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To: Sir Auric Goldfinger who wrote (9187)8/7/2000 11:31:44 PM
From: StockDung  Respond to of 10354
 
More on Memory Metals
---
The Troubled Little Company
Stirs Fresh Controversy
By Kathryn M. Welling
 
09/07/1987
Barron's
(Copyright (c) 1987, Dow Jones & Co., Inc.)
 
REMEMBER Memory Metals?
In the spring and summer of '86, it was a very hot stock.What got investors all worked up about the tiny, Stamford,Conn.-based company was its know-how in making shape-memorycopper alloys, a special type of metal that, after beingformed, instantly reverts to its original shape when heated.Its fans on Wall Street saw practically limitless potentialfor Memory Metals' products, in everything from anti-scaldshower heads to nimble robot fingers.
Then, abruptly last fall, the shares collapsed, when --under SEC pressure -- Memory Metals "clarified" itsdescription of numerous "contracts" it had announced withcompanies invariably better-known than itself, and after aquestioning article in this magazine. Among other things,Barron's noted insider selling in the shares and filled in anomission from Memory Metals's disclosure documents -- namely,that its founder, Neil Rogen, had signed a consent decree tosettle SEC charges of securities fraud in connection with theinitial public offering of another shape-memory alloy firm,back in the 'Seventies.
The company's outside directors quickly removed Rogen andMemory Metal's President, L. MacDonald Schetky, as officers.A formal SEC investigation was launched. And this spring, afederal grand jury in New York City indicted two members ofan alleged ring of conspirators on charges of manipulatingthe shares of Memory Metals, as well as those of two otherOTC companies.
Sentencing of the two, who pleaded guilty and signedsealed plea agreements -- has been put off until this fall.That delay, it appears, was designed to give the prosecutorstime to test their cooperativeness in a much larger probe ofthe group's trading activities. That investigation, which theSEC has been pursuing at least since September 1985, involvesa number of over-the-counter issues. Implicated, according toSEC and federal court documents unearthed by Barron's BillAlpert, and the recollections of many of the participants,are some of the same people connected with Memory Metals orits stock.
In the meantime, though, effective control of thecompany's board has returned to some of the same hands thatgot Memory Metals into trouble in the first place. Thisremarkable development comes despite a raft of shareholdersuits and the continuing criminal investigation.
One of those shareholder suits, filed in federal court inMiami, recently made headlines in the financial press byalleging that one of the most prominent firms on Wall Street,PaineWebber, and Peter Butler, a top-ranked chemicals analystformerly in its employ, had helped manipulate the market inMemory Metals shares. It's clear, from the informationBarron's has turned up, that Butler's enthusiasm for thestock was a major factor fueling Memory Metals' ascent. Butjust how witting, or unwitting, was his -- or PaineWebber's-- participation in the alleged manipulation, it's hard tosay; Butler, PaineWebber, and his current employer, FirstBoston, all refuse to comment on the allegations.
At most, however, Butler seems to have played a supportingrole in the Memory Metals melodrama. The leading charactersin the story were the stock promoters who are the apparenttargets of the SEC and Justice Department probe. Althoughthey rank as habitual violators of federal securities laws,with histories in some cases going back to the 1960s, theyare not well-known. Indeed, the fact that they aren't reallybig-time operators is perhaps the reason they haven't,despite the urging of the courts and the SEC, left thesecurities business.
The indictment returned last April against one of theconspirators, William Rodman -- who at the time was onprobation stemming from another securities fraud case --throws light on the group's activities. While the indictmentalleges securities law violations in the trading of two otherstocks, Memory Protection Devices and Intravision, itconcentrates on Memory Metals.
According to the indictment, Rodman and hisco-conspirators arranged for a small over-the-counterbroker-dealer firm, Securities First Inc., to be officiallylisted as the underwriter for Memory Metals' IPO and to hire"a registered representative whom they controlled." Inreality, though, the indictment charges, Rodman -- who'd beenpreviously permanently enjoined from affiliating with abroker-dealer -- acted as an undisclosed underwriter ofMemory Metals, allocating the stock to both brokers andretail customers.
The indictment further charges that Rodman and his groupthen purchased large quantities of Memory Metals stock andactively traded it through "more than 100 accounts at atleast 35 brokerage firms."
Many of these transactions, according to the government,were actually wash trades that involved no actual change inbeneficial ownership, or were matched orders, in whichmembers of the group took both sides of the deals. They alsoallegedly "parked" large quantities of the stock in variousaccounts to artificially reduce its float, and engaged in"free riding," purchasing the stock without intending to payfor it, except out of profits after it was sold.
Rodman and his co-conspirators, court and SEC documentsindicate, were intent on kiting the value of "founders"shares in Memory Metals, Memory Protection Devices andIntravision. They had acquired these shares by providing"bridge financing," by acting as "consultants" or undisclosedunderwriters, and in at least one instance, throughextortion.
During the hearing at which Rodman entered his guiltyplea, an assistant U.S. attorney handling the case let slipthe name of one of Rodman's alleged co-conspirators: "anindividual by the name of Pericles Constantinou." And as ithappens, Constantinou, who's also known as Perry Constantino,is a key link between the various manipulation schemes thegovernment is trying to unravel.
Last February, a federal court judge in New York City,ruling in a civil case over the collapse of the shares inanother issue, found that Constantinou "engaged in aconcerted effort over a period of time to manipulate theprice of Keystone {Medical} stock." But Constantinou's recordof multiple securities law violations extends back at leastto the early 1970s. It includes rigging the market for theshares of an issue named Fantastic Fudge Inc. and criminalsanctions growing out of an indictment that charged, in part,that Constantinou bribed an adviser to a mutual fund torecommend certain stocks. 1975 was a particularly eventfulyear for Constantinou, the onetime president of a now-defunctOTC firm, Provident Securities. In two completely separatecases, the SEC first enjoined him from associating with anybroker, dealer, investment company or investment adviser, andthen barred him from associating with any broker-dealer.
When contacted by Barron's, Constantinou refused to answerany substantive questions. But court records offer insightinto his activities. Particularly illuminating is thedecision rendered in a civil suit, Competitive AssociatesInc. v. International Health Sciences Inc. et al, in federaldistrict court in New York back in '75.
