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To: PaperChase who wrote (7967)	8/11/2000 12:16:13 AM
From: Frank A. Coluccio	Respond to of 12823

Most forms of common carrier transmission gear allow for "in-service" monitoring and performance measurements in a "bridged" mode. Current day optical systems are capable (either intrinsically or through the use of specialized "in-line" Y-cable appliques (which are used as optical signal splitters in their legitimate role) to inflict the kind of offenses that your question implies. Thus, the avenue exists for more sinister purposes, as well, if individuals who are working "on the inside" of the service provider organization are so inclined. But simply being able to access the wavelength doesn't guarantee the crook anything. They would need to be sync'ed up to able to trap and decipher data, including scrambling algorithms, and they would need to know the type and configuration, transmission speeds and other attributes of the specific types of systems that were being used in the first place. If the customer is using encryption, then the intruder must have possession of the encryption key (or spend considerable time and resources breaking it). The more poignant issue here is the level of trust that one places in the provider's organization. And how trustworthy the employees actually are. Who is to say to what extent individuals will go to breach the security and abscond with information belonging to their customers? Now, if you were to ask me about the government's role in all of this... Another point that should be pointed out at this point has to do with standards. Standards that are set to ensure that service providers employ only the most trustworthy individuals. Forget it. In earlier times, when, for example, there was one Bell System, it was more difficult to get a job with the Telephone Company than it was to gain entrance to Officer Candidate School. If you got past the weeklong battery of aptitude and proficiency tests, then you had to pass a security clearance that would choke a horse. When all was said and done, they gave you a civil service pass to ensure that you got to work during times of public emergencies. Today, in contrast, when even a fly-by-night LAN administrator combines a domain name and some POPware with a piece of script that he/she just cobbled out of Front Page, you have a new service provider. They can offer voice services, international fax, local data services, Internet access and transiting, you name it. Who the h@!! are these people? This is the question that must be anwered, along with their trustworthiness, because these are the people to whom you entrust your information assets. It's not an issue of whether the equipment can be tapped. Because, and to answer your question, it can be tapped.