This is the overview from the unclassified version of the Cox Report:
hillsource.house.gov
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Important Note: This declassified report summarizes many important findings and judgments contained in the Select Committee's classified Report, issued January 3, 1999. U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies within the Clinton administration have determined that other significant findings and judgments contained in the Select Committee's classified Report cannot be publicly disclosed without affecting national security or ongoing criminal investigations.
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A. The People's Republic of China (PRC) has stolen design
information on the United States' most advanced thermonuclear weapons.
The People's Republic of China (PRC) has stolen classified design information on the United States' most advanced thermonuclear weapons. These thefts of nuclear secrets from our national weapons laboratories enabled the PRC to design, develop, and successfully test modern strategic nuclear weapons sooner than would otherwise have been possible. The stolen U.S. nuclear secrets give the PRC design information on thermonuclear weapons on a par with our own.
The PRC thefts from our National Laboratories began at least as early as the late 1970s. Significant secrets are known to have been stolen, from the laboratories or elsewhere, as recently as the mid-1990s. Such thefts almost certainly continue to the present.
ú The stolen information includes classified information on seven U.S. thermonuclear warheads, including every currently deployed thermonuclear warhead in the U.S. ballistic missile arsenal.
ú The stolen information also includes classified design information for an enhanced radiation weapon (commonly known as the "neutron bomb"), which neither the United States, nor any other nation, has yet deployed.
ú The PRC has obtained classified information on the following U.S. thermonuclear warheads, as well as a number of associated reentry vehicles (the hardened shell that protects the thermonuclear warhead during reentry).
In addition, in the mid-1990s the PRC stole from a U.S. national weapons laboratory classified thermonuclear weapons information that cannot be identified in this unclassified Report. Because this recent espionage case is currently under investigation and involves sensitive intelligence sources and methods, the Clinton administration has determined that further information cannot be made public without affecting national security or ongoing criminal investigations.
The W-88, a miniaturized, tapered warhead, is the most sophisticated nuclear weapon the United States has ever built. In the U.S. arsenal, it is mated to the D-5 submarine-launched ballistic missile carried aboard the Trident nuclear submarine. The United States learned about the theft of the W-88 Trident D-5 warhead information, as well as about the theft of information regarding several other nuclear weapons, in 1995.
The PRC has stolen U.S. design information and other classified information for neutron bomb warheads. The PRC stole classified U.S. information about the neutron bomb from a U.S. national weapons laboratory. The U.S. learned of the theft of this classified information on the neutron bomb in 1996.
In the late 1970s, the PRC stole design information on the U.S. W-70 warhead from the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory. The U.S. government first learned of this theft several months after it took place. The W-70 warhead contains elements that may be used either as a strategic thermonuclear weapon, or as an enhanced radiation weapon ("neutron bomb"). The PRC tested the neutron bomb in 1988.
The Select Committee is aware of other PRC thefts of U.S. thermonuclear weapons-related secrets. The Clinton administration has determined that further information about PRC thefts of U.S. thermonuclear weapons-related secrets cannot be publicly disclosed without affecting national security.
The PRC acquired this and other classified U.S. nuclear weapons information as the result of a 20-year intelligence collection program to develop modern thermonuclear weapons, continuing to this very day, that includes espionage, review of unclassified publications, and extensive interactions with scientists from the Department of Energy's national weapons laboratories.
The Select Committee has found that the primary focus of this long-term, ongoing PRC intelligence collection effort has been on the following national weapons laboratories:
ú Los Alamos
ú Lawrence Livermore
ú Oak Ridge
ú Sandia
The Select Committee judges that the PRC will exploit elements of the stolen design information on the PRC's next generation of thermonuclear weapons. The PRC plans to supplement its silo-based CSS-4 ICBMs targeted on U.S. cities with mobile ICBMs, which are more survivable because they are more difficult to find than silo-based missiles.
The PRC has three mobile ICBM programs currently underway - two road-mobile and one submarine-launched program - all of which will be able to strike the United States.
The first of these new People's Liberation Army (PLA) mobile ICBMs, the DF-31, may be tested in 1999, and could be deployed as soon as 2002. These mobile missiles require small warhead designs, of which the stolen U.S. design information is the most advanced in the world.
