Theism and naturalism are contrasted with respect to furnishing an adequate foundation
for the moral life. It is shown that on a theistic worldview an adequate foundation exists
for the affirmation of objective moral values, moral duties, and moral accountability. By
contrast, naturalism fails in all three respects. Insofar as we believe (PLEASE NOTE that he STARTS with BELIEF. He really could have saved a lot of space and just said I believe it's true, that's why I'm right. That is ALL this big long argument says.) that moral values
and duties do exist, we therefore have good grounds(Those "grounds" being the ALREADY accepted belief. Highly illogical.. for believing that God exists.
Moreover, a practical argument for believing in God is offered on the basis of moral
accountability.
Source: "The Indispensability of Theological Meta-ethical Foundations for Morality."
Foundations 5 (1997): 9-12.
Can we be good I see no definition of what "good" is. Since what is "good" varies from culture to culture- what "good" are we talking about?without God? At first the answer to this question may seem so
obvious that even to pose it arouses indignation. For while those of us who are
Christian theists undoubtedly find in God a source of moral strength and resolve which
enables us to live lives that are better HOW does know this? It is not testable. You would need to be able to live two lives side by side in order to test this, and you cannot do that. than those we should live without Him,
nevertheless it would seem arrogant and ignorant to claim that those who do not share
a belief in God do not often live good moral lives--indeed, embarrassingly, lives that
sometimes put our own to shame.
But wait. It would, indeed, be arrogant and ignorant to claim that people cannot be
good without belief in God. But that was not the question. The question was: can we
be good without God? When we ask that question, we are posing in a provocative
way the meta-ethical question of the objectivity of moral values. Are the values we
hold dear and guide our lives by mere social conventions akin to driving on the left
versus right side of the road or mere expressions of personal preference akin to having
a taste for certain foods or not? Or are they valid independently of our apprehension of
them, and if so, what is their foundation? Moreover, if morality is just a human
convention, then why should we act morally, especially when it conflicts with
self-interest? Because being "good" in your society doesn't conflict with self interest. Whatever our society considers "good" it rewards people for. And you can see the rewards change over time as the conception of what is "good" changes over time Or are we in some way held accountable for our moral decisions and
actions?
Today I want to argue that if God exists, then the objectivity of moral values, moral
duties, and moral accountability is secured, but that in the absence of God, that is, if
God does not exist, then morality is just a human convention, that is to say, morality is
wholly subjective and non- binding. We might act in precisely the same ways that we
do in fact act, but in the absence of God, such actions would no longer count as good
(or evil), since if God does not exist, objective moral values do not exist.The first REASONABLE things he has said, but, alas, he doesn't agree with it. Thus, we
cannot truly be good without God. What he MEANS is we cannot be "objectively" good- he is using very loaded and irrational language here sneaking in the word "truly" On the other hand, if we do believeAH, belief again- but where's the proof? None is coming is it? No. that moral
values and duties are objective, that provides moral grounds for believing in God.SO we start with belief and we get to buttress our other belief- oh GOODY- that's nice and circular.
Consider, then, the hypothesis <But we just said that if we are "good" somehow it proves that God exists- NOW we are going to say that if God exists that proves morals exist- are we going to use belief on both ends of the equation and pretend that we were being logical? Oh I DO wonder! This is all SO exciting! Not. that God exists. First, if God exists, objective moral
values exist. To say that there are objective moral values is to say that something is
right or wrong independently of whether anybody believes it to be so. It is to say, for
example, that Nazi anti- Semitism was morally wrong, even though the Nazis who
carried out the Holocaust thought that it was good; and it would still be wrong even if
the Nazis had won World War II and succeeded in exterminating or brainwashing
everybody who disagreed with them.
On the theistic view, objective moral values are rooted in God. God's own holy and
perfectly good nature supplies the absolute standard against which all actions and
decisions are measured. God's moral nature is what Plato called the "Good." He is the
locus and source of moral value. He is by nature loving, generous, just, faithful, kind,
and so forth.
Moreover, God's moral nature is expressed in relation to us in the form of divine
commands which constitute our moral duties or obligations. Far from being arbitrary,
these commands flow necessarily from His moral nature. In the Judaeo-Christian
tradition, the whole moral duty of man can be summed up in the two great
commandments: First, you shall love the Lord your God with all your strength and with
all your soul and with all your heart and with all your mind, and, second, you shall love
your neighbor as yourself. On this foundation we can affirm the objective goodness and
rightness of love, generosity, self-sacrifice, and equality, and condemn as objectively
evil and wrong selfishness, hatred, abuse, discrimination, and oppression.
Finally, on the theistic hypothesis God holds all persons morally accountable for their
actions. Evil and wrong will be punished; righteousness will be vindicated. Good
ultimately triumphs over evil, and we shall finally see that we do live in a moral universe
after all. Despite the inequities of this life, in the end the scales of God's justice will be
balanced. Thus, the moral choices we make in this life are infused with an eternal
significance. We can with consistency make moral choices which run contrary to our
self-interest and even undertake acts of extreme self-sacrifice, knowing that such
decisions are not empty and ultimately meaningless gestures. Rather our moral lives
have a paramount significance. So I think it is evident that theism provides a sound
foundation for morality. Blah blah blah- What if a theistic religion had a God that advocated things akin to the things Hitler wanted? Considering what God did to the Egyptians in the Bible we see this is a perfectly reasonable thing to suppose- THEN theism, evidently does NOT provide a "sound" foundation, REALLY- at least according to the argument this poor guy makes. It is only "sound" because he is looking only at HIS theistic religion (which he likes and thinks is sound) and he is not considering OTHER Theistic religions that could be 180 degrees different from his own. He is not even considering the fact that his OWN theistic religion isn't all that moral- as is evident in the Bible.
