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To: George Papadopoulos who wrote (16346)3/31/2000 3:24:00 AM
From: GUSTAVE JAEGER  Respond to of 17770
 
A Social Ecology Publication

Number 26 January 1992

From Left to Right:
New Right Ideology as a Problem Facing Leftism Today


ise.rootmedia.org

Excerpt:

[...] But let us return to the original problem. The New Right falsely portrays the Left as racist because it sees all people as "equal" and denies the existence of any differences among various ethnic cultures. This is obviously a straw man. The leftist demand for "equality" is based on the continued existence of inequality. Nor does the Left demand "integration" or "accommodation" with the system. Rather, for the Left "equality" means equal treatment for all people, of people having equal rights in a given situation and enjoying equality of opportunity in a given society. Again, what we advocate is equal individual rights for everyone.

It is becoming increasingly clear that the basic contradiction between Left and Right is the contradiction between the centrality of the individual and the centrality of the community. (It is not surprising, then, that the Marxist Left has often had problems determining what is "left" and what is not.) The demand for equal treatment is a demand for pluralism in present-day society, a society that has long consisted of minorities. If this society is to function, it must also acknowledge its own diversity (and not, in fact, the actual equality) of its members--and take people seriously as individuals. But it is precisely this point that the New Right ideologists oppose. "Freedom of opinion," writes Benoist, "ceases where it contradicts the common good."

Like many of the New Right's concepts, its concept of "common good" is vague, but it is essentially a pale paraphrase of voelkisch [folk] totalitarianism. Today it includes "organic popular democracy"--a concept filched from ecologists who have long written of "organic growth." It has still another ideological kinship with spiritualism. Among the new myths that the Right is creating is the myth that for two thousand years the "Volk-concept" has been distorted by concepts of "equality, rationalism, and an elevation of the unaffiliated individual." But judging from the Right's own contradictory notions, a real Volk venerates hierarchy, antirationalism, and an organic community. Accordingly, it is expressly fascist. The antirationalism of the New Right and of countless spiritualistic movements requires a clear leftist interpretation of the Enlightenment.

But polite society still frowns upon the word "fascist," so in the New Right's lexicon, "aristocratic" is used in its place. The New Right's methodology becomes clearer in such passages as this: "The aristocracy creates its own law out of itself," writes Benoist. "It creates order because [the aristocracy] is order. Yes, might makes right. . . Aristocracy, when it intervenes as a political class, creates . . . not only an administrative apparatus but also a cultural, bourgeois apparatus (Gramsci). . . . In the long run an aristocracy must be capable of giving meaning to words."

The New Right, in effect, wants above all to redefine social norms, so that rational doubt is regarded as decadent and eliminated, and new "natural" norms are established. In the conceptual framework of "natural" and "organic" societies, each person is assigned a fixed role in the community, and out of this community bond the governed and the governing alike are to achieve an unmediated identification with the whole. The notion of a "harmonious" state looms large on the horizon of New Right ideology. And it would seem only logical for the Right to imagine that such an identification of the governed and governing strata would be impossible when minorities are among the governed. The New Right's concept of nationalism is wholly reconcilable with a United Europe, and indeed it is redefining itself as a form of "Europeanism." In this bizarre ideological world, "Europeanism" becomes the cement that will presumably hold everything together and gloss over any contradictions.

Other ethnic groups may then simply revert to a cultural Stone Age: "We want to substitute faith for law," writes Benoist, "mythos for logos, duties toward the Creation for the innocence of becoming, humility for the struggle for power; . . . [to substitute] will for pure reason, the image for the concept, and home for exile." One of the principal sources of this mishmash--and anarchists should finally become fully aware of this--is none other than Georges Sorel, who has been quoted by fascists no less than by syndicalists. Sorel is a theorist of the Counter-Enlightenment par excellence, of mythos against reason. "One must consider myth as a means to effect the present," he wrote in Reflections on Violence. "Only the wholeness of mythos is meaningful."

Sorel, in fact, tried to apply mythos to build the ideal of a syndicalist general strike. He sought on the one hand to arouse the workers' fantasies, but on the other hand to avoid the weightier question of the dubious viability of myths. "A myth cannot be refuted," he wrote, "because it is fundamentally identical with the outlook of the group and as a result it is an expression of a movement's convictions." Not surprisingly, Italian fascists were among the most eager practitioners of Sorel's theory, nor is it surprising that the syndicalist Sorel is now being eagerly picked up by the present-day New Right.

Given these views, it is not natural law but new myths that are to determine social consciousness. It is the dream, not the reality, that is to shape society. Whoever generates images in the world has power. But when images cease to be subjected to scrutiny--and for the New Right, one of the failings of reason is that it participates in critical scrutiny--and when the individual no longer counts for anything, when society embraces images--when finally this occurs, then the thousand-year Reich becomes once again imaginable. That myths can have serious social consequences was shown in the recent elections in Bremen, where the Christian Democrats "successfully" used the imagery of a "flood of asylum-seekers" or of "Bremen as Paradise for asylum-seekers," thereby exploiting public hostility toward immigrants and to win votes. With this appeal to the basest of feelings, they were able to induce the citizenry to forget even such a concrete problem as increased taxes. We find a strong emphasis on myth over reason in countless spiritualist, Green, and (eco-)feminist groups.