In addition, the PRC could choose to use elements of the stolen nuclear weapons design information - including the neutron bomb - on intermediate- and short-range ballistic missiles, such as its CSS-6 missiles.
The PRC has the infrastructure and technical ability to use elements of the stolen U.S. warhead design information in the PLA's next generation of thermonuclear weapons. The Select Committee concludes that the production tools and processes required by the PRC to produce small thermonuclear warheads based on the stolen U.S. design information, including the stolen W-88 information, would be similar to those developed or available in a modern aerospace or precision-guided munitions industry. The Select Committee judges that the PRC has such infrastructure and is capable of such production.
The Select Committee judges that the PRC is likely to continue its work on advanced thermonuclear weapons based on the stolen U.S. design information. The PRC could begin serial production of such weapons during the next decade in connection with the development of its next generation of intercontinental ballistic missiles.
A series of PRC nuclear weapons test explosions from 1992 to 1996 began a debate in the U.S. Government about whether the PRC's designs for its new generation of nuclear warheads were in fact based on stolen U.S. classified information. The apparent purpose of these PRC tests was to develop smaller, lighter thermonuclear warheads, with an increased yield-to-weight ratio.
The United States did not become fully aware of the magnitude of the counterintelligence problem at the Department of Energy national weapons laboratories until 1995. In 1995 the United States received a classified PRC document that demonstrated that the PRC had obtained U.S. design information on the W-88 warhead and technical information concerning approximately half a dozen other U.S. thermonuclear warheads and associated reentry vehicles.
The document was provided by a PRC national, unsolicited by the CIA - a "walk in." This individual approached the CIA outside the PRC, and turned over a number of documents. Among these was an official PRC document classified "Secret" by the PRC.
This PRC document included, among other matters, stolen U.S. design information on the W-88 thermonuclear warhead used on the Trident D-5 missile, as well as U.S. technical information on several other strategic U.S. nuclear warheads. The document recognized that the U.S. weapons represented the state-of-the-art against which PRC nuclear weapons should be measured.
By mid-1996 the CIA had determined that the individual who provided the information was secretly under the direction of the PRC intelligence services. The CIA and other U.S. intelligence community analysts have nevertheless concluded that the classified PRC document contained U.S. thermonuclear warhead design information and other technical information on U.S. nuclear weapons.
The stolen U.S. nuclear secrets give the PRC design information on thermonuclear weapons on a par with our own. Currently deployed PRC ICBMs targeted on U.S. cities are based on 1950s-era nuclear weapons designs. With the stolen U.S. technology, the PRC has leaped, in a handful of years, from 1950s-era strategic nuclear capabilities to the more modern thermonuclear weapons designs. These modern thermonuclear weapons took the United States decades of effort, hundreds of millions of dollars, and numerous nuclear tests to achieve.
Such small, modern warheads are necessary for all of the elements of a modern intercontinental nuclear force, including:
ú Road-mobile ICBMs
ú Submarine-launched ICBMs
ú ICBMs with multiple warheads (MRVs or MIRVs)
The PRC has an ongoing program to use these modern thermonuclear warheads on its next generation of ICBMs, currently in development. Without the nuclear secrets stolen from the United States, it would have been virtually impossible for the PRC to fabricate and test successfully small nuclear warheads prior to its 1996 pledge to adhere to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
B. The Select Committee judges that elements of the stolen information on U.S. thermonuclear warhead designswill assist the PRC in building its next generation of mobile ICBMs, which may be tested this year.
The stolen U.S. design information will assist the PRC in building smaller nuclear warheads - vital to the success of the PRC's ongoing efforts to develop survivable, mobile missiles. Current PRC ICBMs, which are silo-based, are more vulnerable to attack than mobile missiles.
The PRC has currently underway three intercontinental mobile missile programs - two road-mobile, and one submarine-launched. All of these missiles are capable of targeting the United States.
The first of these, the road-mobile solid-propellant DF-31, may be tested in 1999. Given a successful flight-test program, the DF-31 could be ready for deployment in 2002.
The Select Committee judges that the PRC will in fact use a small nuclear warhead on its new generation ICBMs. The small, mobile missiles that the PRC is developing require smaller warheads than the large, heavy, 1950s-era warheads developed for the PRC's silo-based missiles. The main purpose of a series of nuclear tests conducted by the PRC between 1992 and 1996 was evidently to develop new smaller, lighter warheads with an increased yield-to-weight ratio for use with the PRC's new, mobile nuclear forces.
