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Politics : PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: Nadine Carroll who wrote (122718)	1/19/2001 6:29:56 PM
From: Mr. Palau	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 769667

>> It gave me the impression that they would have found some other reason to stop it if the calendar hadn't been convenient.<< Of course, we will never know for sure, but I tend to agree with you. I simply don't buy the notion that the Florida Supreme Court was result-driven, but that the United States Supreme Court is above that sort of thing. Looking at the way the voting broke down in the Court should disabuse folks of that notion. Anyway, I am going to go out this weekend and enjoy one of those beautiful national monuments our President had the foresight to establish in recent days. Have a good one.

To: Nadine Carroll who wrote (122718)	1/20/2001 10:40:07 AM
From: H-Man	Respond to of 769667

I can think of no circumstance, where they would not have remanded, given the right amount of time. Listening to the questions from the justices during oral arguments, and reading the opinion, there is no question. Besides, there would be no legal basis to do otherwise. If there were additional legal reasons, they would be cited. Although, the court likes to make decisions narrow, they always cite all reasons for a decision. Here is some more, from the Concurring opinion, that clarifies it a bit more ... 11 BUSH v. GORE REHNQUIST, C. J., concurring ... Surely when the Florida Legislature empowered the courts of the State to grant “appropriate” relief, it must have meant relief that would have become final by the cut-off date of 3 U. S. C. §5. In light of the inevitable legal challenges and ensuing appeals to the Supreme Court of Florida and petitions for certiorari to this Court, the entire recounting process could not possibly be completed by that date. Whereas the majority in the Supreme Court of Florida stated its confidence that “the remaining under-votes in these counties can be [counted] within the re-quired time frame,” ___ So. 2d. at ___, n. 22 (slip op., at 38, n. 22), it made no assertion that the seemingly inevitable appeals could be disposed of in that time. Although the Florida Supreme Court has on occasion taken over a year to resolve disputes over local elections, see, e.g., Beckstrom v. Volusia County Canvassing Bd., 707 So. 2d 720 (1998) (resolving contest of sheriff’ s race 16 months after the election), it has heard and decided the appeals in the present case with great promptness. But the federal deadlines for the Presidential election simply do not per-mit even such a shortened process. As the dissent noted: “In [the four days remaining], all questionable bal-lots must be reviewed by the judicial officer appointed to discern the intent of the voter in a process open to the public. Fairness dictates that a provision be made for either party to object to how a particular ballot is counted. Additionally, this short time period must allow for judicial review. I respectfully submit this cannot be completed without taking Florida’ s presi-dential electors outside the safe harbor provision, cre-ating the very real possibility of disenfranchising those nearly 6 million voters who are able to correctly cast their ballots on election day.” ___ So. 2d, at ___ (slip op., at 55) (Wells, C. J., dissenting). Given all these factors, and in light of the legislative intent identified by the Florida Supreme Court to bring Florida within the “safe harbor” provision of 3 U. S. C. §5, the remedy prescribed by the Supreme Court of Florida cannot be deemed an “appropriate” one as of December 8. It significantly departed from the statutory framework in place on November 7, and authorized open-ended further proceedings which could not be completed by December 12, thereby preventing a final determination by that date. For these reasons, in addition to those given in the per curiam, we would reverse.