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Politics : PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: phyxter who wrote (44117)10/9/2000 12:16:46 AM
From: Neocon  Respond to of 769667
 
Today's Statement by DR. STEPHEN D. BRYEN to Senate Subcommittee on Dual Use Exports to China
US Senate
03/16/99 DR. STEPHEN D. BRYEN

STATEMENT OF DR. STEPHEN D. BRYEN PREPARED FOR DELIVERY TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND FINANCE, SENATE BANKING COMMITTEE, MARCH 16, 1999

Export controls are part of America’s national security system and are intended to protect against the transfer of goods, technology and know-how to potential adversaries. For the export control system to work, it must be based on a coherent and consistently applied policy.

There are some significant and glaring failures in the current export control program, most notably in regard to China. Vast amounts of high technology are being sent to China. This technology can, and will, be leveraged by the Chinese for military purposes. These transfers will significantly alter the balance of power, both regionally and globally.

The United States lacks a workable technology export policy towards China. Recent revelations about the transfer of nuclear warhead technology to China dramatize this lack of policy.

It has been understood for some time that a major Chinese goal is to improve its nuclear weapons capability by adding multiple warheads to its strategic rocket force.

There are many technical aspects to building small and efficient nuclear weapons. High speed computers and specialized software are needed to verify various warhead designs. Advanced high precision machine tools are required to manufacture the complex shapes necessary to create a nuclear reaction in very confined space. More advanced and precise guidance packages need to be fitted so the warheads can effectively hit dispersed targets. Separation technology must be developed so that the release and dispersal of the warheads is effective and the warheads do not destroy each other (warhead fratricide).

Simple espionage would not have provided enough information to China to successfully build such weapons and deploy them. In addition to the blueprints, China would have to acquire the underlying critical technology to turn these designs into real weapons.

It is very important to stress that, before 1995, China lacked many vital parts of the infrastructure to build and deploy advanced, miniaturized nuclear weapons such as the W-88. Since 1995 a vast array of technology has been transferred to China including

hundreds of supercomputers (nearly two hundred in 1998 alone)
precision machine tools, many taken from closed-down US defense plants
guidance know-how particularly GPS technology
satellite separation technology possibly applicable to nuclear weapons
The bulk of these transfers of technology occurred because of weakened export control regulations.

If, by 1996, our government was aware that China had an active effort to acquire technology for small nuclear warheads –as they learned from the reported Los Alamos case—why didn’t the administration lock down technology that could be used by China to advance such a program? In other words, why didn’t the administration put a policy in place to protect our nuclear technology from Chinese exploitation?

Such a policy would have included tightening export controls on technology that China could use for its nuclear weapons program. And it would also have included very tight supervision over technology that might be allowed to go to China.

But, as we know, the opposite happened. No policy was put in place to protect technology –technology controls were significantly liberalized enabling critical technology to go to China, without supervision.

Advanced nuclear weapons are not the only military capability enabled by transfers of high technology to China. Other areas of concern include cruise missiles (giving China the equivalent of our Tomahawk cruise missile), underwater detection of submarines, improved and secure command and control, and guidance packages for smart weapons.

Consider what it would mean if a Chinese "Tomahawk" knocked out our ships at sea or destroyed vital defense bases. Consider too what would happen if, as is likely China exported such weapons to Iran or Iraq. Would we keep the advantage we now have? I doubt it very much.

It would neither have been difficult or impossible for the Defense Department and the intelligence agencies to determine which technology transfers might be leveraged most by China for its top military programs and evolve a plan to deal with the threat. Such a plan would include recommendations on how to control these technologies and provide explicit guidance to agencies responsible for regulating high tech commerce. But no such plan was developed and none has been implemented.

I think it is a national tragedy that critical technology has been allowed to be transferred without due regard to the national security risks and in spite of clear warnings that such transfers would lead to nuclear proliferation and the danger of missile attack against the United States and its friends and allies.

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Dr. Stephen D. Bryen previously served as Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Trade Security Policy and as the Director of the Defense Technology Security Administration. He received the Defense Department's Distinguished Civilian Service Medal in 1985 and in 1988.

freerepublic.com



To: phyxter who wrote (44117)10/9/2000 12:18:27 AM
From: Neocon  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 769667
 
What China Didn't Need to Steal
New York Times
May 5, 1999 GARY MILHOLLIN and JORDAN RICHIE

For fair use

What China Didn't Need to Steal
By GARY MILHOLLIN and JORDAN RICHIE
WASHINGTON -- Americans are right to be outraged that a suspected Chinese spy may have stolen the computer codes for the entire United States nuclear arsenal. But the loss of this data is only half the story. The other half is about hardware.
Even after stealing the plan for an advanced warhead, one would need high-performance equipment to manufacture and test its precision parts. Sadly, China is getting those machines from the United States -- and it doesn't even have to steal them.

