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Strategies & Market Trends : Hedge Funds -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: Marty Rubin who wrote (92)2/20/2001 7:22:07 PM
From: Marty Rubin  Respond to of 120
 
BUSINESSWEEK ONLINE : FEBRUARY 26, 2001 ISSUE

COVER STORY

Hedge Funds Are Hot Again
And they're no longer just for the superwealthy. But should you jump in?

You might say hedge-fund investor Robert F.X. Sillerman is having a rock 'n' roll day. Poring over his 2000 investment results, he has just realized he is up around 20% for the year--a rip-roaring return compared to the stock market. ''I'm elated,'' says the 52-year-old founder and former executive chairman of SFX Entertainment Inc. (SFX), the world's largest live entertainment company, which arranges concerts for the likes of Britney Spears, Kiss, and 'NSync. ''I'm this child of the '60s who happened to strike it big,'' says Sillerman, who made a bundle last year when SFX was sold to Clear Channel Communications for $4.4 billion. And he's constantly on the prowl for newer, younger managers with ''an edge.''

But it's not just the newly minted superwealthy baby boomers who are looking for better-than-soggy stock-market returns. Hedge funds, private pools of capital limited in most cases by law to no more than 100 investors, are no longer the exclusive stomping grounds of the rich and famous. The not-so-wealthy are getting into the game, too. The minimum investment used to be $1 million. Now, it can be as little as $100,000 for investors who participate in ''pooling'' programs at brokerages or even as low as $10,000 for hedge funds that are structured more like mutual funds. Asset managers and brokerage firms are also setting up their own hedge funds and hawking them to their customers.

The cloistered and mysterious world of hedge funds is being transformed and reinvigorated as new types of managers and investors flock to them. This may surprise those who thought hedge funds were dead after last year's notorious demise of Julian Robertson's Tiger funds and George Soros' Quantum funds.

What's so alluring about hedge funds? They can provide much-needed diversification and reduce risk by investing in niche areas such as private equity, commodities, and risk arbitrage or, most important, by shorting stocks--something that typical mutual funds, by law, are restricted from doing. Besides, hedge funds have trumped the average return for U.S. stock mutual funds in 12 of the past 14 years, with 1995 and 1998 the exceptions, according to Hennessee Group, a hedge-fund adviser. With the market showing scant signs of a recovery anytime soon, many investors see hedge funds as the only way to get, or stay, rich.

Hedge funds scored big last year. With the Standard & Poor's 500-stock index down 9.1% and the Nasdaq dropping 39%, the average hedge fund was up 8%, according to Hennessee. That's because they took advantage of an extremely volatile stock market. Managers who shorted, especially technology stocks, struck gold, with short-only funds returning an average of 30%. And risk-arbitrage funds, which typically invest in takeover candidates, took advantage of heavy merger activity to return 14.3%. Sector funds, such as those in health care, hit pay dirt, returning 62% while playing on the extreme ups and downs of biotechs, HMOs, and big pharmaceuticals.

''Hedge funds really delivered, so you've got a lot of money flowing in and incredible interest being shown,'' says Michael Ocrant, editor at Managed Account Reports (MAR/Hedge), which tracks hedge funds. Indeed, endowments and foundations are investing more and more money in hedge funds, and even large pension funds are starting to get their feet wet. Institutional investors now make up around 25% of the $400 billion in hedge-fund assets, according to Cerulli Associates Inc., up from only 5% in 1993. As institutions increase their stakes in hedge funds, they are demanding more oversight and accountability, possibly putting a damper on their performance.

And hedge-fund investing itself can sometimes prove ruinous. These funds use considerable amounts of leverage, or borrowed money, in order to juice returns, and if they bet wrong, losses can escalate. In the 1998 blowup of Long-Term Capital Management, the $130 billion fund borrowed as much as 30 times its capital. It ended up being taken over by creditors. Soros and Robertson imploded after abandoning their core expertise--macro plays that involved trading currencies and interest rates--for calling the shots on stocks. Robertson stuck stubbornly to value stocks, while Soros bet the farm on tech at the wrong time. When a hedge fund performs poorly, investors can't easily get out. Unlike mutual funds, most require a commitment, or lock-up, of one to three years. After that, they can typically only exit on a semi-annual or quarterly basis.

STEALTH MANAGERS. What's more, because hedge funds are largely unregulated, they're more susceptible to fraud. In fact, as hedge funds multiply and as less sophisticated investors get in, experts say it's likely fraud will only increase. No wonder both investors and regulators want hedge funds to open their books and reveal their strategies and risks (page 90).

Still, hedge funds are hotter than ever. Last year alone, their assets jumped $75 billion, and Van Hedge, a consultancy, estimates that hedge-fund assets will reach $1 trillion in five years. Newer, often younger hedge-fund managers have taken the baton from the former industry stalwarts and are racing with it. They are eschewing the macro strategies that made superstars of their predecessors. Unlike Soros and Robertson, who were in the limelight playing the ultimate daredevils who could roil markets, these hedge-fund managers want to remain in the shadows. ''There is absolutely no advantage to our investors for us to attract media attention,'' says one top manager.

