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Politics : Ask Michael Burke -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: Marty Rubin who wrote (87662)12/28/2000 6:59:10 PM
From: Thomas M.  Respond to of 132070
 
Thanks for the link ( risk.ifci.ch ). I'm going to have to reread this part several times to fully grasp it (since I'm not an options wiz), but the conclusions are disturbing.

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UBS fiasco

The biggest single loser in the LTCM debacle was UBS, which was forced to
write off Sfr950 million ($682 million) of its exposure. The UBS involvement with
LTCM pre-dated the merger of Union Bank of Switzerland and Swiss Bank
Corporation in December 1998. Various heads rolled, including that of chairman
Mathis Cabiallavetta (formerly chief executive of Union Bank of Switzerland),
Werner Bonadurer, chief operating officer, Felix Fischer, chief risk officer, and
Andy Siciliano, head of fixed income (who had been with SBC).

UBS's deal with LTCM was a variation on other attempts to turn hedge funds
into a securitized asset class with a protected downside. However in this case
UBS was protecting the downside and LTCM was taking a good deal of the
upside. The sweetener for UBS was a structure that looked more like an option
than a loan, turning any income into a capital gain, and an opportunity to invest
directly in LTCM.

For a premium of $300 million UBS sold LTCM a seven-year European call
option on 1 million of LTCM's own shares, valued then at $800 million. To hedge
the position - the only way it could be done - UBS bought $800 million worth of
LTCM shares. UBS also invested $300 million (most of the $266 million
premium income) directly in LTCM. Such an investment had to be held for a
minimum of three years.

This transaction was completed in three tranches in June, August and October
1997.

The deal was calculated so that the $300 million premium was equivalent to a
coupon of Libor plus 50 basis points over the seven years.

Assuming that LTCM performed well the deal provided UBS with steady,
tax-efficient, return plus a share in the upside, through its $266 million stake.

But if ever its hedge looked like falling below the $800 million strike price it was
looking at a loss. The only way to hedge it would have been to sell LTCM
shares.

But there were various impediments to this. UBS could not just dump the
shares. It was obliged to convert any shares it sold into a loan at par value,
maturing in 2004.

Shares in hedge funds aren't liquid, and LTCM's were no exception. It was
impossible to mark them regularly to market. LTCM reported to shareholders
only monthly. If UBS did sell LTCM shares in a falling market, and then LTCM's
performance picked up again, there was no guarantee it could rehedge its
position. No one was making a market in LTCM shares.

Theoretically there was a volatility cap on the arrangement: if the fund's volatility
exceeded a certain level a cash sum would be reckoned in UBS's favour,
payable at the end of year seven. But it is not clear how that would have left
UBS market-neutral.

In the climate of mid-1997 it is understandable how UBS risk managers might
have overlooked the horrible implications of a worst-case LTCM scenario.
LTCM had a fantastic reputation for big-number but low-risk arbitrage. (There is
a parallel in the reputation that Nick Leeson enjoyed at Barings before March
1995).

But it is clear now that UBS risk managers never faced the possibility of a
collapse of LTCM which would have left them with $766 million exposure ($800
million hedge, $266 million investment, less $300 million option premium). That
is, they didn't wake up to it, apparently, until around April 1998, in a post-merger
review, when it was too late to do much about it.

Credit Suisse Financial Products, which did a similar deal for $100 million, set
that as the maximum it was prepared to lose.

An interesting aspect of the UBS deal is to consider it from LTCM's point of
view. LTCM secured $800 million new investment capital at Libor plus 50 basis
points. It had a call on all returns above that level. UBS's obligation, to convert
any shares it wanted to sell into a loan, provided LTCM with a synthetic
seven-year put on its own performance. Was this an added incentive to roll the
dice? It was a cheap gambling stake.