To: Monty Lenard who wrote (33836 ) 11/4/2000 8:00:39 PM From: Les H Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 436258 The Democratic leadership at first refused to approve. Howard changed his question after my answer to Al Gore's vote instead of the Senate vote which was along party lines. >>>>> The United States was not interested in a unilateral declaration of war against the Iraqis. President Bush, a former ambassador to the United Nations, recognized the value of the U.N.'s support for American actions. The U.N. had passed eleven resolutions condemning the Iraqi invasion and Bush began work on one more. He dispatched top level American officials to the nations of the Security Council to secure their support for the wording of a resolution that would set up a formal deadline for the removal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. U.N. declaration 678 was passed on November 29, 1990 and called for the Iraqis to withdraw by midnight January 15th. The vote was 12 to 2 (Cuba and Yemen), with one abstention (China). The deadline was now set and it was up to Allied commanders to back up militarily this threat. Matching the initial deployments in speed and effectiveness was the second round of shutting allied forces into the region. American tanks from Europe and additional fighter wings from the United States were being rushed overseas to give credibility to the offensive option. Hundreds of thousands of reservists were activated, some for duty in the Gulf and some taking the place of active duty servicemen who were deployed. The idea that some of the troops would soon be rotated out of the Gulf and be home for Christmas was now gone for good. In the Congress, there was considerable concern for the President's actions. Bush reportedly asked the leadership of the Congress to approve U.N. Resolution 678 a day after it was passed, but the Congress refused. Many on Capitol Hill believed that sanctions should be given more time, but some speculated it was "politics as usual" with the Democrats unwilling to support a Republican President unless absolutely necessary. On a daily basis, many of the rank and file Congressmen took to the floor to denounce the administration for not seeking a diplomatic solution. To satisfy his critics, President Bush made one last attempt at a diplomatic solution by offering to send Secretary of State Baker to Baghdad and receive Iraqi Foreign Minister in Washington. For weeks this offer remains unanswered, although Saddam Hussein went out of his way to speak to other people who showed up in the Iraqi capital. Finally, on January 9th, Secretary of State Baker and Tariq Aziz agreed to last-minute meeting in Geneva to discuss the Gulf situation. This was regarded as the last chance at averting a war. Throughout the meeting, the media reported that progress was being made. However, in the end, everything fell apart. A personal letter from President Bush to Saddam Hussein was not even accepted as the Iraqi government demonstrated its intransigence at peacefully ending the Gulf crisis. War seemed more imminent than ever. On Capitol Hill, the Congressional leadership finally relented to the President's request and held a debate on a resolution in support of the U.N. Resolution 678. Although this was not a declaration of war, it did fall within the requirements of the War Powers Act and would authorize the President to commence offensive operations to eject Iraq from Kuwait. After several days of debate, the Congress finally voted on January 12, three days before the deadline in the U.N. resolution, to allow the President to militarily eject Iraqi forces from Kuwait. The vote in the House, 250-183, and the Senate, 52-47, is regarded as the key vote in conduct of the Gulf crisis and many Members of Congress are likely to be held accountable for the way their ballot. Between January 12 and 15th, all the world watched as the clock ticked down and no sign or withdraw was seen. Iraqi statements continued to claim Kuwait as the 19th province of Iraq and that they would never be separated. In the United States, the country heard President Bush state that offensive operations would take place "sooner rather than later" following the midnight deadline on January 15th. >>>>> Contrary to Howard the Duck, it was a U.N. operation and not a unilateral US campaign against Iraq where they could just go after Saddam. U.N. operations didn't go into ill repute until the failed Somalia operations.