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To: Second_Titan who wrote (85024)	1/22/2001 5:30:02 PM
From: jim_p	Read Replies (4) \| Respond to of 95453

We're now up to 19 and counting. Looks like Las Vegas it is: Revised list # 8: Name Attend Preference rz Yes Las Vegas Michael Harper Yes None diana g Maybe Las Vegas Warp Yes Las Vegas Tommycanuch Yes Las Vegas Jim P Yes Cancun Brad R Yes Cancun gpphantom Yes Las Vegas Big Dog Yes Las Vegas quehubo Yes Cancun JimL Yes Cancun Slider Yes (as long as Diana comes) Las Vegas ezspkns Yes Las Vegas Ronald Clark Yes Las Vegas Bruce L Yes Las Vegas John Doyle Yes Las Vegas Sharp end of the drill Yes Las Vegas Rory Heiner Yes Las Vegas Cosmo Yes (if after May 15th) Is there anyone else besides iso on the list for Cancun that would not be able to go to Vegas? Any other changes or additions? Jim

To: Second_Titan who wrote (85024)	1/22/2001 5:49:03 PM
From: Gottfried	Respond to of 95453

Q, I agree with your post #85024. In your previous post you said >IMO, California citizens are responsible for the mismanagement of their energy policy< I read things into that which you may not have intended. We Californians are responsible to pay for the energy mess. The average Californian could not have foreseen it. The people we pay to foresee such things failed us. Gottfried

To: Second_Titan who wrote (85024)	1/22/2001 6:05:20 PM
From: isopatch	Respond to of 95453

OT/From Far Eastern Economic Review. Hi level US defense official see new administration putting paying more attention to LT policy with Asia. OT but a damn good read for those interested in watching a very key area for energy demand. "U.S. Policy Turning Toward Asia By Kurt M. Campbell Issue cover-dated January 25, 2001 The writer was the chief Asian security official at the Pentagon between 1995 and 2000, serving as deputy assistant secretary of defense for Asia and Pacific affairs Periods of political transition in the United States are supposed to be orderly times designed to provide average Americans and prospective presidents alike an opportunity to reflect on recent political history and speculate on what might lie ahead for the nation. This is true for all aspects of national policy, both domestic and international. But one of the unfortunate consequences of last year's protracted post-election campaign has been the absence of a major public reflection on national priorities. Following that, George W. Bush and his team have struggled to prepare for this week's inauguration. There has been scarcely time to reflect about the policy challenges ahead. This is a shame because even though the political pages and editorial space of most American newspapers have been bereft of international coverage in favour of lengthy features on obscure electoral-college procedures, world concerns still wait for the next president--especially in Asia. This millennial campaign and subsequent transition period in my view will come to be seen as an epochal transition point in American attentions, away somewhat from European pursuits and more toward Asia. The possibility of a "transition to Asia" in future foreign-policy preoccupations received scant attention in the actual presidential campaign and the three debates and even less consideration during the transition period. Part of the reason for this is the general agreement in responsible Republican and Democratic circles around three central objectives in Asia--the importance of U.S. bilateral alliances, a consensus on "engaging" China and the desirability of enhanced and open trade and investment. Yet, despite this general political consensus and the benign neglect during the campaign, challenges on the Asian horizon are looming. The Pacific century, long hailed but little understood, lies directly ahead. An examination of the last decade of American foreign-policy pursuits reveals a strong preoccupation with European developments in the immediate wake of the Cold War. Indeed, the American foreign-policy elite has devoted an inordinate amount of its time and ingenuity on three strategic challenges during the last 10 years. These included assisting in the efforts to transform the Soviet Union to Russia, the reunification of Germany and the related task of preserving and reshaping Nato and finally coping with the mess associated with the demise of Tito's Yugoslavia. (Asia, in comparison, received somewhat more episodic attention, including during the 1994 nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula, the 1997 Asian economic crisis and its aftermath and recent efforts to engage China at the highest levels.) However, if we look just over the horizon at the decade ahead, it's a good guess that the three major challenges for the U.S. in the immediate future are in Asia, rather than Europe. After a decade of relative quiescence, Asia now stands on the cusp of major strategic change. My nominations for the top three challenges for the U.S. are: anticipating and dealing with the inevitable changes that are directly ahead on the Korean peninsula, managing the further security and political manifestations of China's rise on the international scene and coping with perhaps further calamitous signs of political incoherence in Indonesia. (If one composed a list of countries important to the U.S. but to whose importance America was largely oblivious, Indonesia would be at the top.) If that list were expanded, the next tier of challenges would likely contain still more Asian concerns. Specifically, trade friction between the U.S. and Asia--long dormant because of the strength of the U.S. economy--will reappear with a vengeance if the American engine of growth slows significantly. The Taiwan Strait also is emerging as one of the most dangerous and unpredictable places on the globe with a U.S. role that is far from clear. Indeed, the entire security architecture (or lack thereof) in Asia may well emerge as a critical shortcoming in the years ahead. The point of all this is that whether the period ahead will be stable and secure will be directly affected by policy decisions taken by the U.S. during the next few years. The changing strategic landscape in Asia demands that Washington pay at least as much high-level attention to the region as it did to the shaping of the new Europe during the 1990s. In other words, Washington must work to shape the forthcoming strategic environment in Asia as relentlessly and creatively as it tackled the previous European challenges in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union."