The suit involves not only Constantinou but Akiyoshi Yamada , whose record of scrapes with securities regulatorsalso considerably longer than Constantinou's, and who alsofigures prominently in the Memory Metals story, and RobertVesco, the infamous fugitive financier best-known for hislooting of I.O.S.
On this occasion, the three landed in court essentiallybecause Competitive Associates, which ran a mutual fund, gotstuck holding the bag when the shares of International HealthSciences, an initial public offering in which it had taken alarge position, went into the tank in the early 1970s. Vescowas International Health's largest shareholder and he, Yamada and Constantinou conspired to distribute the shares through,if need be, crooked means. ( Yamada , through his attorney,declined to answer Barron's queries for the record.)
The Constantinou connection helps explain why MemoryMetals' outside directors, all five of whom had held theirseats for less than four months, acted so quickly last fallto oust its chairman and founder, Rogen, and its president,Schetky, from the company's management, and asked them tostep down from its board.
To briefly recap: Barron's first piece on Memory Metalsappeared on the newsstands on Saturday, Sept. 27. Thefollowing Monday, Rogen and Schetky were relieved ofexecutive authority, although they remained directors and onthe payroll. The move was made, according to Memory Metals'10k report for the year ended that June, but because of aletter Memory Metals had received, dated Aug. 20, 1986, fromthe SEC's enforcement division, advising Memory Metals thatit had begun an informal inquiry into its promotionalactivities.
But only three days later, on Oct. 2, the board convenedagain, to remove Rogen as chairman and CEO, for cause, overhis objections, and to accept Schetky's resignation as anofficer and director. (Rogen remained on the board, thefilings indicate, only because the other directors were toldthat they lacked the legal authority to oust him.)
Rogen and Schetky were dumped with such dispatch, severalof the outside directors explained to Barron's, because ofinformation they were given by the pair's personal attorney.That information, the directors say, indicated that, viadealings with Perry Constantinou and Aki Yamada , Rogen andSchetky had placed Memory Metals in clear violation of thelimits the SEC places on compensation that can be paid tounderwriters.
The company's 10k described what Rogen and Schetky'slawyer told the board, albeit in somewhat stilted andmysterious terms: Just prior to the initial public offeringof Memory Metals shares, in November 1984, "a certainindividual ('Mr. A'), who had introduced Mr. Rogen to thecompany's underwriter, asked Mr. Rogen to transfer to him360,000 shares of the company's common stock. According totheir counsel, 'Mr. A' had been introduced to Mr. Rogen byanother individual ('Mr. B') who Mr. Rogen had met at thecompany's original, but later replaced, underwriter."
To satisfy "Mr. A's" demand, the board was told, Rogendelivered 240,000 shares to him while Schetky gave him120,000 shares, although the certificates weren't endorsedfor transfer. But shortly before the underwriting was slatedto close on March 9, 1985, the documents continue, "'Mr.A'told Mr. Rogen that the offering would not close unless Mr.Rogen and Dr. Schetky gave him signed stock powers forattachment to the previously delivered stock certificates."They were delivered, gratis.
None of Memory Metals' subsequent SEC filings hasidentified the mysterious "Mr. A" or "Mr. B" (the 10Kexplained that they weren't named because the investigationhadn't been concluded). But the 10K did provide a clue:"'Mr.A' is believed by the company to be a principal, officeror employee of the firm which served as a financial relationsconsultant to the company for a fee of $1,500 a month fromSeptember 1985 to September 1986."
Pericles Constantinou confirms that, "I was a financialconsultant to the company, back in -- I think it was throughlast July, a year ago. And then they let me go."Constantinou, then, is undoubtedly "Mr. A."
And "Mr. B," Schetky says, is Akiyoshi Yamada . As MemoryMetals' former president tells it, Yamada was associated withA.T. Brod, the brokerage firm that was first lined up to takethe company public. When Brod backed away from theunderwriting, recalls Schetky, "Aki Yamada . . . thenintroduced us to Perry Constantinou, who in turn introducedus to the brokerage firm {Securities First} which took uspublic."
Schetky still insists that he sees nothing wrong with thedeal that turned over 360,000 Memory Metals shares toConstantinou and Yamada . When the company first went public,he says, "there were all kinds of finder's fees rollingaround in there . . . But it was not company money. Neil{Rogen} and I gave up our own stock . . . to make sure thatthe company went forward."
Yet a complaint the outside directors filed last Februaryin state court in Delaware against Constantinou and a groupof investors charged that they were "attempting to seizecontrol of Memory Metals through a blitzkrieg consentsolicitation" and implied that the payment was something verydifferent from a "finder's fee." Specifically, the complaintalleged, "Constantinou threatened Rogen that the offeringwould fail unless he personally was given 360,000 shares inpayment for his services with respect thereto."
What's more, the fact that Constantinou and Yamada received 360,000 shares at the time of the initial publicoffering was nowhere disclosed in the company's prospectus.
To be sure, Memory Metals' outside directors didn't haveto inquire deeply into Constantinou and Yamada 's past to comeup with reasons aplenty for wanting to sever any ties the twohad to the company. But testimony given in an SEC probe ofthe trading in another stock in which Constantinou wasactive, Keystone Medical, as well as in some recent civilsuits, indicates that "ownership" of that 360,000-share block-- so far as Constantinou and Yamada 's involvement in therigging of Memory Metals shares went -- was only the tip ofthe iceberg.
Some of this testimony came from Constantinou himself. Itwas given last October, at the trial of a suit filed infederal district court in New York by E.F. Hutton over tradesthat were left unsettled when Keystone Medical's stockcollapsed. In it, Constantinou explained how he managed to beactive in the underwriting business, at least on anunofficial level. He testified: "I am not a broker, but dealscome to me, companies to be underwritten, and I bring them tocertain brokerage houses to underwrite. I get a fee for that. . . sort of a finder's fee."
Constantinou went on to explain to the court that hedidn't directly introduce fledgling firms to prospectiveunderwriters; that he worked instead through "certainbrokers" who he'd placed at those firms. The brokers, hesaid, got hefty commissions plus a significant portion of theunderwriters' warrants for their trouble in each deal.
Under questioning, Constantinou conceded that he'drecommended a broker named Joe Tavormina for severalbrokerage industry jobs, including one with Securities First,Memory Metals' underwriter. And Constantinou acknowledgedthat he had recommended "30, 40, maybe 50" clients toTavormina, a former male model who also uses the name, JoeTabor. The significance of that testimony became clear laterin Constantinou's cross-examination.
