here? The crucial question is whether it will survive the battering that it has received from its forward gold sales program through a complex mixture of derivatives. No-one outside the inner circle of 17 bank creditor rocket scientist staff understand the options and future positions. The Adryx camp estimates that total liabilities on the positions range between $850m and $1.1bn. But sources close to the Ashanti camp, say that the mine covered 2-million ounces on Friday [2/4/2000] and that was what set the gold rush going. So without confirmation from Ashanti or the creditors, the figure is guesswork.

By: David McKay & Neil Behrmann

MY COMMENTARY:

As I read this, these thoughts emerge:
1) Goldman who was loaned 8mil gold oz by our own F/R back in September is definitely the Bullion Banker on the biggest hook and their link with Ashanti. This is no longer speculation via this article.

2) Goldman might have been acting in their own behalf, perhaps in buying back to replace some borrowed gold???, i.e., a "partial return" agreement of physical gold to the F/R, due to this transaction.

You ask: how did I arrive at hypothesis #2?
Simply this:
The Ghanian Court Ruling in favor of Adryx, froze all financial matters as pertained Ashanti's hedgebook assets. This ruling was 2/9

Buying of physical gold whether by Ashanti as "rumoured" or by Goldman Sachs as claimed in an above article occured on Friday (2/4) prior to the court ruling.

There is always lag time between filing for "injunctive relief" by Adryx and Court Ruling. Would be interesting to me to find out WHEN Adryx filed their petition in relationship to WHEN Goldman started buying gold 2/4/2000.

3)Goldman helped Ashanti in some manner by facilitating a 2mil oz PHYSICAL BUY x average of $300 per T/oz for a gross of $600 mil on a $570 underwater hedgebook? Prior to the ruling issuance.

4)Goldman did a W.A.G. as cocky as they are, as to their expectation that the Ghanian court would NOT rule in favor of "rogue Adryx" and got their head handed to them in a flash by an angry Ghanian Gov't branch, i.e., the "Court Ruling."

Folks, the numbers do NOT add up:
Either the 10 mil gold oz short is correct or it is not.
Either the 570 mil oz hedgebook shortfall(out?) is correct or not.
Either the physical gold is bought or not.
Either the 100 mil bridge loan to Ashanti is still available or not
Either Geita gets purchased at firesale prices or not...but THAT won't be resolved until at least ONE bidder submits his firm's binding bid by end of Feb.
Either physical gold will be purchased to settle the margin calls or not
Either a $ amount will be negotiated instead of gold purchase or not.
Either this situation will go from a short term to a long term debt or not.

One thing is for sure:
Buying back an underwater short position OR purchasing new gold to replace borrowed gold negatively affects SOME type of Ashanti ASSET account, and that has been forbidden until an EGM is held.

Maybe Bob Johnson can dig up what Geita's "costs" to mine per oz are going to be, when the victor gets the Geita spoils. Then, based upon whether that is near term accretive to the victorious Geita winner, we can all pile into the stock of said victor when Geita gets flipped in March.

Anyone want to get a pool started on which of the biggies gets to play with Ghanian Govt and Geita Spoils?

I'll kick in the first nugget and put it down on Anglo...

O/49r