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Pastimes : Let's Talk About Our Feelings!!! -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: Neocon who wrote (81903)6/16/2000 9:17:00 AM
From: Ilaine  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 108807
 
No, I didn't quote Moses, I quoted God.

The Pope opposes the death penalty, and Catholics don't get to vote on church doctrine. It's not a democracy.



To: Neocon who wrote (81903)6/16/2000 9:24:00 AM
From: Ilaine  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 108807
 
Excerpts from an encyclical by Pope John Paul II - Passages dealing with the death penalty
in the encyclical EVANGELIUM VITAE

9. And yet God, who is always merciful even when he punishes, "put a mark on Cain, lest any who came upon him should kill him" (Gen 4:15). He thus gave him a
distinctive sign, not to condemn him to the hatred of others, but to protect and defend him from those wishing to kill him, even out of a desire to avenge Abel's death.
Not even a murderer loses his personal dignity, and God himself pledges to guarantee this. And it is precisely here that the paradoxical mystery of the merciful
justice of God is shown forth. As Saint Ambrose writes: "Once the crime is admitted at the very inception of this sinful act of parricide, then the divine law of God's
mercy should be immediately extended. If punishment is forthwith inflicted on the accused, then men in the exercise of justice would in no way observe patience and
moderation, but would straightaway condemn the defendant to punishment. ... God drove Cain out of his presence and sent him into exile far away from his native
land, so that he passed from a life of human kindness to one which was more akin to the rude existence of a wild beast. God, who preferred the correction rather
than the death of a sinner, did not desire that a homicide be punished by the exaction of another act of homicide".

27. Among the signs of hope we should also count the spread, at many levels of public opinion, of a new sensitivity ever more opposed to war as an instrument
for the resolution of conflicts between peoples, and increasingly oriented to finding effective but "non-violent" means to counter the armed aggressor. In the same
perspective there is evidence of a growing public opposition to the death penalty, even when such a penalty is seen as a kind of "legitimate defence" on the part of
society. Modern society in fact has the means of effectively suppressing crime by rendering criminals harmless without definitively denying them the chance to reform.

40. The commandment regarding the inviolability of human life reverberates at the heart of the "ten words" in the covenant of Sinai (cf. Ex 34:28). In the first
place that commandment prohibits murder: "You shall not kill" (Ex 20:13); "do not slay the innocent and righteous" (Ex 23:7). But, as is brought out in Israel's later
legislation, it also prohibits all personal injury inflicted on another (cf. Ex 21:12-27). Of course we must recognize that in the Old Testament this sense of the value of
life, though already quite marked, does not yet reach the refinement found in the Sermon on the Mount. This is apparent in some aspects of the current penal
legislation, which provided for severe forms of corporal punishment and even the death penalty. But the overall message, which the New Testament will bring to
perfection, is a forceful appeal for respect for the inviolability of physical life and the integrity of the person. It culminates in the positive commandment which obliges
us to be responsible for our neighbour as for ourselves: "You shall love your neighbour as yourself" (Lev 19:18).

55. Moreover, "legitimate defence can be not only a right but a grave duty for someone responsible for another's life, the common good of the family or of the State".
Unfortunately it happens that the need to render the aggressor incapable of causing harm sometimes involves taking his life. In this case, the fatal outcome is
attributable to the aggressor whose action brought it about, even though he may not be morally responsible because of a lack of the use of reason.


56. This is the context in which to place the problem of the death penalty. On this matter there is a growing tendency, both in the Church and in civil society, to
demand that it be applied in a very limited way or even that it be abolished completely. The problem must be viewed in the context of a system of penal justice ever
more in line with human dignity and thus, in the end, with God's plan for man and society. The primary purpose of the punishment which society inflicts is "to redress
the disorder caused by the offence". Public authority must redress the violation of personal and social rights by imposing on the offender an adequate punishment for
the crime, as a condition for the offender to regain the exercise of his or her freedom. In this way authority also fulfils the purpose of defending public order and
ensuring people's safety, while at the same time offering the offender an incentive and help to change his or her behaviour and be rehabilitated.

It is clear that, for these purposes to be achieved, the nature and extent of the punishment must be carefully evaluated and decided upon, and ought not go to the
extreme of executing the offender except in cases of absolute necessity: in other words, when it would not be possible otherwise to defend society. Today however,
as a result of steady improvements in the organization of the penal system, such cases are very rare, if not practically non-existent.


In any event, the principle set forth in the new Catechism of the Catholic Church remains valid: "If bloodless means are sufficient to defend human lives against an
aggressor and to protect public order and the safety of persons, public authority must limit itself to such means, because they better correspond to the concrete
conditions of the common good and are more in conformity to the dignity of the human person".

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