"Q: Now, those underwritings that you would refer to thebroker . . . didn't you anticipate that you or some companylike World Wide Capital that you were affiliated with, wouldprovide bridge financing to the company before theunderwriting?
"A: If it was needed, yes.
"Q: And World Wide Capital or some other company wouldhave restricted stock in that company, is that correct?
"A: Hopefully.
"Q: And then, hopefully, the underwriting would be sold .. . in part to clients that you recommended . . . Therestrictions would come off the stock. World Wide would sellthe restricted stock and make a lot of money. Wasn't that thetransaction that was contemplated?
"A: If you want to take a scenario from now to three yearsfrom now, yes."
World Wide Capital is a "consulting and bridge financing"outfit based in New York City. Its president is Constantinouand, according to disclosure documents filed before itsregistration with the SEC was terminated in 1986, its othermajor shareholders include William Rodman -- the same WilliamRodman who has already pleaded guilty to manipulating MemoryMetals stock. Its corporate headquarters were at 225 ParkAve., suite 339, at least during 1985.
The picture of suite 339 that emerges from the variouscourt testimony is of a very cramped, chaotic and activeplace, where Perry Constantinou and Bill Rodman were verymuch in evidence, almost always on the phone, and oftenshared in the same conversations. Their offices also servedas at least temporary quarters for, besides World Wide, FirstFlorida Securities, a brokerage firm that became the targetof lawsuits stemming from Keystone Medical's collapse; WasteTechnology, an OTC-traded "pyrolytic resource recovery firm"of which Constantinou in a January 1986 deposition, said hewas a vice president, and, in connection with which, he iscurrently under indictment in Florida; Multivest, a realestate and construction products firm that also dabbles inproviding bridge financing and whose president, BarryPomerantz, is a third major shareholder in Constantinou'sWorld Wide Capital; and, Consulcor Corp., which providedbridge financing to Memory Metals that was repaid out of theproceeds of its initial offering, and wound up with warrantsto purchase 270,000 shares.
These various firms' bridge financing activities are athread that ties them to several of the stocks allegedlymanipulated by the trading ring the government isinvestigating. One example: Constantinou's office mate,Rodman pleaded guilty to manipulating the shares of MemoryProtection Devices as well as Memory Metals. And Rodman was amajor shareholder of World Wide Capital. That firm's mostrecent 10k, for 1984, lists among its scant assets 100,000restricted shares of Memory Protection, acquired for $1,000.Memory Protection's own more recent SEC filings, in turn,disclose that in order to finance an acquisition at the endof last year, it obtained a loan, at 5% over the prime, fromU.S.I. Venture Corp. and some private individuals, who gotpreferred stock convertible into common and warrants asadditional consideration for making the loan. One of theprincipals of U.S.I. is William Spier, a former vice chairmanof Phibro-Salomon and a current director of GAF Corp., whoserved briefly last summer as one of Memory Metals' outsidedirectors.
Spier, who declined to answer Barron's inquiries, was oneof the five business and academic luminaries added to MemoryMetals' board in June '86, at the peak of the effort to hypethe stock. As Schetky, the company's former president,recalls, it was analyst Peter Butler who strongly recommendedSpier be elected a director. But in any event, Spier was alsothe first of those five to quit the board, on Sept. 29, whenthe rest of the directors -- who at that point knew only thatthe SEC was investigating the company's promotionalactivities -- failed to go along with his motion that Rogenand Schetky be relieved of their duties that day.
It's possible that Spier and Constantinou eachindependently got involved in the two Memory companies.However, Constantinou, in his Keystone testimony, listed a"William Spier" as one of the investors to whom he'drecommended Keystone shares.
In any case, Constantinou was not only Memory Metals'financial relations consultant, and a major holder of itsrestricted shares, via the certificates he extracted fromRogen and Schetky, but also, according to a former FirstFlorida broker who worked with him in suite 339, effectivelyacted as Memory Metals' underwriter. The broker and trader,Rochelle Slovis, told the SEC in a deposition how, in early'85, after she went to work for First Florida in theconference room of Constantinou's small suite of offices,there were more than a few times when Constantinou and Rodmangave her direct and sometimes unusually specific orders, tocross trades, for example, without going through theirbroker, who, she said, was Joe Tabor.
Slovis also told the SEC that "I helped Perry Constantinouclose his deal" for Memory Metals. How? "They just needed toknow what accounts had paid for the stock, Memory Metals, inorder to close the deal because they needed, I think, $3million to close the deal or something like that. They didnot have records of checks coming in, checks that cleared,number of shares. They didn't know how to correlate the wholebit, which I did. The bank didn't have the records that wereclear enough so that they could systematically just checkoff. They had commingled their funds."
"Q: This was an underwriting by Securities First?"
"A: Yes."
"Q: Do you know what Mr. Constantinou's association waswith Securities First or Memory Metals?"
"A: Well, there was an association. Obviously. . . Ireally didn't want to know more than that. I didn't reallycare."
Former Memory Metals president Schetky recently insistedto Barron's that all the "flak" Memory Metals has taken wascaused by two outsiders, who have been "apprehended and havepleaded guilty to the charges." He added, "It was veryclearly this group which was hyping the stock and driving itup to what we considered a very high price, one that couldn'treally be justified by what we were doing." But, he asserted,"We had no control over that."
Yet they did have at least some nominal control overConstantinou, whom they hired, after all, to do financial PRfor them. What's more, Schetky's warm endorsement of thisspring's effective takeover of Memory Metals by a group ledby Ernest Barbella is puzzling. The "takeover" placed controlof the company back in virtually the same hands that had heldit at the start of its meteoric speculative rise. "This is agroup of bona fide investors who had every reason to beconcerned," he insists. "They had substantial moneyinvolved."
Less than a month after Memory Metals' outside directorsousted Rogen and Schetky last October, Barbella sent thecompany a letter requesting a shareholders' meeting. Hefollowed that up, on Nov. 3, with a letter saying he plannedto propose his own slate of directors, and then with an SECfiling that indicated he indicated to solicit proxies.