The Select Committee judges that the PRC will exploit elements of the stolen U.S. thermonuclear weapons designs on its new ICBMs currently under development. The advanced U.S. thermonuclear warheads for which the PRC has stolen U.S. design information are significantly smaller than those for which the PRC's silo-based missiles were designed. The U.S. designs, unlike those in the PRC's currently-deployed arsenal, can be used on smaller mobile missiles.
The Select Committee judges that:
ú The PRC is likely to continue to work on small thermonuclear warheads based on stolen U.S. design information
ú The PRC has the infrastructure and ability to produce such warheads, including warheads based on elements of the stolen U.S. W-88 Trident D5 design information
ú The PRC could begin serial production of small thermonuclear warheads during the next decade in conjunction with its new generation of road-mobile missiles
ú The introduction of small warheads into PLA service could coincide with the initial operational capability of the DF-31, which could be ready for deployment in 2002
These small warhead designs will make it possible for the PRC to develop and deploy missiles with multiple reentry vehicles (MRVs or independently targetable MIRVs).
Multiple reentry vehicles increase the effectiveness of a ballistic missile force by multiplying the number of warheads a single missile can carry as many as ten-fold.
Multiple reentry vehicles also can help to counter missile defenses. For example, multiple reentry vehicles make it easier for the PRC to deploy penetration aids with its ICBM warheads in order to defeat anti-missile defenses.
The Select Committee is aware of reports that the PRC has in the past undertaken efforts related to technology with MIRV applications. Experts agree that the PRC now has the capability to develop and deploy silo-based intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple reentry vehicles (MIRVs or MRVs).
Experts also agree that the PRC could have this capability for its new mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles within a reasonable period of years that is consistent with its plans to deploy these new mobile missiles. The PRC could pursue one or more penetration aids in connection with its new nuclear missiles.
If the PRC violates the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty by testing surreptitiously, it could further accelerate its nuclear development.
The Select Committee judges that, if the PRC were successful in stealing nuclear test codes, computer models, and data from the United States, it could further accelerate its nuclear development. By using such stolen codes and data in conjunction with High Performance Computers (HPCs) already acquired by the PRC, the PRC could diminish its need for further nuclear testing to evaluate weapons and propose design changes.
The possession of the stolen U.S. test data could greatly reduce the level of HPC performance required for such tasks. For these reasons, the Select Committee judges that the PRC has and will continue to aggressively target for theft our nuclear test codes, computer models, and data.
Although the United States has been the victim of systematic espionage successfully targeted against our most advanced nuclear weapons designs - and although the Select Committee judges that the PRC will exploit elements of those designs for its new generation of ICBMs - the United States retains an overwhelming qualitative and quantitative advantage in deployed strategic nuclear forces. Nonetheless, in a crisis in which the United States confronts the PRC's conventional and nuclear forces at the regional level, a modernized PRC strategic nuclear ballistic missile force would pose a credible direct threat against the United States.
Neither the United States nor the PRC has a national ballistic missile defense system.
In the near term, a PRC deployment of mobile thermonuclear weapons, or neutron bombs, based on stolen U.S. design information, could have a significant effect on the regional balance of power, particularly with respect to Taiwan. PRC deployments of advanced nuclear weapons based on stolen U.S. design information would pose greater risks to U.S. troops and interests in Asia and the Pacific.
In addition, the PRC's theft of information on our most modern nuclear weapons designs enables the PRC to deploy modern forces much sooner than would otherwise be possible.
At the beginning of the l990s, the PRC had only one or two silo-based ICBMs capable of attacking the United States. Since then, the PRC has deployed up to two dozen additional silo-based ICBMs capable of attacking the United States; has upgraded its silo-based missiles; and has continued development of three mobile ICBM systems and associated modern thermonuclear warheads.
If the PRC is successful in developing modern nuclear forces, as seems likely, and chooses to deploy them in sufficient numbers, then the long-term balance of nuclear forces with the United States could be adversely affected.
C. Despite repeated PRC thefts of the most sophisticated U.S. nuclear weapons technology, security at our national nuclear weapons laboratories does not meet even minimal standards.
