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Strategies & Market Trends : ahhaha's ahs -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: gpowell who wrote (1083)	2/16/2001 11:18:18 PM
From: Ahda	Respond to of 24758

To understand, to read to see things that took place then and still do now . To read laws where provisions lay in wording and yet see people who are 99.9 percent genetically the same broadly speaking. Some where in the one percent humanity becomes political nonsense and egos aand greed that lack the concept of same planet and people.

To: gpowell who wrote (1083)	2/16/2001 11:44:43 PM
From: ahhaha	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 24758

Nice try. Gas was also regulated for the worst of reasons. In 1954 the Supreme Court issued the Phillips Petroleum Company v. Wisconsin decision, which declared that the Natural Gas Act of 1938 required regulation of both pipeline rates and the prices charged by gas producers, known as wellhead prices. As economics, there was no reason to regulate a competitive market containing thousands of producers. As regulation, wellhead price control was theatric. Instead of dealing with a few dozen familiar pipelines, the FPC had to examine the costs of tens of thousands of gas wells, including those of finding new supplies. By 1960 the FPC had decided ten producer rate cases and had 2,900 pending. It finally cut the backlog by regulating rates on the basis of average costs in an area, first regionally and later nationally. As policy, wellhead price control was disastrous. Basing its decisions on historic data, the FPC seriously underestimated the costs of replacing exhausted wells. In every year between 1966 and 1978 proved gas reserves in the lower forty-eight states fell. As production fell and shortages worsened, pipelines often had to curtail supplies to distributors, who in turn curtailed their captive customers. Seeing the shortages, the FPC issued several general price increase orders, but they seemed irrelevant in the near term. The oil shocks of the 1970s further aggravated the shortages, as oil users attempted to turn to price-controlled gas. There were no shortages of gas sold in the state where it was produced. These intrastate markets were not subject to FPC wellhead regulation. In 1977 newly elected President Jimmy Carter looked at the reserve statistics. Definitely not an economist, he concluded that the planet was running out of gas. Instead of quick price decontrol, he proposed a war on consumption, with producer incentives added almost as an afterthought. Beyond other consumption-limiting policies, the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978 regulated gas-burning facilities--beginning with a ban on new gas-fired power plants. By 1990 that act would prohibit any use of gas to generate electricity. On the supply side, the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 would alleviate interstate shortages by putting intrastate gas under the interstate price controls. That act would deregulate some newly discovered and preexisting gas, but only over the next ten years. Some prices could never rise above shortage levels, and about half of all gas would never be deregulated. The newly created FERC would take over most of the regulation. Everything could only get worse.