At this point, the company's affairs were being run by atwo-man team of outside directors. They were M. BrianO'Shaughnessy, a senior vice president-marketing ofInspiration Resources Corp., and L.G. Schafran, managingpartner of the real estate investing firm of the same name.One of the first things they'd done, upon taking over, was tohire some high-powered legal talent to investigate theallegations being made about the company, and handle thenumerous suits and countersuits that were quickly filed, notonly by shareholders, but by the company itself against itsformer officers.
Nor did it take long for Memory Metals' outside board todecide to battle the Barbella overtures. The board hadinformation that suggested Barbella had ties not only toConstantinou and Yamada , but to Schetky, Memory Metals'former president.
When Rogen and Schetky's attorney, sometime around Oct. 1,had told the outside directors about the 360,000 shares thatwere given to Constantinou and Yamada , he also traced 100,000of those shares in their subsequent journey to ErnestBarbella. Yamada had given him the shares, Barbella claimed,to satisfy a $200,000 debt from an unrelated businessdealing. A few months later, Barbella tried to get the sharesregistered, Schetky's lawyer reported, but was informed thatrecord ownership of the shares couldn't be transferred.That's when Barbella cut a deal with Schetky, in whose namethe shares were still officially recorded. Barbella returnedthe certificate to Schetky, who proceeded to sell another100,000 shares, and then turned over about 75% of theproceeds, or $600,000, to Barbella.
In less than a year's time, in other words, Barbella's"loan" to Yamada was paid back threefold.
In their legal challenge to Barbella's threatened proxyfight, Memory Metals' outside directors raised severalobjections, starting with the fact that his disclosurematerials failed to reveal from whom he'd gotten those100,000 shares (from "an individual" is the way the documentsread). Nor did the filings disclose, according to thecomplaint, that "Barbella has been acquainted with Yamada forsome time, and it was Yamada that originally introducedBarbella to Constantinou and, indeed, Memory Metals.Thereafter, Barbella has introduced other brokers, with whomhe has long done business, to Memory Metals, throughConstantinou. He has kept in touch with Constantinou eversince and admits talking with him two or three times a weekin recent weeks."
Memory Metals' board was uncomfortable too, over some ofthe details of Barbella's business career -- not all of whichwere reported in the documents he filed with the SEC. Listedin the resume Barbella did disclose were two littleover-the-counter firms on whose boards he had served:Musikahn Corp. and HME Records; both filed for Chapter 11 in1985, shortly after Barbella became a director. Omitted fromthe resume was a consent agreement he'd signed and an $85,000fine he'd paid last summer to the Agriculture Department, tosettle charges that one of his companies, Mid-West Meat Co.,bribed New York area supermarket executives.
Yet another significant omission from Barbella'sdisclosure documents, Memory Metals' board complained, wasthat Perry Constantinou, though he hadn't filed with the SECas an official member of Barbella's group, was in fact tryingto persuade shareholders to side with the insurgents. MemoryMetals' complaint recounts a series of three contacts with abroker in Hawaii (who owns shares himself and has a number ofcustomers who own shares) by Constantinou, and alleges theywere illegal: "Those conversations consisted of praisingBarbella's business acumen, with the likely consequence ofinducing that broker, and hence his customers, to giveBarbella a written consent."
The legal skirmishes between Memory Metals and theBarbella group were called to a halt on Feb. 13. Barbellaagreed to a four-year standstill pact, in exchange for thecompany's promise to elect two of his nominees to the board.Barbella was also named to a panel that was to advise theboard on employee compensationa group with some unusual teethin its charter. If O'Shaughnessy, who by then had beenelected the company's chairman and CEO, refused to go alongwith its recommendations, the peace treaty would be scuttled.
Memory Metals' board decided to negotiate with Barbella,according to former director Paul Kaestle, becausenegotiating "was better than continuing to fight, because itwas so expensive that it was going to drive the companybankrupt. You'd have won, and you'd have had nothing. That'sthe kind of choice we faced."
The main objections of the existing directors to theBarbella group, says Kaestle, were that "it wasn't clear thatBarbella and some of the people with him in the takeoverattempt were squeaky clean. And some of their own admitteddealings were less than desirable, in our view. On the otherhand, the resolution was semi-acceptable, in that he hadproposed a couple of directors who were not part of hisimmediate group, who had impeccable business records, andthose were the two who were put on the board."
The agreement quickly came under fire, however, from someof Memory Metals' outside directors. On April 7, thereconstituted board ousted O'Shaughnessy, in favor of StephenFisher, who'd been Memory Metals' vice president in charge ofoperations since 1985, and its chief operating officer sinceSchetky's removal from that post. At that same meeting, L.G.Schafran and Paul Kaestle resigned, and Barbella's twonominees joined the board. They are Jean-Paul Marx, presidentof Rhone-Poulenc Capital, and Martin H. Kern, an executivevice president of the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.
The upshot of all the maneuvering was that only two ofMemory Metals' outside directors, who had been strugglingsince the previous fall to keep the company afloat, remainedon the board. These two, however, weren't terribly "outside."Both had long been associated with Memory Metals, even ifthey only joined its board in June of '86. Indeed, back in1984, the company's red herring identified the pair, Dr. C.Marvin Wayman of the University of Illinois, and Dr. NicholasJ. Grant, a former director of MIT's Center for MaterialsSciences and Engineering, as members of its "advisory board."That nine-member group, the prospectus said, advised thecompany's management and board "with respect to business,financial, and technological planning and development." Thegroup had purchased 130,000 Memory Metals shares in 1983 fora penny a share.
Exactly two weeks after O'Schaughnessy was removed,Schetky was re-elected to the board. Today, in other words,Memory Metals' board consists of Rogen and Schetky and one oftheir long-time employees, Fisher, plus two outside directorswho've been associated with the company from its verybeginnings -- and Barbella's two nominees.
So, despite the continuing SEC and Justice Departmentinvestigations into Memory Metals and the parts severalhabitual violators of the securities laws played in itsorigins and last year's dramatic appreciation in its stock --and despite the collapse in the company's stock, theshareholder suits, and evidence of dubious dealings uncoveredby its own lawyers -- control of Memory Metals' board hasessentially reverted to the people in charge when all thoseterrible things began to happen to it.
But then, Memory Metals has always claimed that what'sspecial about its products is that, after they change shape,they snap back to their original



