October 16, 2000
Gore Is Criticized for Russian Arms Deal
That Endorsed Sale of Submarine to Iran
By BOB DAVIS and MICHAEL M. PHILLIPS
Staff Reporters of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
WASHINGTON -- Al Gore's prominence in Russia policy is becoming a
campaign asset -- for his rival George W. Bush.
The vice president was criticized on Friday for signing a Russian arms deal
that endorsed Moscow's sale of a submarine to Iran. That comes on top of
Mr. Bush's attack during last week's presidential debate on U.S. and
International Monetary Fund economic policies toward Russia.
Unfortunately for Mr. Gore, the controversies come at a time when Middle
East crises have already shifted attention away from the domestic issues he
wants to emphasize.
"Gore has tried to talk of his foreign-policy
experience, compared to Bush's," says Robert
Zoellick, a foreign-policy adviser for the Texas
governor. "This is a heaven-sent opportunity for us
to say, 'Gore has experience, but bad experience.'
"
Pollsters doubt that Russia will become a big issue
in the campaign, or that the vice president's record
there will hurt him. But the controversies helped
knock the Gore campaign off stride at a time when
it hoped to rebound from a lackluster debate
performance by focusing on Mr. Bush's record in
Texas. With only 22 days left until the election, neither camp can afford to
spend days off message.
The arms controversy involves an agreement signed in 1995 by Mr. Gore
and Victor Chernomyrdin, then Russia's prime minister. The pact, whose
details were disclosed in the New York Times, endorsed Russia's
completion of deliveries to Iran of a diesel-powered submarine, T-72
tanks and other arms, which were part of Soviet-era contracts. Russia
agreed to complete the sales by the end of 1999, and not sell weapons to
Tehran, other than the ones specified.
For its part, the U.S. didn't seek penalties against Russia under a 1992
law, co-sponsored by Mr. Gore, then a senator from Tennessee, and
Republican Sen. John McCain of Arizona. That law proscribes sanctions
against countries that sell advanced weapons to nations such as Iran, which
the U.S. classifies as state sponsors of terrorism.
Aides to the vice president argued that the arms pact aided the U.S.
because the submarine and tanks weren't "advanced" weapons, as defined
by the Pentagon -- and thus the U.S. couldn't have applied sanctions
anyway. The nation most threatened by such arms, said a Gore aide, was
Iraq. "That's in our national interest," he said.
Nevertheless, Mr. Bush said he was "troubled that any agreement was
made that would allow arms to be sold to Iran." Mr. McCain said the
agreement "shows indefensibly bad judgment."
The arms controversy raises again the role of Mr. Gore in setting the
Clinton administration's Russia policy, which has sometimes been
ineffectual and naïve. The administration had hoped to help transform
Russia into a benign market-based economy. But that country has been
wracked by economic turmoil and the bitter war in Chechnya.
Mr. Gore's main role was co-chairing semiannual
meetings with Mr. Chernomyrdin and his
successors of the U.S.-Russia Binational
Commission. At the meetings, the vice president
pushed for reforms in Russia's courts, laws and
regulatory agencies that he hoped would make the
country attractive for foreign investors. Russia is
far from meeting Western standards, but U.S. and
IMF officials defend the effort as a long-term
investment.
The commission steered clear of big economic
policy issues -- such as interest rates and
government spending. Indeed, Mr. Gore's big task on the economy was to
deliver lectures to the Russians written by Treasury officials. The Treasury
has kept a tight grip on U.S. economic policy toward Russia, using the
Group of Seven major industrialized nations and the IMF to press its
reformist views.
On at least one occasion, however, Mr. Gore ventured out on his own. In
December 1993, after a commission meeting, Mr. Gore told reporters that
the IMF should lighten up on the Russians and not insist on such strict
budget tightening. The comment irked Treasury officials and some Russian
reformers, who felt that the IMF was making headway in encouraging
sound economic policies.
It took a couple weeks of tough, high-level meetings to solidify U.S. policy
behind the IMF again.
Mr. Gore's advisers argue that the meetings helped personalize relations
between the vice president and Mr. Chernomyrdin, which became
important during the Kosovo war, when Moscow named Mr.
Chernomyrdin as a special envoy. The two men met in the vice president's
mansion, with other U.S. officials, and devised strategies to end the
conflict.
In addition, the vice president helped negotiate big reductions in nuclear
arsenals in the former Soviet Union and the elimination of nuclear weapons
from Ukraine, Kazakstan and Belarus. That effort was begun under the
Bush presidency.
"The vice president's approach to Russia is premised on what is in the
national security interests of the U.S.," said Marc Ginsburg, a Gore
foreign-policy adviser.
But a Russia specialist who is Gov. Bush's chief national-security aide,
Condoleezza Rice, said Mr. Gore's efforts reflected a pattern of
"weakness and constant capitulation" toward Russia.
Write to Bob Davis at bob.davis@wsj.com and Michael M. Phillips at
michael.phillips@wsj.com |