Contrast this with the atheistic hypothesis. First, if atheism is true, objective moral
values do not exist. If God does not exist, then what is the foundation for moral values?
More particularly, what is the basis for the value of human beings? If God does not
exist, then it is difficult to see any reason to think that human beings are special or that
their morality is objectively true.We are special because we WANT to be. What could be better than that? Heck - that's why (imo) people created religions- so they could be EVEN more special. It is EASY for people to think they are special- everyone thinks they are. I've never met ANYONE who didn't think they were special. Egoism is not our problem- humility and compassion are what is lacking in our species. And I say "lacking" in the relative sense of MY wanting to see MORE of these qualities. This author, for example, apart from benefitting from some remedial education, could also use some humility and compassion. Moreover, why think that we have any moral
obligations to do anything? Who or what imposes any moral duties upon us? Michael
Ruse, a philosopher of science from the University of Guelph, writes,
The position of the modern evolutionist . . . is that humans have an awareness of
morality . . . because such an awareness is of biological worth. Morality is a biological
adaptation no less than are hands and feet and teeth . . . . Considered as a rationally
justifiable set of claims about an objective something, ethics is illusory. I appreciate that
when somebody says 'Love they neighbor as thyself,' they think they are referring
above and beyond themselves . . . . Nevertheless, . . . such reference is truly without
foundation. Morality is just an aid to survival and reproduction, . . . and any deeper
meaning is illusory . . . .
1
As a result of socio-biological pressures, there has evolved among homo sapiens a sort
of "herd morality" which functions well in the perpetuation of our species in the struggle
for survival. But there does not seem to be anything about homo sapiens that makes
this morality objectively true.
Moreover, on the atheistic view there is no divine lawgiver. But then what source is
there for moral obligation? Moral obligation exists because societies evlove (it seems) just as creatures do. As societies evolve the webs of "rules" within those societies get more complex. Of course we can see in the real world the differences in the complex rules society to society- many rules work. There appears to be no "right" answer. Unless you start off with a determination to find one and wear blinders so you don't have to look at the evidence that might endanger your theory. Richard Taylor, an eminent ethicist, writes,
The modern age, more or less repudiating the idea of a divine lawgiver, has
nevertheless tried to retain the ideas of moral right and wrong, not noticing that, in
casting God aside, they have also abolished the conditions of meaningfulness for moral
right and wrong as well.
Thus, even educated persons sometimes declare that such things are war, or abortion,
or the violation of certain human rights, are 'morally wrong,' and they imagine that they
have said something true and significant.
Educated people do not need to be told, however, that questions such as these have
never been answered outside of religion.
2
He concludes,
Contemporary writers in ethics, who blithely discourse upon moral right and wrong and
moral obligation without any reference to religion, are really just weaving intellectual
webs from thin air; which amounts to saying that they discourse without meaning.
3
Now it is important that we remain clear in understanding the issue before us. The
question is not: Must we believe in God in order to live moral lives? There is no reason
to think that atheists and theists alike may not live what we normally characterize as
good and decent lives. Similarly, the question is not: Can we formulate a system of
ethics without reference to God? If the non- theist grants that human beings do have
objective value, then there is no reason to think that he cannot work out a system of
ethics with which the theist would also largely agree. Or again, the question is not: Can
we recognize the existence of objective moral values without reference to God? The
theist will typically maintain that a person need not believe in God in order to recognize,
say, that we should love our children. Rather, as humanist philosopher Paul Kurtz puts
it, "The central question about moral and ethical principles concerns this ontological
foundation. If they are neither derived from God nor anchored in some transcendent
ground, are they purely ephemeral?"4
If there is no God, then any ground for regarding the herd morality evolved by homo
sapiens as objectively true seems to have been removed. After all, what is so special
about human beings?What limited imagination this guy has! We are as special as we think we are. But that's not good enough for THIS guy- he wants to be annointed by GOD special! Do we need further proof of how special humans are capable of thinking themselves? They are just accidental by-products of nature which have
evolved relatively recently on an infinitesimal speck of dust lost somewhere in a hostile
and mindless universe and which are doomed to perish individually and collectively in a
relatively short time. Some action, say, incest, may not be biologically or socially
advantageous and so in the course of human evolution has become taboo; but there is
on the atheistic view nothing really wrong about committing incest. If, as Kurtz states,
"The moral principles that govern our behavior are rooted in habit and custom, feeling
and fashion,"5 then the non-conformist who chooses to flout the herd morality is doing
nothing more serious than acting unfashionably.
The objective worthlessness of human beings on a naturalistic world view is
underscored by two implications of that world view: materialism and determinism.
Naturalists are typically materialists or physicalists, who regard man as a purely animal
organism. But if man has no immaterial aspect to his being (call it soul or mind or what
have you), then he is not qualitatively different from other animal species. For him to
regard human morality as objective is to fall into the trap of specie-ism. On a
materialistic anthropology there is no reason to think that human beings are objectively
more valuable than rats.Only if we were thinking OUTSIDE of ourselves, looking at all creation objectively- and humans can't do that. We are trapped in our won reality, of humanness. We are more special than rats because WE are thinking about ourselves being more special than rats. Rats probably think they are more special than us- but since they can't type- they can't contribute to this argument. Secondly, if there is no mind distinct from the brain, then
everything we think and do is determined by the input of our five senses and our
genetic make-up. There is no personal agent who freely decides to do something. But
without freedom, none of our choices is morally significant. No choise is ultimately morally significant, THEORETICALLY speaking- but it can have great practical significance.They are like the jerks of a
puppet's limbs, controlled by the strings of sensory input and physical constitution. And
what moral value does a puppet or its movements have? |