To: Sir Auric Goldfinger who wrote (9187)8/7/2000 11:39:27 PM
From: StockDung  Respond to of 10354
 
Ray D'Onofrio was partners with Regis Possino at one time at FIRST CAPITAL

tenkwizard.com



To: Sir Auric Goldfinger who wrote (9187)8/7/2000 11:53:37 PM
From: StockDung  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 10354
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

August Term 1997
(Argued April 23, 1998 Decided )
Docket No. 97-6195

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL, INC.; LOUIS J. SEPE; MARIA SEPE;
CASTLE SECURITIES CORP.; MICHAEL T. STRUDER; LESLIE
S. ROTH; and DUDLEY MIHRAN FREELAND,
Defendants,

JOHN ROMANO,
Defendant-Appellee.

B e f o r e : WALKER, CALABRESI, Circuit Judges, and RESTANI,
Judge.


Plaintiff-appellant Securities and Exchange Commission
appeals from the June 18, 1996 order of the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York (Peter K.
Leisure, District Judge) dismissing, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6), the SEC's claim that defendant-appellee John Romano
engaged in market manipulation in violation of Section 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78j(b), and Rule
10b-5 thereunder, 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5.
Vacated and remanded.

RICHARD H. WALKER, General
Counsel (Jacob H. Stillman,
Associate General Counsel,
Lucinda O. McConathy,
Assistant General Counsel,
Christopher Paik, Senior
Counsel, Paul Gonson,
Solicitor, Securities and
Exchange Commission,
Washington, D.C., on the
brief), for Plaintiff-
Appellant.

RONALD E. DePETRIS, DePetris &
Bachrach, New York, New York,
for Defendant-Appellee.




WALKER, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff-appellant Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") appeals from the June 18, 1996 order of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Peter K. Leisure, District Judge) dismissing, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the SEC's claim that defendant-appellee John Romano engaged in market manipulation in violation of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78j(b) (" 10(b)"), and Rule 10b-5 thereunder, 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 ("Rule 10b-5").