A study we recently completed shows that the Commerce Department approved more than $15 billion worth of strategically sensitive exports to China in the last decade. Although supposedly intended for civilian purposes, the department's records show that much of this "dual-use" equipment went directly to nuclear-missile and military sites, the vertebrae of China's strategic backbone.

And unbeknownst to the American suppliers, several of these Chinese companies later sold nuclear and other military equipment to Iran and Pakistan, according to American intelligence reports and news accounts.

More than half of the $15 billion in exports consisted of computers. China had been denied access to high-performance computers until President Clinton loosened computer controls in 1996, after strenuous lobbying by his political supporters in Silicon Valley. Then a flood of computer exports began.

By now China has imported about 400 high-performance machines, just what would be needed to process the American nuclear codes and simulate the workings of our arsenal. Although China has insisted that these computers were imported for civilian uses, it has refused virtually all requests to let United States officials see what the machines are really doing.

In all, the military and strategic value of what China got from the Commerce Department was at least as great as what it may have gotten from spies. Consider the following:

The state-owned China National Nuclear Corporation was allowed to buy equipment useful for uranium prospecting made by International Imaging Systems, a California company. China National Nuclear then helped Iran prospect for uranium that American intelligence officials believe will be used in making nuclear weapons.

The state-owned China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation, which manufactures China's newest anti-ship cruise missiles, was allowed to buy a computer system that is useful for simulating wind effects. Not only did these missiles strengthen the Chinese military, but the company has also exported some to Iran, where, according to the United States naval commander in the Persian Gulf, they threaten our personnel.

The Chinese Academy of Sciences was allowed to buy equipment from the Convex Computer Corporation (which has since been bought by Hewlett-Packard) for processing data from an experimental fusion reactor. The academy then exported the reactor to Iran, where it is used for training nuclear scientists.

American equipment was approved for export to the National University of Defense Technology, which helps the People's Liberation Army design advanced weapons; the University of Electronic Science and Technology, which helps develop stealth aircraft and advanced military radar, and the Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, which helps develop missiles and specializes in guidance, navigation and flight dynamics. (The licensing records do not reveal whether all the items approved were actually shipped, but there is no reason to think they weren't.)

In the decade we studied, American companies were also licensed to sell China a great deal of noncomputer equipment that could be used for weaponry.

This included $241 million worth of machinery for making special semiconductors that can go into missiles, torpedoes, smart munitions, fuses and secure communications equipment; $131 million worth of high-speed oscilloscopes, which can record data from nuclear weapon tests, help design nuclear weapon firing circuits and develop missile guidance systems; $111 million worth of high-accuracy machine tools that can produce the precision parts needed for nuclear weapons and long-range missiles, and $5.4 million worth of vibration-testing equipment, which can enable nuclear weapons and missiles to withstand shock, impact and rapid acceleration.

Although China is not an enemy of the United States, it is not an ally. We disagree on fundamental issues like human rights, trade and the spread of weapons of mass destruction. "Engagement," the current policy toward China, is an abstraction connoting cultural visits and the opening of business ties. But in reality, this policy includes a trade in the means to make advanced weaponry.

Are high-tech exports so vital that we are willing to help China build a potent nuclear arsenal and the modern missile force to deliver it?

Gary Milhollin is director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control. Jordan Richie is senior associate at the project.

freerepublic.com



To: phyxter who wrote (44117)10/9/2000 12:20:21 AM
From: Neocon  Respond to of 769667
 
5am -- May 7, 1999 Bill Gertz
Eased export controls aided Beijing's missile technology

