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Politics : PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: Machaon who wrote (122356)	1/17/2001 9:20:52 PM
From: d.taggart	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 769667

Still playing the fool hey barry,Bush sent food and food servers,Clinton was playing army when he changed the mission to get some warlords and he got our butts kicked he was better off playing army with monica,if ya know what I mean

To: Machaon who wrote (122356)	1/17/2001 11:38:22 PM
From: KLP	Respond to of 769667

You must not remember the Somalia famine...the whole article is interesting, but here's a snip... ndu.edu Expanded Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement in Somolia Expanded peacekeeping in Somalia began after the failure of UNOSOM I accompanied by the specter of 500,000 Somalis dead from famine by the fall of 1992 and hundreds of thousands more in danger of dying. The U.S.-led coalition approved by the Security Council in December 1992 had a mandate of protecting humanitarian operations and creating a secure environment for eventual political reconciliation. At the same time, it had the authority to use all necessary means, including military force. By March 1993, mass starvation had been overcome, and security was much improved. At its peak, almost 30,000 U.S. military personnel participated in the operation, along with 10,000 personnel from twenty-four other states. Despite the absence of political agreement among the rival forces, periodic provocations, and occasional military responses by UNITAF, the coalition retained its impartiality and avoided open combat with Somali factions--blending its coercive powers with political dialogue, psychological operations, and highly visible humanitarian activities. On May 4, 1993, UNITAF was succeeded by UNOSOM II, but the transition was badly managed. Basic U.N. deficiencies in planning, C3I, and political acumen were compounded by an expanded and intrusive mandate; greatly diminished military capabilities; more aggressive Somali opposition; uncertain support from the United States; differences within the coalition; and uncertainty by the Security Council, the Secretariat, and others. Subsequently, UNOSOM II crossed the "Mogadishu (or Beirut) line" and became a badly flawed peace enforcement operation. (In Beirut in 1983 and Mogadishu in 1994, military forces came to be seen by parties to the local conflict as co-belligerents rather than impartial peacekeepers.) In Somalia, peace enforcement was only an implicit element of the original U.N. mandate, which focused on peace-building (disarmament, political reconciliation, and economic rehabilitation). However, after a confrontation between the Somali National Alliance (SNA) and the U.N. led to the killing of twenty-five Pakistani peacekeepers, the Security Council made the operation's peace-enforcement mission explicit. It was executed by both U.N. forces and a 1,000-man U.S. rapid-reaction force under U.S. operational control, with the authority of the United Nations. (There was also a 3,000-man U.S. logistics unit under U.N. operational control.) A lack of decisiveness, cohesion, and command and control by the undermanned U.N. mission (half the strength of UNITAF, with some 20,000 personnel) and a series of armed clashes between U.S./U.N. forces and the SNA created a virtual state of war and undermined the effectiveness of the U.N. operation. Confusion over the dual-command relationship between the U.S. and UNOSOM II was another complicating factor, with a U.S. general officer serving as both the U.N. deputy forces commander and commander of U.S. forces. A clash on October 3-4 left eighteen U.S. personnel dead and seventy-eight wounded, along with over one thousand Somali casualties. Public outcry in the United States contributed to the decision to withdraw U.S. forces in March 1994. That, coupled with continued internal strife and SNA hostility toward the U.N., led to a total U.N. withdrawal in March 1995. This was executed skillfully, without casualties, in a carefully planned combined U.S.-U.N. action. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------

To: Machaon who wrote (122356)	1/18/2001 8:25:44 AM
From: H-Man	Respond to of 769667

The fact remains, and will always remain, that the waring parties did not challenge the presence of military until Clinton and his clowns changed the mission. What you call garbage is documented historical fact. Since Clinton Strongly supported UNISOM and UNISOM II, it is certain that he would have sent the troops as well. You ask a silly question, regarding the rules the warring parties played by, but I will give a responsible answer: The waring parties did not attack US or UN troops. Only when troops went hunting, did trouble began. You made the statement, that it was impossible for Clinton to pull out. You have failed to provide any evidence or facts to support that statement. Indeed Clinton kept troops there for 2 years. You are welcome to your opinion, but there are no facts or circumstances to support it.