<<The money didn't disappear....it wasn't there to begin with.>>
William, your above comment directed towards friday's DOW and Nasdaq reduction in "wealth" is a very good introduction to some recent old news of the type given at the Le Metropole Cafe in commentary format.
Most of us on this thread can run in circles chasing each others posts in an attempt to capture what really did happen so that we know where we are being taken.
For myself I will continue to parrot the GATA line and hope that where they take me is a better place than where I would take myself.
Time will tell. Doug
The Dos Passos Table, Discussion du Jour: Guest Speaker Definitions of Money in Congress: Webster vs. Greenspan
By Reginald H. Howe www.GoldenSextant.com March 7, 2000
Daniel Webster addressed the subject of the nation's money in a speech on the Specie Circular delivered in the Senate on December 21, 1836:
... to a question by U.S. Rep. Ron Paul, R- Texas, Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan spoke to the subject of the nation's money in his Humphrey- Hawkins testimony on February 17, 2000:
By definition, all prices are indeed the 'ratio of an exchange of a good for money.'
And what we seek is what that is.
Our problem is we used M-1 at one point as the proxy of money, and it turned out to be a very difficult indicator of any financial state. We then went to M-2 and had the similar problem. We have never done M-3 per se because it largely reflects the extent of expansion of the banking industry. And when in effect banks expand, in and of itself, it doesn't tell you terribly much about what real money is.
So our problem is not that we do not believe in sound money. We do. We very much believe that, if you have a debased currency, that you will have a debased economy.
The difficulty is in defining what part of our liquidity structure is truly money.....
Regrettably, none of those which we have been able to develop, including MZM -- has done that.
That does not mean that we think that money is irrelevant.
It means we think our measures of money have been inadequate.
And, as a consequence of that, we, as I have mentioned previously, have downgraded the use of the monetary aggregates for monetary policy purposes, until we are able to find a more stable proxy for what we believe is the underlying money in the economy."
Question by Dr. Paul:
"So it's hard to manage something you can't define?"
Answer by Mr. Greenspan:
"It is not possible to manage something you can't define."
What irony!
Daniel Webster, senator and speculator, arguing for a flexible currency, gives an irrebuttable defense of gold and silver as the constitutionally mandated standard of value and sole legal tender.
The monetary provisions of the Constitution have never changed.
What has changed are the interpretations that politicians and judges put on them. The result is that the actual money of the country has gone from a thing that could be easily defined to a notion that defies all attempts at definition.
In the process, the concept of a true standard of value has been lost, and the distinction between money and credit has been obliterated.
The consequences are almost too fearful to contemplate. ... a full- blown currency crisis.
[End.]
The Hemingway Table Discussion du Jour: US Financial Markets Doug Nolan David W. Tice & Associates The Prudent Bear Fund dcnoland@aol.com April 7, 2000
Note: GSEs = Government Sponsored Enterprises
Capital Markets as Reckless Creators of Money and Credit
... very much like the work of Northern Trust's Paul Kasriel and will highlight his recent writing,
"Do Government Sponsored Enterprises Create Credit? No, Alan Does."
ntrs.com
as it does a nice job explaining the consensus view, although we obviously disagree.
The thrust of our argument is that that GSE's, money market funds, and capital markets generally have come together to develop into critical instigators of money and credit excess.
While some would like to believe that the GSE's and other non-banks do not create money or credit, that they only provide a beneficial function as "intermediary" between savings and investment, this belies reality.
Instead, these often-aggressive institutions are pivotal players in an historic bubble that has virtually nothing to do with efficiently allocating savings, but everything to do with money and credit excess.
Indeed, through the capital markets, unprecedented money and credit growth has fueled an unprecedented financial and economic bubble.
Today's commentary will rehash some old "stuff", while also hopefully shedding some new insight.....
So, one might ask, why do we have a problem with this arrangement of converting risky debt into money?
Well, we actually have a list of concerns, but for this discussion there is a key aspect of this seemingly wonderful alchemy that needs to be highlighted: derivatives.
But first, one more point needs to be made.....
Conventional thinking has it that the GSEs are simply intermediaries, middlemen between those saving and those wanting to borrow money.
As the thinking goes, the GSEs operate..... ... they simply "intermediate" without creating additional credit, or buying power.
As logical as analysis is on the surface, it is nonetheless flawed.....
... governments have for some time closely regulated bank lending, using such measures such as reserve and capital requirements.
Or at least they used to.
... they are not burdened by either reserve or capital requirements. This is precisely why we make the argument that the mechanism of money market funds taking deposits and lending into the capital marke ts provides an "infinite multiplier" for money and credi t creation. Unlimited additional money market liabilitie s can be created as long as deposits are made into money market funds and these deposits are lent and re-circulate d back into additional money market deposits.
... To keep the game going would necessitate an acceleration of credit growth, and to accomplish this, the "intermediation" function took on momentous importance.
What was really needed was a mechanism to convert $100's of billions of risky loans into securities that even the most risk-averse would be willing to hold.
What developed was one of history's great alchemies, the "conversion" of loads of risky securities into something people love: money.
This was quite an accomplishment and for this magic, Wall Street teamed with the GSEs.
... with their special status as government-sponsored enterprises and the perception that the US government would stand behind these institutions' debt in case of crisis, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and the Federal Home Loan Bank System have been granted virtually unlimited access to the capital markets. No matter how leveraged these institutions become, they maintain AAA ratings and have unlimited access to money market borrowings....
So, one might ask, why do we have a problem with this arrangement of converting risky debt into money?
Well, we actually have a list of concerns, but for this discussion there is a key aspect of this seemingly wonderful alchemy that needs to be highlighted: derivatives.
But first, one more point needs to be made about money.
We mentioned earlier that one of the key characteristics of money is the perception that it is a "store of value".
This is critical.
... must look elsewhere to obtain what is perceived to be an adequate risk buffer.
This "elsewhere" has become the derivatives marketplace....
... Derivatives are clearly the weak link in the chain.....
... it is our contention that the interest rate derivative marketplace is now in dislocation and that this will prove a seminal event for the US credit bubble.....
In conclusion, it is critical to recognize how fragile and vulnerable a system becomes when the capital markets take the lead as instigators of money and credit excess.....
... financial historians will not be kind when they look back at the proliferation of derivatives and the unprecedented credit and speculative excess fueled by the GSEs, money market funds, banks, hedge funds, Wall Street firms, and the aggressive US financial sector generally.
Not only have they fostered major distortions and imbalances to both the financial system and economy, they have also poisoned our money supply.
How this all plays out is today uncertain but, unfortunately, such egregious excesses only end badly.
this all plays out is today uncertain but, unfortunately, such egregious excesses only end badly. |