We hold that Romano can be primarily liable under 10(b) for following a stock promoter's directions to execute stock trades that Romano knew, or was reckless in not knowing, were manipulative, even if Romano did not share the promoter's specific overall purpose to manipulate the market for that stock. We therefore vacate the order of the district court and remand for further proceedings.

Background

The following facts are taken exclusively from the SEC's amended complaint, which on a motion to dismiss at the pleading stage must be read in the light most favorable to the SEC.

Romano was employed as a trader and registered representative of defendant Castle Securities Corporation ("Castle"), a securities broker-dealer. Castle agreed to participate in a scheme whereby it and other defendants, including Romano, would manipulate upward the price of the stock of U.S. Environmental, Inc. ("USE"). At the direction of stock promoter Mark D'Onofrio ("D'Onofrio"), certain of the defendants or their nominees traded USE shares among themselves "for the purpose of creating the appearance of an actual market for trading USE shares" and thus raising USE's stock price. The complaint alleges that

Romano knowingly or recklessly participated in and furthered a market manipulation by:

(a) effecting offers, purchases, and sales of USE securities in return for promises of risk-free profit for engaging in such trades;

(b) effecting directed and controlled trades of USE securities;

(c) effecting "wash sales" and "matched orders"; and

(d) effecting trades involving undisclosed nominees.

Wash sales are "transactions involving no change in beneficial ownership" and matched orders are "orders for the purchase [or] sale of a security that are entered with the knowledge that orders of substantially the same size, at substantially the same time and price, have been or will be entered by the same or different persons for the sale/purchase of such security." Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 205 n.25 (1976). The complaint states further that

Romano agreed to advise D'Onofrio continuously as Castle received buy and sell orders for USE shares during each trading day. Romano agreed to execute trades as directed by D'Onofrio, and Romano also agreed to move, or adjust, the price Castle quoted for USE shares at D'Onofrio's direction. In return, D'Onofrio assured Romano that Castle would receive a profit on the transactions D'Onofrio directed.

In a typical manipulative transaction,

(a) D'Onofrio would direct a buy order from one of the . . . brokerage accounts controlled by the D'Onofrio group [consisting of stock promoters Ramon N. D'Onofrio, Richard Kirschbaum, and D'Onofrio] to a market maker other than Castle;

(b) D'Onofrio would arrange in advance that the other market maker would contact Romano at Castle to buy the same number of shares;

(c) D'Onofrio would alert Romano that the other market maker would be calling Romano for stock;

(d) D'Onofrio, specifying number of shares and price, would instruct Romano to sell shares of USE to the other market maker; and

(e) D'Onofrio would supply Castle with the specified number of shares at a discount, enabling Romano to complete the transaction at a price at which both Castle and the other market maker received a risk-free profit on the transaction, as had been prearranged with Castle and Romano.



Romano, Castle, and the D'Onofrio group "intentionally engaged" in such "manipulative conduct . . . between September 1989 and December 1989." As a result of these manipulative trades, the price of USE stock rose from $.05 to approximately $5.00 per share in this period. In June or early July 1990, Castle sold approximately 15,000 shares of USE stock to retail customers at $6.00 per share. Between September 1989 and August 1990, Castle made a profit of approximately $175,000 as a result of its market-making activity for USE.

The SEC then commenced the instant action, alleging that defendants violated various provisions of the securities laws in connection with their manipulation of USE stock and other aspects of an illegal scheme involving USE. Romano moved, pursuant to Fed R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), to dismiss the SEC's manipulation claim under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 thereunder. The district court granted the motion, see SEC v. U.S. Envtl., Inc., 929 F. Supp. 168, 171 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), on the sole ground that the SEC had failed to allege that Romano was a "primary violator[]," as required by the Supreme Court in Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994). Rather, the district court held that Romano was alleged only to be an aider/abettor of securities violations, because Romano "follow[ed] directions from D'Onofrio in carrying out buy or sell orders" and "did not himself make wash sales, match orders, or use undisclosed nominees to artificially affect the price of securities." U.S. Envtl., 929 F. Supp. at 170. The district court stated that "[e]ven if Romano knew that [the buyers and sellers] were D'Onofrio and undisclosed nominees of D'Onofrio, and hence knew that D'Onofrio was manipulating USE stock, he did not himself manipulate USE stock because he did not himself have a manipulative purpose." Id. In a subsequent order certifying for interlocutory appeal "[t]he issue of what level of scienter is required before a person trading in securities can be said to manipulate the securities," the district court noted that "where . . . manipulation is the basis of the claim, manipulative intent, and not mere knowledge or recklessness, is required before Rule 10b-5 is violated." SEC v. U.S. Envtl., Inc., No. 94 Civ. 6608, at 1-3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 1996). On August 25, 1997, this court granted the SEC's motion for an interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1292(b).

Discussion

In reviewing the district court's dismissal of the SEC's claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), we are "required to accept the material facts alleged in the complaint as true" and will vacate the dismissal "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of [its] claim which would entitle [it] to relief." Easton v. Sundram, 947 F.2d 1011, 1014-1015 (2d Cir. 1991) (quotation marks omitted). Our review is de novo. See Leeds v. Meltz, 85 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1996).