We Have a Problem with Fascists, Not with Asylum-Seekers!

If we recall what has been said up to now, it becomes clear that the events in Hoyerswerda and the arson attacks everywhere in the new Federal Republic are not reducible only to the issue of "rootless youth" or the "blind rage of frustrated youth with no future prospects," as conventional politicians and opinion-makers would have us believe. We have no problem with asylum-seekers, as the conservatives glibly claim. We have a very real problem with fascists. As an electoral tactic, politicians of all the democratic parties take their point of departure from a false issue, thereby showing how little consciousness they have of the present situation. They tend to grasp politics only in terms of momentary victories over their rivals. But what makes their behavior so grim is that they play over the long run into the hands of the Right. The fascists, for their part, are beginning to gain their first electoral successes, a fact that will clearly foster the growth of their movement in the future.

The media, of course, turn up their noses at the openly visible hatred of foreigners and at the violence exhibited by the fascists. But the way in which they do so contributes significantly toward turning these outrageous incidents into a widespread conflagration. When an eager reporter pushes a microphone under the nose of a seventeen-year-old in Hoyerswerda, who, without even being challenged, proceeds to speak of his plans to attack foreigners again--this in itself becomes an event and adds new meaning to the process of fascisization.

Neither the media and politicians, nor many others, have done any serious thinking about the new fascism. As always, they look for "rational" explanations for people's completely irrational behavior, and their explanations are blatantly superficial. They single out the refugees and the old Communist regime in the east, despite the fact that the number of arson attacks in the western region of North Rhine-Westphalia is certainly comparable to number of the attacks in the east.

But what if the new fascism has no conscious goal? Certainly, that it has no rational arguments is something we have already seen. What the New Right is shrewdly doing, however is to disengage the concept of fascism from its deadly past. Here too the Left, or at least the anarchists, are being used as a prototype for the Right. For in response to the question of how we define anarchism, we have over the years replied that anarchism is a lifestyle, indeed a life-feeling. All too often, today's New Rightists also define fascism as a "style" rather than as a political phenomenon. Hanspeter Siegfried incisively concludes that "the [fascist] style manifests itself in a love of danger, boldness, and speed, a glorification of war, and a 'tension between youth and death.' For the 'fascists' war is a battle for its own sake, not a means for reaching a goal. . . . Fascism becomes a cultural phenomenon, with which a positive identification once again becomes possible."

That the fascist life-style is quite capable of becoming a distinctly fascistic identity is revealed by the apparent ease with which it turns to violence. Violence as a test of courage, violence conceived as an expression of a fascist life-feeling--it is against this background that "aimless" skinheads and fascists attack foreigners in subways, in residences, and on the open street. Given this way of thinking, the New Right and present-day fascism must be seen in a radically new light.

This article was originally published in German in Schwarzer Faden: Vierteljahreschrift fuer Lust und Freiheit (Grafenau). The article title comes from a comment made by Burkhard Hirsch during a discussion on immigrants in September 1991. Translated by Janet Biehl.



To: George Papadopoulos who wrote (16346)4/1/2000 5:44:00 AM
From: GUSTAVE JAEGER  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 17770
 
Diaspora politics vs. Realpolitik or Why your local daily will never tell you about a French mastermind behind the bombing of two U.S. embassies in East Africa....

Samuel Huntington, "The Erosion of American National Interests," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, no. 5
(September-October 1997)

mtholyoke.edu
Excerpt:

COMMERCIALISM AND ETHNICITY

The lack of national interests that command widespread support does not imply a return to isolationism. America remains involved in the world, but its involvement is now directed at commercial and ethnic interests rather than national interests. Economic and ethnic particularism define the current American role in the world. The institutions and capabilities -- political, military, economic, intelligence -- created to serve a grand national purpose in the Cold War are now being suborned and redirected to serve narrow subnational, transnational, and even nonnational purposes. Increasingly people are arguing that these are precisely the interests foreign policy should serve.

The Clinton administration has given priority to "commercial diplomacy," making the promotion of American exports a primary foreign policy objective. It has been successful in wringing access to some foreign markets for American products. Commercial achievements have become a primary criterion for judging the performance of American ambassadors. President Clinton may well be spending more time promoting American sales abroad than doing anything else in foreign affairs. If so, that would be a dramatic sign of the redirection of American foreign policy. In case after case, country after country, the dictates of commercialism have prevailed over other purposes including human rights, democracy, alliance relationships, maintaining the balance of power, technology export controls, and other strategic and political considerations described by one administration official as "stratocrap and globaloney."(5) "Many in the administration, Congress, and the broader foreign policy community," a former senior official in the Clinton Commerce Department argued in these pages, "still believe that commercial policy is a tool of foreign policy, when it should more often be the other way around -- the United States should use all its foreign policy levers to achieve commercial goals." The funds devoted to promoting commercial goals should be greatly increased; the personnel working on these goals should be upgraded and professionalized; the agencies concerned with export promotion need to be strengthened and reorganized. Landing the contract is the name of the game in foreign policy.