The PRC stole design information on the United States' most advanced thermonuclear weapons as a result of a sustained espionage effort targeted at the United States' nuclear weapons facilities, including our national weapons laboratories. The successful penetration by the PRC of our nuclear weapons laboratories has taken place over the last several decades, and almost certainly continues to the present.
More specifically, the Select Committee has concluded that the successful penetration of our National Laboratories by the PRC began as early as the late 1970s; the PRC had penetrated the Laboratories throughout the 1980s and 1990s; and our Laboratories almost certainly remain penetrated by the PRC today.
Our national weapons laboratories are responsible for, among other things, the design of thermonuclear warheads for our ballistic missiles. The information at our national weapons laboratories about our thermonuclear warheads is supposed to be among our nation's most closely guarded secrets.
Counterintelligence programs at the national weapons laboratories today fail to meet even minimal standards. Repeated efforts since the early 1980s have failed to solve the counterintelligence deficiencies at the National Laboratories. While one of the Laboratories has adopted better counterintelligence practices than the others, all remain inadequate.
Even though the United States discovered in 1995 that the PRC had stolen design information on the W-88 Trident D-5 warhead and technical information on a number of other U.S. thermonuclear warheads, the White House has informed the Select Committee, in response to specific interrogatories propounded by the Committee, that the President was not briefed about the counterintelligence failures until early 1998.
Moreover, given the great significance of the PRC thefts, the Select Committee is concerned that the appropriate committees of the Congress were not adequately briefed on the extent of the PRC's espionage efforts.
A counterintelligence and security plan adopted by the Department of Energy in late 1998 in response to Presidential Decision Directive 61 is a step toward establishing sound counterintelligence practices. However, according to the head of these efforts, significant time will be required to implement improved security procedures pursuant to the directive. Security at the national weapons laboratories will not be satisfactory until at least sometime in the year 2000.
See the chapters PRC Acquisition of U.S. Technology, PRC Theft of U.S. Thermonuclear Warhead Design Information, and PRC Missile and Space Forces for more detailed discussions of the Select Committee's investigation of these matters.
A. The PRC has stolen U.S. missile technology and exploited itfor the PRC's own ballistic missile applications.
The PRC has proliferated such military technology to a number of other countries, including regimes hostile to the United States.
The Select Committee has found that the PRC has stolen a specific U.S. guidance technology used on current and past generations of U.S. weapons systems. The stolen guidance technology is currently used on a variety of U.S. missiles and military aircraft, including:
ú The U.S. Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS)
ú The U.S. Navy Stand-off Land Attack Missile-Extended Range (SLAM-ER)
ú The U.S. Navy F-14
ú The U.S. Air Force F-15, F-16, and F-117 fighter jets
The stolen guidance technology has direct applicability to the PRC's intercontinental, medium- and short-range ballistic missiles, and its spacelift rockets.
The theft of U.S. ballistic missile-related technology is of great value to the PRC. In addition to ICBMs and military spacelift rockets, such technology is directly applicable to the medium- and short-range PLA missiles, such as the CSS-6 (also known as the M-9), the CSS-X-7 (also known as the M-11), and the CSS-8 that have been developed for, among other purposes, striking Taiwan.
CSS-6 missiles were, for example, fired in the Taiwan Strait and over Taiwan's main ports in the 1996 crisis and confrontation with the United States.
The Select Committee has uncovered instances of the PRC's use of this specific stolen U.S. technology that:
ú Enhance the PRC's military capabilities
ú Jeopardize U.S. national security interests
ú Pose a direct threat to the United States, our friends and allies, or our forces
The Clinton administration has determined that particular uses by the PRC of this stolen U.S. technology cannot be disclosed publicly without affecting national security.
The PRC has proliferated weapons systems and components to other countries including Iran, Pakistan, Libya, Syria, and North Korea.
B. In the late 1990s, the PRC stole or illegally obtained U.S.developmental and research technology that, if taken to successful conclusion, could be used to attack U.S. satellites
and submarines.
During the late l990s, U.S. research and development work on electromagnetic weapons technology has been illegally obtained by the PRC as a result of successful espionage directed against the United States. Such technology, once developed, can be used for space-based weapons to attack satellites and missiles.
