To: Ellen who wrote (106511 ) 12/8/2000 7:25:10 PM From: gao seng Respond to of 769670 Wells: The law does not require futile acts. ..Thus, I agree with the trial court that the Miami-Dade Board did not abuse its discretion in discontinuing the manual recount. -- Furthermore, even conceding that the trial judge at the outset applied an erroneous “probability of doubt” standard in deciding that plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of establishing a cause of action, the trial judge faced a conundrumഊ-50- that must be adequately explained. Plaintiffs asked the trial judge to grant the very remedy–a recount of the under-votes–he prays for without first establishing that remedy was warranted. Before any relief is granted, a plaintiff must allege that enough legal votes were rejected to place in doubt the results of the election. However, in order for the plaintiffs to meet this burden, the under-vote ballots must be preliminarily manually recounted. Following this logic to its conclusion would require a circuit court to order partial manual recounts upon the mere filing of a contest. This proposition plainly has no basis in law. -- As I stated at the outset, I conclude that this contest simply must end. Directing the trial court to conduct a manual recount of the ballots violates article II, section 1, clause 2 of the United States Constitution, in that neither this Court nor the circuit court has the authority to create the standards by which it will count the under-voted ballots. The Constitution reads in pertinent part: “Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors.” Art. II, § 1, cl. 2, U.S. Const. The Supreme Court has described this authority granted to the state legislatures as “plenary.” See McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 7 (1892). “Plenary” is defined as “full, entire,ഊ-55- complete, absolute, perfect, [and] unqualified.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1154 (6th ed. 1990). The Legislature has given to the county canvassing boards–and only these boards–the authority to ascertain the intent of the voter. See § 102.166(7)(b), Fla. Stat. (2000). Just this week, the United States Supreme Court reminded us of the teachings from Blacker when it said: [Art. II, §1, cl. 2] does not read that the people or the citizens shall appoint, but that ‘each State shall’; and if the words ‘in such manner as the legislature thereof may direct,’ had been omitted, it would seem that the legislative power of appointment could not have been successfully questioned in the absence of any provision in the state constitution in that regard. Hence the insertion of those words, while operating as a limitation upon the State in respect of any attempt to circumscribe the legislative power, cannot be held to operate as a limitation on that power itself.”