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Politics : Formerly About Advanced Micro Devices -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: Dan3 who wrote (130114)12/28/2000 10:09:47 AM
From: Alighieri  Respond to of 1571896
 
the warhead will arrive via UPS in a crate labeled medical equipment (or some such)...

If it is as reliable as my last UPS shipment, I rest easier...

Al



To: Dan3 who wrote (130114)12/28/2000 11:14:07 AM
From: pgerassi  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 1571896
 
Dear Dan3:

There are problems with FEDEX. Contrary to popular belief, a suitcase nuke is not very safe. It is also heavy. It contains explosives that are easy to track and detect. Since, it must be moved by air (all FEDEX packages are flown to Memphis (at least AFAIK)), it will be scanned for explosives. Thus, it would not make it out country (it may even blow at that point which makes it worse than useless). Once they get a positive either by sniffer or by X-Ray, the jig is up. Ditto for any Air Cargo by commercial firms. So private aircraft or ships must be used. Private aircraft are routed to international airports for customs scan (here the jig is up but, in the US). A detonation here is likely only to affect the airport and close communities (most airports are surrounded by low density populations and international terminals are even placed in areas more remote than the main terminal) thus, a kiloton nuke will not damage a city but a few thousand in the airport proper and infrastructure such as runways, hangars, and buildings (Hiroshima and Nagasaki were about 20 kilotons at 2000 feet (50% kill radius about 1 mile) and a 1 kiloton nuke detonation at ground level has a 50% kill radius of less than 300 meters).

It might take a lot longer but, we would probably find the perpetrators of a suitcase nuke denotation. A MIRVed Nuclear Warhead is typically between 50 and 500 kilotons and has a 50% kill radius of between 1.5 to 5 miles. Thus the ICBM does far more damage with only one warhead than a suitcase nuke and it typically has between 8 and 16 of them. As the adage goes, you can kill a few dozen, cause a few million in damage and get away with it but, if you kill a few thousand and cause a few billion in damage, they WILL find you (even sworn enemies will cooperate to find you as you are extremely dangerous to everyone else (trust is very difficult to one who has used a suitcase nuke by anyone)).

Using optical connections, it is possible to operate through an EMP Pulse and it takes less than a second or two to reconnect to the outside with electrical connections after an EMP burst for SC shielded systems (picture this, the SC box is unlatched, opens, and a arm is rotated out of the box with a plug to connect to the socket connecting the outside antennas thus, completely operational two seconds after an EMP burst). So delicate systems are able to be protected through an EMP burst. The inner electronics of missiles could be protected in the same way. Laser guided missiles can be built to operate during an EMP burst. The designator system can be offline for a few seconds and intercept can still be made. Kinetic weapons survive just fine through an EMP burst. If they were shot before a burst, they will reach their target during and after one.

Pete



To: Dan3 who wrote (130114)12/28/2000 11:24:10 AM
From: richard surckla  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 1571896
 
Dan3... "Yes, and there are a number of reasons, both technical and political, for not attempting a boost phase intercept."

Wrong!!!! We are already doing it. Our fleet of ABL's are being developed now. A fleet of seven will be completed and flying operational missions by 2008. These are designed for boost phase interception, which under present technology is the only way to intercept a ICBM.