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Strategies & Market Trends : Anthony @ Equity Investigations, Dear Anthony, -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: Fundamentls who wrote (58561)8/12/2000 7:44:22 PM
From: LPS5  Respond to of 122087
 
If you have no such relationship with a company or its employees, and discover something on your own, the fact that it is non-public is not material. Many investors discover important facts about companies that only they are privy to, and they may or may not choose to share it with others.

No. You're talking about the originally singular definition of insider trading that had to do with fiduciary responsibilities and overwhelmingly dealt with corporate insiders, executive officers, and the like. Of course there is due diligence and good old fashioned investigative sleuthing, but to the extent that such involves the acquisiton of privileged (material and nonpublic) information, there is potentially liability. Read below:

srz.com

Over the last three decades, two theories of liability emerged for insider trading. The "traditional" theory covers actions by corporate insiders like officers or directors, or temporary insiders like investment bankers or lawyers working for the company whose securities are being traded. Under this theory, the duty not to trade the securities is based on the duty owed to the corporation's shareholders not to gain a personal advantage through the use of nonpublic information about the corporation's securities.

The traditional theory, however, left a gap in regulation. As the Supreme Court ruled in Chiarella v. United States in 1980, it does not cover someone who trades on material nonpublic information but has no special relationship tothe corporation whose stock he trades.

To help close that gap, the misappropriation theory was developed. It covers improper uses of market-sensitive information by "outsiders" who gain access to nonpublic information by abusing a relationship of trust and confidence owed to someone who does not have an obligation to thec orporation's shareholders. The doctrine has been applied (although not consistently) to a variety of corporate outsiders, including bankers, lawyers, arbitragers, financial printers, reporters and psychiatrists for abusing relationships with employers, parents, newspaper readers and patients by trading on inside information.


This, Fund and others, is the point which we are debating. It is not so much a matter of right or wrong but one which is currently being mulled over in court(s). It was noted above that this second theory of insider information has been applied inconsistently. Below, more details on the point that I think is the actual source of debate:

Whether a participant in a securities transaction owes a duty of a type that brings insider trading liability is often a complex question of fact-finding and hindsight interpretation. But there is no reason such participants should be subject to so much uncertainty. Thus, whether or not the Supreme Court upholds the misappropriation theory in the O'Hagan case, Congress should define and prohibit insider trading under both theories. Without altering the fraud provisions of Section 10(b), Congress should add to the 1934 law a ban on insider trading proposed by the S.E.C. and the American Bar Association in 1987. The proposal would:

Make it unlawful to trade securities while in the possession of material nonpublic information if one knows or recklessly disregards that the information has been wrongfully obtained or that the purchase or sale would be a wrongful use of the information. "Wrongfully obtained" means that the information is obtained by theft, bribery, misrepresentation or espionage, or by conversion, misappropriation or breach of a fiduciary duty or of a relationship of trust and confidence.


Prohibit "tipping" by insiders, and allow private investors who were injured by inside traders to sue.

Codify S.E.C. rule 14(e)(3), which specifically bars trades on material nonpublic information in the context of a tender offer.


If indeed this series of discussions is indeed a matter of opinion regarding the misappropriation theory and the liabilities involving certain parties obligations to the "owner" or "topic" of such information, my opinion is that such liabilities should exist. JMHO.

LPS5