To: George Papadopoulos who wrote (16655 ) 6/16/2000 5:24:00 AM From: GUSTAVE JAEGER Respond to of 17770
Round-the-clock TV coverage of Euro 2000! Tomorrow the whole of Belgium is gonna hold its breath.... Germany vs. England is scheduled in Charleroi --did I hear "hooligan"?? Back to more serious business.... I've got interesting stuff for a mafia-basher like you, George:Kigyou Shatei , the highest stage of (Nippon) capitalism:CRIME SYNDICATES AND JAPAN'S CHANGING SOCIAL STRUCTUREBy: Seiji Iishiba Translated by Nicola Britain and Hiroyuki Yamada (Originally appeared in Jurist #985, 9/1/91) tuj.ac.jp Excerpt:3. Stage Three (1985-Present Day): The Organized Crime Stage Stage Two saw the Bouryokudan expand their income base from purely illegal to both illegal and legitimate operations. During Stage Three, the legitimate businesses expanded to form separate and independent entities, many of which even incorporated. This was the advent of the era of criminal corporations. During Stage Two, the formation of a company was merely nominal. The company usually simply consisted of a Bouryokudan office; shareholders were taken from the ranks of Bouryokudan members. In contrast, during Stage Three the management personnel of these companies began to come from outside the crime syndicates. These were the "Kigyou Shatei;" a form of corporate Yakuza brotherhood. Kigyou Shatei are not Bouryokudan, but external organizations which support the activities of the Bouryokudan. During Stages One and Two, these organizations facilitated the criminal profit-making of the Bouryokudan. Examples of these early Kigyou Shatei are the middlemen who smuggled the weapons being supplied to the Bouryokudan, or the go-betweens who arranged the clientele when the Bouryokudan opened an illegal gambling establishment. However, during Stage Three, the Kigyou Shatei took on the role of managing the capital acquired through the Jounou system. Money laundering features as one of the more important duties of the Kigyou Shatei. The crime syndicates entrust capital to the Kigyou Shatei to invest through legal, and sometimes illegal, channels and the resulting profits are shared. Kigyou Shatei are generally not crime syndicate members, but usually "quasi-members" directly connected with the executive class of the Bouryokudan. While they co-exist with the Bouryokudan, sharing the same money-making interests, they appear to be members of the general public. The very existence of the Kigyou Shatei serves to support the increasingly shrewd, intellectual, and even vicious, activities of the Bouryokudan, and they are important financial consultants for the crime syndicates. Kigyou Shatei were originally run by former Yakuza members, but as activities such as capital management came to require a specialized knowledge of law and economics, these former Yakuza were replaced by ordinary people. Today, instances exist where the owner of a business is a crime syndicate executive while the managers are simply ordinary (i.e., low-ability) citizens. Thus management is separated from the role of provision of capital. Kigyou Shatei make their profit from corporate activities supported by organized crime, while the crime syndicate achieves a stable capital base by receiving secure investment profits. In this way, the Bouryokudan made a huge amount of money during Stages Two and Three, resulting in the expansion of the organization, which in turn, increased the inflow of capital. Bouryokudan executives became underworld quasi-capitalists, investing the capital obtained from criminal and anti-social activities. Although the money is made from criminal and anti-social activities, it is managed in accordance with current civil and commercial law and in such a way that the business takes the form of a legal business venture. Alternatively, the Bouryokudan at least endeavor to form apparently legal business ventures. In 1985, when the Bouryokudan were increasingly engaging in such business activities, the Japanese government abruptly adopted a policy of capital relaxation. This not only accelerated the increase in the volume of Bouryokudan investment capital but also invited the worst-case scenario of underworld money mixing with the surplus capital generated by the governments low-interest policy. This phenomenon may be called a "Mafia economy." [...] ______________ And remember George, this is fancy-schmancy Japan --no Albanian roughneck to blame here!!! Obviously, the Japanese "Mafia-model" applies to Europe and the U.S. as well, especially in areas where a strong community spirit used to prevail. Over here, corporatism and family-businesses have been the rule since the Middle Ages and as globalization brings a lot of hardship to Europe's industrial belt, nobody's questioning money laundering so long as it keeps the local outfit up-and-running....