In 1997, the PRC stole classified U.S. developmental research concerning very sensitive detection techniques that, if successfully concluded, could be used to threaten U.S. submarines.
C. Currently-deployed PRC ICBMs targeted on the United States are
based in significant part on U.S. technologiesillegally obtained by the PRC in the 1950s.
This illustrates the potential long-term effects of technology loss.
Even in today's rapidly changing technological environment, technology losses can have long-term adverse effects. Currently-deployed PRC ICBMs targeted on the United States are based on U.S. and Russian technologies from the 1950s and 1960s.
In the 1950s, a U.S. military officer and associated members of the design team for a U.S. ICBM program (the "Titan" missile program) emigrated to the PRC and illegally gave U.S. missile and missile-related technology to the PRC.
This information formed the basis for the up to two dozen PRC CSS-4 ICBMs that are currently targeted on the United States.
All but two of these missiles have been deployed by the PRC for the first time in this decade.
D. In the aftermath of three failed satellite launches since 1992,U.S. satellite manufacturers transferred missile design information and know-how to the PRC without obtaining the legally required licenses.
This information has improved the reliability of PRC rockets useful for civilian and military purposes.
The illegally transmitted information is useful for the design and improved reliability of future PRC ballistic missiles, as well.
U.S. satellite manufacturers analyzed the causes of three PRC launch failures and recommended improvements to the reliability of the PRC rockets. These launch failure reviews were conducted without required Department of State export licenses, and communicated technical information to the PRC in violation of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations.
The Select Committee has concluded that the PRC implemented a number of the recommended improvements to rocket guidance and to the fairing (or nose cone), which protects a satellite during launch. These improvements increased the reliability of the PRC Long March rockets. It is almost certain that the U.S. satellite manufacturers' recommendations led to improvements in the PRC's rockets and that the improvements would not have been considered or implemented so soon without the U.S. assistance.
It is possible or even likely that, absent the U.S. satellite manufacturers' interventions on the problems associated with the defective fairing on the PRC's Long March 2E rocket and the defective guidance system on the PRC's Long March 3B rocket, one or more other PRC launches would have failed.
The PRC Long March rockets improved by the U.S. technology assistance are useful for both commercial and military purposes. The military uses include launching:
ú Military communications and reconnaissance satellites
ú Space-based sensors
ú Space-based weapons, if successfully developed
ú Satellites for modern command and control and sophisticated intelligence collection
The Select Committee judges that the PRC military has important needs in these areas, including notably space-based communications and reconnaissance capabilities.
In addition, design and testing know-how and procedures communicated during the launch failure reviews could be applied to the reliability of missiles or rockets generally. U.S. participants' comments during the failure investigations related to such matters as:
ú Missile design
ú Design analysis
ú Testing procedures
ú The application of technical know-how to particular failure analyses
To the extent any valuable information was transferred to the PRC's space program, such information would likely find its way into the PRC's ballistic missile program. The ballistic missile and space launch programs have long been intertwined and subordinate to the same ministry and state-owned corporation in the PRC.
For example, the PRC's Long March 2 rockets and their derivatives (including the Long March 2E, on which Hughes advised the PRC) were derived directly from the PRC's silo-based CSS-4 intercontinental ballistic missiles that are currently targeted on the United States.
The various institutes and academies in the PRC involved in ballistic missile and rocket design also share design and production responsibilities. Many of the PRC personnel in these organizations have responsibilities for both commercial rocket and military missile programs. Attendees at important failure review meetings included PRC personnel from such organizations.
In fact, information passed during each of the failure analyses has the potential to benefit the PRC's ballistic missile program. The independent experts retained by the Select Committee judge that information valuable to the PRC's ballistic missile and space programs was transferred to the PRC in the failure investigations.
The rocket guidance system on which Loral and Hughes provided advice in 1996 is judged by the Select Committee to be among the systems capable of being adapted for use as the guidance system for future PRC road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles, although if a better system is available, it is more likely to be chosen for that mission.
The Select Committee judges that information on rocket fairings (that is, nose cones) provided to the PRC by Hughes may assist the design and improved reliability of future PRC MIRVed missiles, if the PRC decides to develop them, and of future submarine-launched ballistic missiles.
