To: duncan moyer who wrote (111 ) 5/11/2000 7:53:00 PM From: A.L. Reagan Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 543
Duncan: the real interesting (unknown by anybody) question is what percentage of the non-institutional ownership is/was already held in margin accounts versus cash accounts. It really would not surprise me if a lot of the individual ownership was already in cash accounts - just regular non-margin accounts, retirement plans, etc. Suspect there was already some short covering, but 25 million short could be a whole lot if say 50% of the non-institutional shares are already in cash after further deducting LOR's holdings of GSTRF shares and other insider holdings which presumably are not available on the borrow. So, for shorts the GGMDM could be a real game of "musical shares!" But it could be better than even a one to one ratio. And maybe I'm not thinking this through, so bear with and feel free to correct. We start with say brother Gera's 1,000 shares, assumed to be in a margin account. These are borrowed by Anthony@Lookatme and shorted. Anthony's buyer, call him Duncan Moyer, puts them in his margin account. Then Impristine, Anthony's faithful acolyte, borrows Duncan's shares, shorts and Leo Bloom buys them today. All of a sudden, Arun Gera, Duncan, and Leo Bloom switch from cash to margin, placing a demand for 1,000 shares each, total 3,000. But wait, there are really only 1,000 shares out there actually issued by GSTRF! Where do the other 2,000 shares come from? (Please somebody with a cash account sell to me now!) I think I've got this right, but the point is to show how there can be a real multiplier effect if a huge short position (in proportion to the real number of shares available in margin accounts) has to be unraveled quickly. Strikes me as similar to an old-fashioned run on the bank when the depositors demand cash, but, oops, it's all been lent out! So, methinks the float analysis of the WSJ and Anthony@Ain'tIGreat might have a few logical holes. We shall see. More disclosure: I've already disclosed this once but for the benefit of all the regulators out there: Way, way before the GGMDM arose, I espoused on SI an arbitrage position that would take advantage of any whacky price disparities between GSTRF and LOR by shorting GSTRF against an existing long LOR position. This mostly arose as an observation of the rise and fall of the Gilder Effect, where GSTRF approximately doubled and LOR remained anchored, and part of the purpose would be to lower my aggregate risk while still participating in G*. Just because I am a statistically insignificant portion of this "I want my Wheaties back" plan, I do not intend to forego this long ago pre-planned arbitrage strategy if a whacky price disparity arises again between GSTRF and LOR, which I presently define as GSTRF price > 1.75x LOR. In plain English, if say GSTRF is at $16 and LOR at $9, subject to some degree of market stability, I may attempt to not only sell my GSTRF shares but also become a DREADED SHORT MYSELF! (As a hedge against LOR, not as a speculator). Further disclosure: I do not live in California!