Or at least it is the name of one game. The other game is the promotion of ethnic interests. While economic interests are usually subnational, ethnic interests are generally transnational or nonnational. The promotion of particular businesses and industries may not involve a broad public good, as does a general reduction in trade barriers, but it does promote the interests of some Americans. Ethnic groups promote the interests of people and entities outside the United States. Boeing has an interest in aircraft sales and the Polish-American Congress in help for Poland, but the former benefits residents of Seattle, the latter residents of the Eastern Europe.

The growing role of ethnic groups in shaping American foreign policy is reinforced by the waves of recent immigration and by the arguments for diversity and multiculturalism. In addition, the greater wealth of ethnic communities and the dramatic improvements in communications and transportation now make it much easier for ethnic groups to remain in touch with their home countries. As a result, these groups are being transformed from cultural communities within the boundaries of a state into diasporas that transcend these boundaries. State-based diasporas, that is, trans-state cultural communities that control at least one state, are increasingly important and increasingly identify with the interests of their homeland. "Full assimilation into their host societies," a leading expert, Gabriel Sheffer, has observed in Survival "has become unfashionable among both established and incipient state-based diasporas . . . many diasporal communities neither confront overwhelming pressure to assimilate nor feel any marked advantage in assimilating into their host societies or even obtaining citizenship there." Since the United States is the premier immigrant country in the world, it is most affected by the shifts from assimilation to diversity and from ethnic group
to diaspora.

During the Cold War, immigrants and refugees from communist countries usually vigorously opposed, for political and ideological reasons, the governments of their home countries and actively supported American anticommunist policies against them. Now, diasporas in the United States support their home governments. Products of the Cold War, Cuban-Americans ardently support U.S. anti-Castro policies. Chinese-americans, in contrast, overwhelmingly pressure the United States to adopt favorable policies towards China. Culture has supplanted ideology in shaping attitudes in diaspora populations.

Diasporas provide many benefits to their home countries. Economically prosperous diasporas furnish major financial support to the homeland, Jewish-Americans, for instance, contributing up to $1 billion a year to Israel. Armenian-Americans send enough to earn Armenia the sobriquet of "the Israel of the Caucasus." Diasporas supply expertise, military recruits, and on occasion political leadership to the homeland. They often pressure their home governments to adopt more nationalist and assertive policies towards neighboring countries. Recent cases' in the United States show that they can be a source of spies used to gather information for their homeland governments.

Most important, diasporas can influence the actions and policies of their host country and co-opt its resources and influence to serve the interests of their homeland. Ethnic groups have played active roles in politics throughout American history. Now, ethnic diaspora groups proliferate, are more active, and have greater self-consciousness, legitimacy, and political clout. In recent years, diasporas have had a major impact on American policy towards Greece and Turkey, the Caucasus, the recognition of Macedonia, support for Croatia, sanctions against South Africa, aid for black Africa, intervention in Haiti, NATO expansion, sanctions against Cuba, the controversy in Northern Ireland, and the relations between Israel and its neighbors. Diaspora-based policies may at times coincide with broader national interests, as could arguably be the case with NATO expansion, but they are also often pursued at the expense of broader interests and American relations with long-standing allies. Overall, as James R. Schlesinger observed in a 1997 lecture at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the United States has "less of a foreign policy in a traditional sense of a great power than we have the stapling together of a series of goals put forth by domestic constituency groups . . . The result is that American foreign policy is incoherent. It is scarcely what one would expect from the leading world power."

Schlesinger had to recognize, however, that multiculturalism and heightened ethnic consciousness have caused many political leaders to believe this is "the appropriate way to make foreign policy. " In the scholarly community some argue that diasporas can help promote American values in their home countries and hence "the participation of ethnic disaporas in shaping U.S. foreign policy is a truly positive phenomenon."(6) The validity of diaspora interests was a central theme at a May 1996 conference on "Defining the National Interest: Minorities and U.S. Foreign Policy in the 21st century." Conference participants attacked the Cold War definition of national interest and what was described as "the traditional policy community's apparent animosity toward the very idea of minority involvement in international affairs." Conferees explored "the experiences of Jewish-Americans and Cuban-Americans and sought to extract lessons from the way these two; groups succeeded in influencing foreign policy while others failed." The sponsorship of this conference by the New York Council on Foreign Relations, once the capstone institution of the foreign policy establishment, was the ultimate symbol of the triumph of diaspora interests over national interests in American foreign policy.

The displacement of national interests by commercial and ethnic interests reflects the domesticization of foreign policy. Domestic politics and interests have always inevitably and appropriately influenced foreign policy. Now, however, previous assumptions that the foreign and domestic policymaking processes differ from each other for important reasons no longer hold. For an understanding of American foreign policy it is necessary to study not the interests of the American state in a world of competing states but rather the play of economic and ethnic interests in American domestic politics. At least in recent years, the latter has been a superb predictor of foreign policy stands. Foreign policy, in the sense of actions consciously designed to promote the interests of the United States as a collective entity in relation to similar collective entities, is slowly but steadily disappearing.
[snip]