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Politics : Sharks in the Septic Tank -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: Lazarus_Long who wrote (3807)	1/28/2001 11:44:44 PM
From: Dayuhan	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 82486

What the Soviets, unconstrained by public opinion, might have done with a strategic advantage is very different from what the Americans might have done. Using your example of Hungary: would the US have actually launched a nuclear strike to defend Hungary, even with a BMD system in place? I doubt it. Would any President have the balls to threaten a strike he knew he wouldn't be able to actually carry out? I doubt it. It should be noted that a limited strike, even with a BMD in place, would be an appallingly risky affair. Suppose the Soviets responded with a full-scale launch? Would the BMD be able to handle it? Would anyone be willing to find out? The Soviets, if they were thinking, would have known that it would be politically impossible for America to conduct a nuclear strike in response to anything but a grave and direct threat. Which is why the intelligent policy for the Soviets to adopt would have been to keep the direct threat level well below a level that would warrant a nuclear strike, and concentrate on nibbling away at our sphere of influence in the developing world, an area in which nuclear forces had no real relevance. The art of war by proxy had two parts: first, choosing a proxy that could win, second, making sure that proxy wasn't going to be a bigger pain in the ass than the government it replaced. In Afghanistan we managed the first objective, but did less well on the second. In general, though, the Soviets were quite adept at maneuvering us into taking the sides of the decaying colonial powers and the corrupt and incompetent local autocrats, and we were all to willing to pick up those loosing hands.