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Politics : Ask Michael Burke -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: Night Trader who wrote (82674)8/5/2000 4:35:00 AM
From: Bilow  Read Replies (3) | Respond to of 132070
 
Hi martin knight; Re low margin requirements in the 20s... Isn't the "Livermore" book merely purported to be by him? And might his wife have had access to sufficient wealth that loaning her $10 grand wasn't a sweat? And given the fact that it is written anonymously, couldn't some of the information be a bit fictional?

Try and make a stab at explaining why it would be a common business practice to loan a total stranger $9500 on $500 worth of equity in the hope of making a percent or two when they made money trading. I'd like to hear your business analysis of the thing. The fact is that if the brokers really thought the market couldn't do anything but go up, they would have bought stocks with the money and make the big profits, not lend it to traders in order to make commissions. For understanding the events of 3/4 of a century ago, it seems to me like the book we want to rely on is a book written by John Kenneth Galbraith, not a book written by Anonymous.

Here are some quotes from his book. I've got the paperback edition, 1988, ISBN 0-395-13935-X, 0-395-47805-7 (pbk.), library of congress card #72-2285 printed by Houghton Mifflin Company, of Boston.

If the brokers were loaning money with 5% margin, those margin loans wouldn't be very safe, but he writes:
One of the paradoxes of speculation is that the loans that underwrite it are among the safest of investments. They are protected by stocks which under all ordinary circumstances are instantly salable, and by a cash margin as well. (p 21)

This is direct and to the point:
In fact, the Federal Reserve was helpless only because it wanted to be. Had it been determined to do something, it could for example have asked Congress for authority to halt trading on margin by granting the Board the power to set margin requirements. Margins were not low in 1929; a residue of caution had caused most brokers to require customers to put up in cash 45 to 50 percent of the value of the stocks they were buying. However, this was all the cash numerous of their customers had. An increase in margins to, say, 75 per cent in January 1929, or even a serious proposal to do so, would have caused many small speculators and quite a few big ones to sell. (p32)

As I stated before, if a broker lost that residue of caution the effect would not be that he would loan money to strangers to buy stocks at 5% down, instead he would use his own advice and buy the stocks himself.

-- Carl