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Politics : PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: Ilaine who wrote (124027)	1/28/2001 12:46:10 PM
From: KLP	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 769670

Re: where could Iraq get weapons grade plutonium or uranium? Did some research CB, and found there are quite a number of articles regarding weapons grade plutonium or uranium....and where is Iraq (and other countries) getting it?? I've listed a couple of sites....the 2nd one is interesting and frightening at the same time... gdr.org usafa.af.mil JEFFREY A. LARSEN, Lt Colonel, USAF Director, Institute for National Security Studies EXECUTIVE SUMMARY While weapons of mass destruction have been recognized as a "major threat to our security," with nuclear weapons being the most potentially devastating, it is less understood that growing stockpiles of nuclear weapons grade fissile materials (plutonium and highly enriched uranium) are also a "clear and present danger" to international security. Much of this material is uncontrolled and unsecured in the former Soviet Union (FSU) Fissile materials are the essential elements for nuclear bomb making. Access to these materials is the primary technical barrier to a nuclear weapons capability since the technological know-how for bomb making is available in the world scientific community. A determined proliferator will be capable of making a nuclear weapon irrespective of financial and political costs, as has been demonstrated in South Africa, Iraq, and north Korea. Strategies to convince proliferators to give up their nuclear ambitions are problematic since, for the most part, those ambitions are a part of larger regional security concerns. The proliferation risks of fissile materials are great and there are no short term solutions. Of immediate concern is the breakdown of societal controls in the FSU and the huge amount of unsecured and uncontrolled fissile materials. There is no national material control and accounting in Russia. No one knows exactly how much fissile materials they have, and at most sites not only do they not know how much they have, they do not know if any is missing. A bankrupt atomic energy industry, unpaid employees and little or no security has created a climate in which more an more fissile materials will likely be sold in black markets or diverted to clandestine nuclear weapons programs or transnational terrorist groups. Growing stockpiles of plutonium are another major proliferation risk. Plutonium is not an economically viable fuel and there are no good long-term solutions for its disposition. Plutonium is a by-product of nuclear reactors and it is expected that there will be enough for 70,000 Hiroshima-type bombs by the year 2010. Coupled with the inability of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to adequately safeguard these materials, these growing stockpiles of plutonium are a serious long-term threat. Despite the seemingly hopeless magnitude of the problem, a number of non-proliferation efforts have been taken to strengthen the international non-proliferation regime. The crown jewel of that regime is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Measures to build on NPT have included nuclear weapon states agreeing to provide strengthened security assurances, establishing regional nuclear weapons free zones that include banning the production and reprocessing of fissile materials, harmonizing and expanding export controls, and negotiations on a fissile material cut-off regime that would cap the existing stocks of fissile materials. Other initiatives include enhanced cooperation with law enforcement to stop nuclear materials trafficking, the negotiation of a treaty making nuclear smuggling a crime against international law, endorsing IAEA proposals for strengthening safeguards, expanding material control and accounting efforts in the FSU, and funding for interim plutonium disposal options to lessen the risk of illicit diversion. While unprecedented progress has been made, and the proposals for strengthening the non-proliferation regime contained here will hopefully be implemented, the problems of the FSU are diverse and complex to be solved overnight. Nor can anything be done about the continued growth of plutonium in the short term. Control over these materials will ultimately rely on the continuos and simultaneous exercise of several measures--ranging from building international regimes, regional conflict resolution, and the cooperative efforts to slow and eventually reverse the availability of these materials. While there may be little one can do now to stop a determined proliferator, over time international consensus and a strengthened non-proliferation regime will convince proliferators that the costs far outweigh the gains. The US will have to take the lead--because no one else can--to meet this challenge through the entire range of political and economic tools discussed. The regime is not foolproof, but that does not mean that ongoing efforts and the proposals for enhancements are in vain. These efforts can close the proliferation spigot to a slow drip while time and the commonality of interest in non-proliferation change the political motivations to obtain these materials for illicit purposes. Eventually a seamless web of measures will result in the international community as a whole exercising the political will to stop and ultimately end the threat of nuclear weapons. FIVE MINUTES PAST MIDNIGHT: THE CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS GRADE FISSILE MATERIALS I. Introduction: What Is the Problem? The breakup of the Soviet Union left nuclear material scattered throughout the Newly Independent States and increased the potential for the theft of those materials, and for organized criminals to enter the nuclear smuggling business. As horrible as the tragedies in Oklahoma City and the World Trade Center were, imagine the destruction that could have resulted had there been a small-scale nuclear device exploded there. - President William Clinton U.S. Air Force Academy, May 31, 1995 A recent public opinion survey revealed that the American people believe that the danger from nuclear weapons is even greater today than during the Cold War. Indeed, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction may be the most important threat to US national and international security in the post-Cold War era. The proliferation of nuclear weapons, as well as other weapons of mass destruction, will likely continue over the next few decades in a limited number of countries, posing a real and immediate threat to US interests, friends and allies, and forces deployed around the globe. Nuclear weapons proliferation is clearly the most threatening and devastating of these mass destruction weapons. Given the number of nuclear weapons in various world inventories and the relative availability of both technology and nuclear materials, the acquisition or fabrication of a nuclear weapon by a state or terrorist group with interests inimical to that of the US is alarmingly possible. And, given the already-prevalent availability of technology and information associated with building nuclear weapons, the greatest threat and challenge to the nuclear non-proliferation regime in the immediate future will be to control and limit the spread of nuclear weapons-usable fissile materials. The danger is so great and the threat so immediate that US policy-makers and the public need to recognize the illicit diversion of fissile materials as a critical and urgent national security priority, one that will require top-level attention, public education and sufficient resource allocation if we are to eventually prevail over this new security challenge. >>>>>>>>>>There is a good deal more info in this article...