When Loral and Hughes assisted the PRC, they could not know whether the PRC would in fact use such information in their military programs.
i. In 1993 and 1995, Hughes showed the PRC how to improve the design and reliability of PRC rockets.
Hughes' advice may also be useful for design and improved reliability of future PRC ballistic missiles.
Hughes deliberately acted without seeking to obtain the legally required licenses.
In 1993 and 1995, Hughes showed the PRC how to improve the design and reliability of PRC Long March rockets with important military applications. The information provided by Hughes also may be useful for improving the reliability of future PRC ballistic missiles. Hughes deliberately acted without the legally required licenses.
In 1993 and 1995 Hughes analyzed the causes of PRC launch failures and, for both failures, illegally recommended to the PRC improvements to the fairing, a part of the rocket that protects the payload. The PRC changed the fairing of its Long March rocket to incorporate the Hughes recommendations.
Hughes also corrected deficiencies in the PRC's coupled loads analysis, a critical rocket design technology.
Hughes also identified changes needed in PRC launch operations.
The State Department's Office of Defense Trade Controls has concluded that Hughes significantly improved the PRC space launch program and contributed to the PRC goal of assured access to space. The State Department further concluded that the lessons learned by the PRC are inherently applicable to their missile program.
The State Department administers arms export licensing, and would have been the proper authority to license the Hughes failure investigations.
The State Department found that the PRC and Hughes personnel engaged in an extensive exchange of data and analyses, which, among other things, identified and corrected for the PRC deficiencies in a number of technical areas, including:
ú Anomaly analysis
ú Accident investigation techniques
ú Telemetry analysis
ú Coupled loads analysis
ú Hardware design and manufacture
ú Testing
ú Modeling
ú Simulation
ú Weather analysis
The illegally transmitted information improved the PRC's military rockets and operations. The illegally transmitted information may assist the PRC in the design and improved reliability of future silo-based or mobile PRC ballistic missiles, including particularly missiles that require fairings (or nose cones). These would include missiles with advanced payloads (that is, multiple warheads, or certain penetration aids designed to defeat missile defenses), and submarine launched ballistic missiles.
The PRC has the capability to develop and deploy silo-based missiles with multiple reentry vehicles (MIRVs or MRVs). Within a reasonable period of years that is consistent with the PRC's possible deployment of new mobile missiles, the PRC could deploy multiple warheads on those mobile missiles, as well. The PRC also appears to have gained practical insight into U.S. coupled loads analysis, and insight into diagnostic and failure analysis techniques for identifying the causes of a launch failure. Such lessons could be applied to both rockets and missiles.
In both 1993 and 1995, Hughes failed to apply for or obtain the required Department of State licenses for its activities, because Hughes knew that the Department of State would be unlikely to grant the license and that the licensing process would in any case be lengthy.
Hughes also engaged in deliberate efforts to circumvent the Department of State licensing requirement. To this end, Hughes sought the approval of a Department of Commerce official for its 1995 activities and claims to have sought the approval of a Department of Defense monitor for some of its 1993 activities, although Hughes knew that neither official was legally authorized to issue the required license.
Hughes had important commercial interests in the PRC at the time it engaged in the failure investigations. These interests included future sales of satellites to the PRC or to parties serving the PRC market, and reducing the cost and improving the safety of launching satellites in the PRC.
ii. In 1996, Loral and Hughes showed the PRC how to improve the design and reliability of the guidance system used in the PRC's newest Long March rocket.
Loral's and Hughes' advice may also be useful for design and improved reliability of elements of future PRC ballistic missiles.
Loral and Hughes acted without the legally required license, although both corporations knew that a license was required.
Loral and Hughes analyzed for the PRC the potential causes of a 1996 PRC launch failure, identified for the PRC the true cause of the failure as a particular element within the Long March rocket's guidance unit, and provided the PRC with technical assistance that may be useful not only for the PRC's commercial and military space launch programs, but for ballistic missiles as well.
In so doing, Loral and Hughes deliberately acted without the legally required license, and violated U.S. export control laws.
Although Loral and Hughes were well aware that a State Department license was required to provide assistance related to the guidance system of a PRC rocket, neither company applied for or obtained the required license. Loral was warned of the need for a license at the time it agreed to participate in the investigation, but took no action.
Loral |