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By Bill Gertz
THE WASHINGTON TIMES
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U.S. satellite technology transferred to China in 1995 and 1996 has improved Beijing's rockets and missiles, according to a report to be released May 7 by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.
The bipartisan committee report sets out that the Chinese government is engaged in a covert operation aimed at influencing U.S. policies.
"Technical analyses and methodologies provided by American satellite companies to the [People's Republic of China] during various satellite-launch campaigns result in the transfer to the PRC of technical knowhow," the report says. "Such transfer enables the PRC to improve its present and future space launch vehicles and intercontinental ballistic missiles."
A senior Republican Senate aide said the report "confirms our worst fears" about the Clinton administration's policy of loosening satellite-export controls and trying to deal with aggressive Chinese spying on technology.
"China developed and implemented a covert-action plan to influence U.S. policy and through illegal campaign contributions sought to loosen controls on critical technologies," the aide said. "And it worked."
The aide said technology transfers to China "damaged national security" because "Chinese rockets are now or will become more reliable, more deadly and more potent and could be used against the United States."
The report says there is evidence that U.S. satellite technology "was incorporated into the PRC space-launch program," and the panel assumed that "any improvements in the PRC's space-launch vehicles would be incorporated wherever practicable in the PRC's military ballistic missile program.
"The committee concludes that the technical information transferred during satellite-launch campaigns enables the PRC to improve its present and future space-launch vehicles and ICBMs."
If Beijing uses the space technology in its growing force of strategic intermediate-range and short-range missiles, "national security will have been damaged," the report says.
"The committee believes . . . the PRC will use the transferred information to improve its short-range ballistic missiles, intermediate-range ballistic missiles and related technology. These missiles could threaten U.S. forces stationed in Japan and Korea, as well as allies in the region."
The intelligence committee says the CIA regards space launchers as "missiles in disguise," and notes that the Chinese Long March space booster "shares components with the PRC's CSS-4 intercontinental ballistic missile," most of which are targeted at U.S. cities.
The panel began investigating technology transfers to China in May after reports that two U.S. satellite manufacturers, Hughes Electronics Corp. and Loral Space & Communications Ltd., improperly shared satellite technology with China that boosted Beijing's long-range missiles.
The committee also investigated the connection between Democratic Party fund-raiser Johnny Chung and Beijing. Chung received a $300,000 donation from a Chinese aerospace company that contributed to President Clinton's 1996 re-election campaign.
According to the committee, China in 1995 launched "a plan to influence the U.S. political process favorably toward that country. . . . The plan was an official PRC plan, and funds were made available for its implementation."
The report says the CIA failed to recognize "the scope of PRC efforts to influence our foreign policy and our elections." It recommended increased efforts to monitor Chinese political-influence operations.
The committee examined export controls on satellites during the Reagan, Bush and Clinton administrations and focused in particular on several Chinese rocket failures in 1995 and 1996 that led to improper sharing of missile-related technology.
The Clinton administration transferred jurisdiction for licensing commercial satellites from the State Department to the Commerce Department, which subordinated national security to business interests, the committee says.
The report provides new details on the technology shared with the China Academy of Launch Technology after the Jan. 26, 1995, crash of a Long March rocket carrying a Hughes Apstar-2 satellite.
Hughes technicians helped improve the Long March booster. This "imparted to the Chinese sufficient knowhow to correct the overall deficiencies. The Hughes data was "very specific" and gave the Chinese insights on how U.S. manufacturers check boosters and satellites for defects.
A Feb. 15, 1996, Chinese rocket failure that destroyed a Loral Intelsat 708 satellite resulted in Loral's sharing of technology with the China Great Wall Industries Corp., which makes space launchers and missiles. The data could help China improve its launch and missile-testing practices and "could improve the reliability of PRC space-launch vehicles."
The data obtained from Loral is likely to be used by China and to "find its way into their space-launch and ballistic-missile programs," the report says.
Satellite motor technology shared with China in 1994 by Martin Marietta Astrospace "potentially benefited PRC space launch and missile programs," the report said. Major problems with Chinese satellite "kick motors" ended after the 1994 cooperation.
The 45-page report, which is not a classified document, recommends strengthening security on U.S. satellites launched abroad, and that annual reports are sent to Congress on satellite technology safeguards.

freerepublic.com



To: phyxter who wrote (44117)10/9/2000 12:22:23 AM
From: Neocon  Respond to of 769667
 
Foreign Policy
Governor Bush believes that American foreign policy must be more than the management of crisis. It must have a great and guiding goal: to turn this time of American influence into generations of democratic peace. This is accomplished by concentrating on enduring national interests and by resisting the temptation to withdraw from the world. As President, George W. Bush will pursue a distinctly American internationalism. He will set priorities and stick to them to avoid drift in foreign policy.

Governor Bush’s Foreign Policy Priorities
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As President, George W. Bush will:

Work with our strong democratic allies in Europe and Asia to extend the peace and deal with the challenges of China and Russia – two great powers in transition.

Promote a fully democratic Western Hemisphere, bound together by free trade.

Defend America's interests in the Persian Gulf and advance peace in the Middle East, based upon a secure Israel.

Check the contagious spread of weapons of mass destruction, and the means to deliver them.

Lead toward a world that trades in freedom.

Governor Bush’s Foreign Policy Principles and Proposals
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Excerpts from Governor Bush’s Foreign Policy Address, November 19, 1999.

No Isolationism: America cannot withdraw from the world. “American foreign policy cannot be founded on fear. Fear that American workers can’t compete. Fear that America will corrupt the world – or be corrupted by it. This fear has no place in the party of Reagan, or in the party of Truman.”