Romano's principal contention on appeal, with which the district court agreed, is that he cannot be primarily liable under 10(b) for following a stock promoter's directions to execute trades that Romano knew, or was reckless in not knowing, were manipulative, where Romano did not share the promoter's ultimate "manipulative . . . purpose" to raise the stock price. We disagree.

Under 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78j,

It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange

....

(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the [SEC] may prescribe.

In Central Bank, the Supreme Court held that private civil liability under 10(b) applies only to those who "engage in the manipulative or deceptive practice," but not to those "who aid and abet the violation." 511 U.S. at 167. The Court observed that "[a]iding and abetting is a method by which courts create secondary liability in persons other than the violator [or violators] of the statute." Id. at 184 (quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). We have noted further that a primary violator is one who "participated in the fraudulent scheme" or other activity proscribed by the securities laws. SEC v. First Jersey Secs., Inc., 101 F.3d 1450, 1471 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 57 (1997).

Under the foregoing standards, we believe that, as alleged in the complaint, Romano falls well within the boundaries of primary liability. As an initial matter, we disagree with the district court's view that "[e]ven if Romano knew that [the buyers and sellers] were D'Onofrio and undisclosed nominees of D'Onofrio, and hence knew that D'Onofrio was manipulating USE stock, [Romano] did not himself manipulate USE stock because he did not himself have a manipulative purpose." U.S. Envtl., 929 F. Supp. at 170. This view conflates the distinction drawn in Central Bank between primary violators and aiders/abettors based on conduct with the separate issue of scienter. We have noted that

[t]he Supreme Court in Central Bank did not in any way rely on the level of scienter at issue, but on the fact that aiding and abetting was not included within the terms of [the Securities Exchange Act of 1934].

....

[The] Court held that aiding and abetting claims fall outside of the scope of 10(b) altogether, without drawing any distinction between claims requiring intent and claims requiring only recklessness

or some other level of scienter. Dinsmore v. Squadron, Ellenoff, Plesent, Sheinfeld & Sorkin, 135 F.3d 837, 843-44 (2d Cir. 1998). Thus, whether Romano was a primary violator rather than an aider and abettor turns on the nature of his acts, not on his state of mind when he performed them.

A. Scienter

Of course, to establish Romano's liability under 10(b), the complaint must as a threshold matter allege that Romano acted with sufficient scienter. See Chill v. General Elec. Co., 101 F.3d 263, 266 (2d Cir. 1996). The complaint's allegation that Romano "knowingly or recklessly participated in and furthered a market manipulation by . . . effecting 'wash sales' and 'matched orders'" and that he "intentionally engaged" in "manipulative conduct" is plainly sufficient to satisfy that requirement. It is well-settled that knowledge of the proscribed activity is sufficient scienter under 10(b). See Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 197 ("[t]he words 'manipulative or deceptive' . . . strongly suggest that 10(b) was intended to proscribe knowing or intentional misconduct"); First Jersey Secs., 101 F.3d at 1467 ("knowing misconduct" sufficient to establish liability under securities fraud statutes); SEC v. Lorin, 76 F.3d 458, 460 (2d Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (affirming liability against defendant who "knew of the manipulation agreement and knowingly participated in carrying it out"); cf. Restatement (Second) of Torts, 8A (1965) ("If the actor knows that the consequences are certain, or substantially certain, to result from his act, and still goes ahead, he is treated by the law as if he had in fact desired to produce the result."). Therefore, the allegation that Romano executed trades that he knew were for a manipulative purpose sufficiently alleged scienter in a manner supporting 10(b) liability.

Although we need not rely on this point, we also note that the complaint's claim that Romano recklessly participated in the manipulation also alleges sufficient scienter. See San Leandro Emergency Med. Group Profit Sharing Plan v. Philip Morris Cos., 75 F.3d 801, 813 (2d Cir. 1996) ("In order to establish scienter . . . , [it is sufficient that] the plaintiffs . . . identify circumstances indicating conscious or reckless behavior by the defendants"); Chill, 101 F.3d at 267; see also Louis Loss & Joel Seligman, Securities Regulation, Vol. VIII, ch.9, B(6), at 3665-67 n.521 (3d ed. 1991) (noting holdings of eleven circuits that recklessness can constitute sufficient scienter); cf. Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 193 n.12 (leaving open question whether "reckless behavior" is sufficient to establish 10(b) liability).

Moreover, as long as Romano, with scienter, effected the manipulative buy and sell orders, Romano's personal motivation for manipulating the market is irrelevant in determining whether he violated 10(b). Even if Romano were motivated by a desire to obtain compensation rather than by a desire to change USE's market price, as D'Onofrio was, Romano is liable under 10(b) if, with scienter, he effected the manipulative trades.

B. Primary Violator or Aider and Abettor

It is plain to us that the complaint alleged Romano to be a primary violator. Romano "participated in the fraudulent scheme," First Jersey Secs., 101 F.3d at 1471, i.e., the manipulation of USE's stock, by effecting the very buy and sell orders that artificially manipulated USE's stock price upward. Indeed, if the trader who executes manipulative buy and sell orders is not a primary violator, it is difficult to imagine who would remain liable after Central Bank.

