Dear Dan3:
Deployment at this time is foolish. Let the R&D program continue. A limited ABM system is not destabilizing as others would tell you. If it is well known that it can only handle say 50 to 100 warheads, Russia could simply overwhelm it. Obviously, a government such as North Korea, Libya, Iraq, and even Israel could not overwhelm such a system. Buildup of both the infrastructure required and the weapons to deliver is a high bar to go over today. All we would be doing is to protect against those who have only a few MIRV ICBMs. Those that have only single warhead ICBMs or SLBMs, have an even higher bar to overcome. All of this takes money, resources, and time.
Since anything that can just overwhelm the system, would probably still cause a global disaster of practically unbelievable proportions (an estimate of 100 typical MIRV warheads detonating around the globe would cause 98% world population death, mostly due to starvation, and even higher destruction of global infrastructure). The only countries with that level of capability are Britain, China, France, Russia, and us.
As for the tests, I believe that the known trajectory is not told to the system. Thus, intercepts are much harder. The trajectory of the target is fixed to improve safety. Also, you do not learn to shoot baskets from mid-court you start close and work you way around and when the short stuff is very reliable, do you start with the long range stuff. Thus only two real tries to actually intercept with a kill vehicle have occurred, once where it missed and once later when it failed to launch. The first two attempts in anything, where you integrate complex components, are typically failures. Did you hit two home runs the very first two times you tried to hit the ball? Did you not land on your posterior the very first two times you tried to ice skate? How about the first two time you tried to walk? Especially, when the goal is to walk a mile?
No, the testing has gone according to the typical results in such cutting edge R&D. Lots of failures in the beginning, and about the first half dozen or so are complete failures. After that, some successes are accomplished to show that you are on the right track. By the end of the R&D phase, typical success rates are somewhere on the order of 60 to 80% against more difficult challenges.
To deploy, the above percentages are better than zero, the current percentage of having no system at all. To those that can only launch one or two ICBMs, no system practically guarantees success where a porous system could be better than advertised and 20% of success is far more costly than certain defeat by conventional forces of your target. Like good burglers, they go after the easy targets. If we are harder than someone else, they will go after that someone else.
As to the question of a suitcase bomb, if detected before it can be used, would be a complete disaster for the perpetrators. Every country with the possible exception of a likely few, would make sure that group or government is completely destroyed (under the adage, if they can do it to them, it can happen to us). If traced after the fact, then they will be even more devastated than before because of the larger losses (IMHO, incarceration for life with continuous public display (torture optional) would be a greater deterent than execution (they were willing to die for the cause) no matter how gruesome). Detection of nuclear materials used in such a bomb are quite easily detected even at modest ranges (tens of meters), thus preventing transport by commercial means either by passenger or via cargo is much more easily interdicted. Even after detonation, residual signatures show highly probable place of manufacture, as the source of the fissible material and the design used leave large "fingerprints" for detectives to find.
All in all, once the R&D have yielded a system with the minimal levels of reliability (or better), a limited missile defense (as long as the deployment cost is not greater than 100 billion or so) is probably better to have than no system at all. MAD is no longer needed to stop runaway buildup as economic forces have done a better job. Thus the ABM treaty has lived past its usefulness. As it was a bilateral treaty with the USSR, which no longer exists, our keeping it is only a salve to Russian interests (they would be willing to sign it again as it is in their interests because of their economy can not rekindle the arms race with us). When the R&D has yielded a system that is known to work, then we can negotiate if, we so desire. The Russians would have to give up quite a lot for us to continue the ABM treaty (IMHO they will not give up enough) as it exists now and China would need to sign it as well as our allies. Otherwise, we give up too much.
Pete |
