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Politics : About that Cuban boy, Elian -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: Master (Hijacked) who wrote (4640)	5/10/2000 9:55:00 AM
From: The Barracuda™	Respond to of 9127

President Kennedy got America into Vietnam, Clinton got America into Kosovo America Learning The Hard Way In Kosovo Military Operation Foreign Affairs News Source: Army Times Published: May 15, 2000 Author: Chris Petty Posted on 05/10/2000 06:39:21 PDT by Stand Watch Listen The Kosovo operation is rapidly sliding down the slope of lofty wars gone bad. What began as a compelling call to arms -- the repression, rape, and slaughter of an innocent people -- has, unfortunately, been turned into a question of "how will the United States get itself out of this mess?" This leads to an obvious question: How did we get into this mess in the first place? For argument's sake, assume the cause is just, and the United States has decided to use force. This conveniently allows us to ignore the question of why this nation should go to war, and focus on the pressing issue in Kosovo: how America fights it wars. Understanding the war-fighting imperative is key to this problem. If this imperative is followed, the nation produces effective policy through conflicts such as World War II and Desert Storm. If the imperative is violated, the nation achieves less than desirable outcomes such as Vietnam, Haiti, Somalia and Kosovo. The war-fighting imperative is simply a management model for policy makers, both civilian and military, surrounding the decision to wage war. The process begins with the National Command Authority -- normally the president, national security advisor, secretary of state, CIA director and secretary of defense -- deciding on the use of force and the appropriate political goals of the war. It addresses the tough questions about why we are fighting in the first place and defines the desired political end of the conflict. Despite how you feel about the role of Congress in the process, the important point here is that these are civilian officials making this decision. Once these issues are carefully formulated, the next step involves translating this end-state vision to the appropriate military commander in chief, determined by geographic areas of responsibility. It is here that the civilian vision is linked to the military plan. At this point, all operational boundaries and any political constraints that affect the CINC's prosecution of the war are defined up front. From this point on, it is a military mission. If the military commander proves inept, or strays from the president's intent, he is replaced. Micromanaging military planning and execution past this point is not an option. The final step in the process is translating the military goals and strategies into operational actions and tactics. This step begins with the CINC and his staff developing the concept of the operations for the campaign. The process ends with the maneuver commanders (divisions, brigades and task forces) filling in the final details and executing the plan. This creates an effective span of control and complete accountability throughout the whole process. And, perhaps most important of all, it allows people to focus their talents and skills doing what they were hired and/or trained to do. Simply put, we are failing in Kosovo because we have not followed our war-fighting imperative. As the NCA created the political objectives of the war: "stop the genocide," "restore the Kosovars to their homes," and "degrade Milosevic's ability to do harm," it appeared they might be headed down the right track. But as these political aspirations were translated into military plans, the process derailed quickly. Does anyone think Gen. Wesley Clark was allowed to create his plan, tailor his force, and prosecute the war? The first clue to the answer was the president's declaration of "no ground troops." Civilian leaders making these operational decisions hamper the military commander's freedom to act. To use the chess analogy, Clark was told to play a chess match using only his bishops. To a military planner, this is an absurd restriction. The next indication of a broken process was the tactical decision-making at the NCA level. Targeting decisions, order of battle, troop movements, and a variety of detailed tactical decisions that should not even have been made at Clark's level were being made in Washington. This was a grave mistake that clearly demonstrates a broken war-fighting imperative. These two examples merely demonstrate the symptoms of the bigger problem. The war-fighting imperative is the intuitive link between policy and war. It has proven itself to be a reliable model as recently as Desert Storm. Yet, America continues to learn the hard way how difficult it is to right the train when it's off the track. Kosovo, as with many wars before, has gotten off the track. Perhaps our policy makers will be wise enough to set it straight again. Maj. Chris J. Petty is a senior aviator and a graduate of West Point. He is serving full time in the Colorado Army National Guard Civil Support Teams (8th WMD-CST) in Denver.

To: Master (Hijacked) who wrote (4640)	5/10/2000 10:12:00 AM
From: Yogizuna	Read Replies (2) \| Respond to of 9127

Vince, I am glad that you decided to re-post some of my writing on abortion here. Please feel free to post it anywhere else you choose to. You misunderstand me here. I am not on a political crusade against Castro, although he is certainly deeply involved. My opinions here would be roughly the same no matter which dictator was in charge in Cuba (or ring of dictators), and as long as many Cubans feel that they have to risk their lives and those of their loved ones to escape their wretched existence. Sorry, but I do not believe or feel that being with one's own natural father takes precedence over one's freedom, and my opinion will not change on that. Yogi