To: abbigail who wrote (41733 ) 4/11/2000 1:17:00 AM From: John F. Respond to of 74651
abbigail, here is an article you might enjoy.... Is Microsoft A Predator Or Prey? 10/21/1998 Investor's Business Daily, Page A24 Copyright Investor's Business Daily, Inc. 1998. By JOHN R. LOTT JR. Microsoft Corp.'s antitrust trial finally got underway Monday. The federal government charges the firm with predation and exclusionary practices that harm rivals and consumers alike. So where are the higher prices? The lower quality? The stalled innovations? These things exist in the imaginations of zealous Justice Department lawyers and smarting competitors. Actual evidence of antitrust violations is much less than meets the eye. Take Microsoft's dominance over word processing and spreadsheet software. Microsoft Word has been the top selling word processor program since '92. Yet the average price of word processing software has fallen by almost 70%, reversing an upward trend. And since Microsoft's Excel displaced Lotus as the top spreadsheet in '93, prices have dropped nearly 60%. Coincidence? Hardly. But these steep price drops do explain the hostility of Microsoft's competitors. A number of notable high-tech firms are lined up to testify against Microsoft: Apple Computer Inc., Sun Microsystems Inc., IBM, Netscape Communications Corp., Intel Corp., Intuit Inc. and America Online Inc. But are customers better served if competitors are on friendly terms rather than in fierce competition? It's an old question. George Stigler, the late Nobel Prize-winning economist, once showed that politicians who supported the Sherman Antitrust Act also backed protectionist tariffs. Stigler argued that both types of laws were passed at consumers' expense to protect inefficient firms from lower-cost competitors. Despite popular myths about robber barrons and capitalism run amok, corporate "predation" is quite rare. Economists point to only three likely "predators" in U.S. history: Standard Oil, the Tobacco Trust and Southern Bell Telephone Company - companies that peaked almost 100 years ago. Were they illegal monopolies? Maybe. Then again, the data have never ruled out the possibility that they were simply superior competitors. Take the Tobacco Trust. Some historians argue that when its members merged with independent tobacco firms at the turn of the century, causing stock prices of other tobacco companies to fall, that was predation. Lacking hard evidence, academics point to internal corporate memos that boast of driving competitors out of business. Here's another possibility: Mergers lower production costs, helping customers while hurting competitors. That isn't predation. In fact, the law's standard of evidence has changed over the years. Intent alone isn't enough for liability in a predatory pricing case. In other words, what might look like predatory pricing may be nothing more than vigorous, above-marginal cost competition. Recently, I looked at all 21 publicly traded firms accused or convicted of predation between '63 and '88. These companies hardly fit into the textbook definition of "predatory behavior." All of these companies were boosting output when the government alleged they were engaging in predatory practices. But their profits were also rising - hardly a sign of below-cost pricing. In fact, every case suggests the law was used to punish relatively efficient firms for driving out less efficient competitors. Less evident is any effort on the part of accused or convicted companies encouraging managers to break the law. Say a company wanted its managers to expand production and sell its wares below cost. The last thing we'd see is that same company tying managerial compensation more closely to short-run profits. That would punish managers who actually engaged in predation. Yet this is exactly what we see: Firms accused or convicted of predation were more likely to have compensation tied closely to short-run profits. So, has the Justice Department finally nailed a truly predatory firm with Microsoft? That's doubtful. Even if Justice successfully uses the testimony of competitors to paint a picture of a company intent on depriving the public of competition, it's going to have trouble proving any damages done to consumers. It may be too much to hope, but the Microsoft case could cause us to rethink the big question of whom antitrust laws really protect: the consumer or the weak competitor? John R. Lott Jr. is the John M. Olin Law and Economics fellow at the University of Chicago School of Law and author of "Are Predatory Commitments Credible? Who Should the Courts Believe?" (University of Chicago Press, forthcoming in '99).