No Drift: The President must set priorities and stick to them. “Unless a president sets his own priorities, his priorities will be set by others – by adversaries, or the crisis of the moment, live on CNN.”

Eurasia, the strategic heartland, our greatest priority. “Two of Eurasia’s greatest powers – China and Russia – are powers in transition. And it is difficult to know their intentions when they do not know their own futures. If they become America’s friends, that friendship will steady the world. But if not, the peace we seek may not be found.”

China: China is a competitor, not a strategic partner. “We must deal with China without ill-will – but without illusions.”

US Allies in the Pacific. “We must show American power and purpose in strong support for our Asian friends and allies. This means keeping our pledge to deter aggression against the Republic of Korea, and strengthening security ties with Japan. This means expanding theater missile defenses among our allies.”

Taiwan. We must “honor…our promises to the people of Taiwan. We do not deny there is one China. But we deny the right of Beijing to impose their rule on a free people. As I’ve said before, we will help Taiwan to defend itself.”

Trade. “China will find in America a confident and willing trade partner. And with trade comes our standing invitation into the world of economic freedom. China’s entry into the World Trade Organization is welcome, and this should open the door for Taiwan as well.”

Human Rights. “If I am president, China will know that America’s values are always part of America’s agenda. Our advocacy of human freedom is not a formality of diplomacy, it is a fundamental commitment of our country. It is the source of our confidence that communism, in every form, has seen its day. And I view free trade as an important ally in what Ronald Reagan called ‘a forward strategy for freedom.’”

Russia: Our first order of business is the national security of our nation.
“Instead of confronting each other, we confront the legacy of a dead ideological rivalry – thousands of nuclear weapons, which, in the case of Russia, may not be secure. And together we also face an emerging threat – from rogue nations, nuclear theft and accidental launch. All this requires nothing short of a new strategic relationship to protect the peace of the world.”

Weapons of Mass Destruction. “In an act of foresight and statesmanship, [Senator Lugar and Senator Sam Nunn in 1991] realized that existing Russian nuclear facilities were in danger of being compromised. The next president must press for an accurate inventory of all this material. I’ll ask the Congress to increase substantially our assistance to Russia in dismantling as many of their weapons as possible, as quickly as possible.”

Missile Defense. “We…need missile defense systems – both theater and national. If I am Commander-in-Chief, we will develop and deploy them. Under the mutual threat of rogue nations, there is a real possibility the Russians could join with us and our friends and allies to cooperate on missile defense systems. But there is only one condition. Russia must break its dangerous habit of proliferation.”

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and Proliferation. “In the hard work of halting proliferation, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is not the answer. I’ve said that our nation should continue its moratorium on testing. Yet far more important is to constrict the supply of nuclear materials and the means to deliver them – by making this a priority with Russia and China.”

Democracy in Russia. “Dealing with Russia on essential issues will be far easier if we are dealing with a democratic and free Russia. Our goal is to promote, not only the appearance of democracy in Russia, but the structures, spirit, and reality of democracy. This is clearly not done by focusing our aid and attention on a corrupt and favored elite. Real change in Russia –as in China – will come not from above, but from below. From a rising class of entrepreneurs and business people. From new leaders who will build a new Russian state, where power is shared, not controlled.”

Chechnya. “Even as we support Russian reform, we cannot excuse Russian brutality. When the Russian government attacks civilians – killing women and children, leaving orphans and refugees –it can no longer expect aid from international lending institutions. Just as we do not want Russia to descend into cruelty, we do not want it to return to imperialism. Russia does have interests with its newly independent neighbors…The United States should actively support these nations of the Baltics, the Caucasus and Central Asia, along with the Ukraine, by promoting regional peace and economic development, and opening links to the wider world.”

India. “India is now debating its future and its strategic path, and the United States must pay it more attention. We should establish more trade and investment with India as it opens to the world. And we should work with the Indian government, ensuring it is a force for stability and security in Asia. This should not undermine our longstanding relationship with Pakistan, which remains crucial to the peace of the region.”

Alliances: Greater consultation and greater cooperation are needed to address security challenges. “All our goals in Eurasia will depend on America strengthening the alliances that sustain our influence – in Europe and East Asia and the Middle East. For NATO to be strong, cohesive and active, the President must give it consistent direction: on the Alliance’s purpose; on Europe’s need to invest more in defense capabilities; and, when necessary, in military conflict. To be relied upon when they are needed, our allies must be respected when they are not. The United States needs its European allies, as well as friends in other regions, to help us with security challenges as they arise. For our allies, sharing the enormous opportunities of Eurasia also means sharing the burdens and risks of sustaining the peace. The support of friends allows America to preserve its power and will for the vital interests we share.”

georgewbush.com