In Central Bank, holders of defaulted bonds sued the issuer and others alleging primary liability under Rule 10b-5 and also sued the indenture trustee on the theory that the trustee aided and abetted the other defendants' violations by recklessly ignoring its oversight duties. The Supreme Court held that 10(b) "prohibits only the making of a material misstatement (or omission) or the commission of a manipulative act," 511 U.S. at 177, and it dismissed the claim against the trustee, who had done neither. Similarly, Shapiro v. Cantor, 123 F.3d 717 (2d Cir. 1997), involved an accounting firm that allegedly aided and abetted a fraudulent omission by "preparing [] financial projections that were later included in the principal defendants' offering memoranda," which in turn failed to disclose that one of the principals was a convicted felon. Id. at 721. We held in Shapiro that the accounting firm was not primarily liable, because "there exist[ed] no allegation that [its] projections misrepresented any financial fact" and the accounting firm in that case had no legal duty to disclose the information omitted from the offering memoranda. Id. at 721-22.

Romano, in contrast, did not simply fail to disclose information when there was no duty to do so, as in Shapiro, or fail to prevent another party from engaging in a fraudulent act, as in Central Bank, when there existed no duty to prevent such. Rather, Romano himself "commi[tted] a manipulative act," Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 177, by effecting the very buy and sell orders that manipulated USE's stock upward.

Finally, it is of no relevance that D'Onofrio, not Romano, masterminded the USE stock manipulation and that D'Onofrio's group "directed" Romano to effect the illegal trades.

The absence of 10(b) aiding and abetting liability does not mean that secondary actors in the securities markets are always free from liability under the securities Acts. Any person or entity, including a lawyer, accountant, or bank, who employs a manipulative device . . . may be liable as a primary violator under 10b-5 . . . . In any complex securities fraud, moreover, there are likely to be multiple violators. . . .

Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 191. Like lawyers, accountants, and banks who engage in fraudulent or deceptive practices at their clients' direction, Romano is a primary violator despite the fact that someone else directed the market manipulation scheme. The Supreme Court in Central Bank never intended to restrict 10(b) liability to supervisors or directors of securities fraud schemes while excluding from liability subordinates who also violated the securities laws. In sum, the complaint alleges that Romano is primarily liable under 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 for the manipulation of USE stock.

Finally, in concluding, we make a few observations. First, in granting Romano's motion to dismiss, the district court dismissed the amended complaint's "third claim for relief--that Romano violated 10(b) . . . and Rule 10b-5." U.S. Envtl., 929 F. Supp. at 171. Although the amended complaint's third claim was brought under Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. 77q(a) (" 17(a)"), as well as under 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, neither the district court's opinion nor its certification order mention 17(a). We also note that neither the SEC nor Romano has addressed 17(a) on appeal. We conclude, therefore, that the district court did not dismiss the SEC's third claim under 17(a), and we do not address 17(a) in this opinion.

Second, we note that, although Romano suggests that the complaint fails to allege Romano's fraud with particularity as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b), see Appellee's Br. at 6-7, the district court explicitly declined to rule upon that issue, see U.S. Envtl., 929 F. Supp. at 171, and did not certify that issue for appeal. We therefore are without jurisdiction to consider the point.

Third and last, we note that The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67 ("Reform Act"), enacted after Central Bank, provides that, in SEC actions, "any person that knowingly provides substantial assistance to another person in violation of a provision of [15 U.S.C. Chapter 2B, which includes 10(b)], or of any rule or regulation issued under this chapter [including Rule 10b-5], shall be deemed to be in violation of such provision to the same extent as the person to whom such assistance is provided." 15 U.S.C. 78t(f). Thus, unlike private plaintiffs, the SEC now has authority to assert aiding and abetting claims under 10(b). See id.; SEC v. Fehn, 97 F.3d 1276, 1283 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 59 (1997). It remains unclear, however, whether the SEC could bring aiding/abetting claims in cases based on conduct occurring prior to the enactment of the Reform Act. See id. at 1286-87 (applying Reform Act retroactively under particular circumstances of that case). Because the SEC did not make this argument before the district court or on appeal, however, we do not address this alternate ground for vacating the district court's dismissal. See Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(6); LoSacco v. City of Middletown, 71 F.3d 88, 92 (2d Cir. 1995) (arguments not addressed in appellate brief are waived).

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the order of the district court is vacated and remanded. Each party shall bear its own costs.

Copyright © 1998 by The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., Washington D.C.



To: Sir Auric Goldfinger who wrote (9187)8/8/2000 1:08:11 AM
From: StockDung  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 10354
 
The FINX Group Closes Acquisition of Internet Marketing Company


ELMSFORD, N.Y.--(BUSINESS WIRE)--Aug. 4, 2000--The FINX Group Inc. (OTC BB: FXGP) Friday reported that its planned acquisition of a controlling interest in Internet marketer Shopclue.com has been closed.

According to Lewis S. Schiller, vice-chairman and chief executive officer of The FINX Group, the transaction involved 1,030,000 shares of the company's common stock.

Shopclue.com, based in Armonk, N.Y., is an application service provider that enables small- and medium-sized businesses (merchants) to establish an online presence rapidly and inexpensively by using the company's proprietary software, for which it has five pending patents.

This new acquisition, which becomes the sixth operation embraced by The FINX Group, will continue to be managed by Blake Schiller, its founder and president. Schiller said the company's website will be live, operational and open to merchants and the public starting today.

NOTE: Any statements contained in this release that are not statements of fact may be considered "forward-looking statements" as that term is defined under U.S. Federal security laws. Forward-looking statements are only predictions and may differ materially from actual events or results.

CONTACT:

Molesworth Associates Inc., Green Valley, Ariz.

Gordon Molesworth, 520/625-0550

KEYWORD: NEW YORK