That also helps to explain why in hedge funds these days, small is beautiful. Most managers, particularly those who have migrated from such megashops as Tiger and Soros, which at their peaks were managing $23 billion and $22 billion, respectively, are electing to close their funds at $500 million or $1 billion. This way, their strategies attract less attention from other investors, and they can zap in and out of positions. ''With more money, you have to come up with more ideas or settle for higher concentration in fewer stocks,'' says Charles J. Gradante, president and chief investment strategist at Hennessee. For example, Scott Bessent, who worked for Soros, raised $1 billion for his fund in just three months, then abruptly closed the door to new investors. Soros himself had plunked down $150 million in the fund.

''BRAIN DRAIN.'' Viking Global Investors, managed by a trio of former Tiger cubs, as alums of Tiger are known (page 84), has also elected to remain relatively small. And unlike Tiger, Viking is run by a team. ''They have three teams of analysts who are assigned a pool of capital, and they have to come to meetings and justify what they want to do with that money. If they don't have good enough ideas, they have to put the money back in the pool,'' says an investor. The fund was up 89% last year after fees.

The cream of the crop, say experts, are those managers who have come out of top shops like Tiger or Quantum. ''There's been a huge brain drain out of every corner of Wall Street into hedge funds. And many of these guys who are starting hedge funds have just spent three or four years at another top fund. So there's much less of a question about their ability to run hedged money,'' says Bruce D. Ruehl, chief investment strategist at Tremont Advisers Inc., a hedge-fund consultant. Wall Street's stars are attracted in good part by big money. In a good year, managers at top hedge funds can easily pull down several million dollars, since the fund keeps 20% of profits in addition to a 1% or 2% management fee.

That's why more and more mutual-fund managers have jumped ship to start hedge funds on their own or at their existing firms. Jeffrey Vinik, the former Fidelity Magellan manager, opened his own hedge fund in late 1996 and racked up triple-digit returns through the end of 2000. He recently closed up shop in order to run a smaller pool of money for himself. But Vinik's success seems to be the exception. ''It has to do with the Holy Grail of hedge-fund strategies: the ability to short--and mutual-fund managers often just can't do it because they've never done it,'' says Hennessee's Gradante.

Last year, because most hedge funds beat the market, managers earned their keep. ''Nondirectional strategies are the greatest interest right now,'' says Clark B. Winter, chief global investment strategist for Citigroup's Private Bank Div. Nondirectional, or market-neutral, means that the strategy has little correlation to the stock market--that is, whether the stock market is up or down, the fund should still outperform. Market-neutral funds returned 15.6% last year. But doing even better were long-short equity funds, which gained 16.4%, according to MAR/Hedge. These funds invest primarily in stocks and can go long or short them. Not that this strategy is new. In fact, the first hedge fund, created in 1949, was a long-short equity fund.

How important is shorting to a hedge-fund manager? It can mean the difference between dazzling returns and disaster. Some of the best-performing funds over the past year were technology-focused long-short funds that started shorting the market in the second half of last year when the Nasdaq took its biggest lumps. The three biggies doing this---Pequot Technology, the $5 billion fund run by Arthur J. Samberg in Westport, Conn.; Bowman Capital, the $5.5 billion fund run by Tiger alum Lawrence Bowman in San Mateo, Calif.; and Galleon Technology Fund, the $2 billion fund managed by Raj Rajaratnam in New York--returned 34%, 19%, and 12.5% last year, respectively, according to various hedge-fund trackers. Compare that to the average tech-sector mutual fund, which plummeted 33%.

HAVE IT BOTH WAYS. A long-short stock strategy tends to be less risky, especially when the bets are spread out across a variety of sectors. Maverick Capital Ltd., for example, the eight-year-old fund run by another Tiger cub, Lee Ainslie III, invests in eight different sectors, including media, technology, health care, and retail, and has positions in over 200 stocks. It was up 27.6% last year. And some sector funds other than tech have performed phenomenally (page 86).

Experts even say that macro strategies could make a comeback in the next year or two. ''Trends like a strengthening euro and yen against the dollar and falling interest rates in the U.S. are new opportunities for macro strategies,'' says Hennessee's Gradante. Some younger macro players such as Stanley Druckenmiller, Soros' former top lieutenant who now runs Duquesne Capital, are getting investors' attention. But these funds are quite different from their macro predecessors'. For one, they are more diversified, having branched out into domestic equities. They are also far less leveraged, use more sophisticated risk-management tools, and are smaller. Druckenmiller's fund has only $3 billion, compared with Quantum's $22 billion at its peak.

The megatrend starting to rock the industry is the invasion of pension funds, foundations, and the like. Hedge funds have been attracting bucketloads of institutional money, a phenomenon that most likely will continue to mushroom. The California Public Employees Retirement System, the largest U.S. pension fund, with $117 billion in assets, recently decided to put $1 billion into hedge funds for the first time and is looking to put more of its money into alternative investments.

There's a catch: Pension funds, because of their fiduciary responsibility to their investors, put dramatically different demands on hedge funds. Pensions, and increasingly those who lend capital to hedge funds, insist that hedge funds be much more open about their strategies, disclose how leveraged they are, and follow strict risk-management measures. They even try to negotiate fees. ''Hedge funds don't want any corollary, additional requirements imposed on them that would take their focus away from making money,'' says Kenneth M. Raisler, a Sullivan & Cromwell lawyer who represents hedge funds.

The inflow of pension and endowment money and the growing popularity of hedge funds among individuals explain why financial-services companies are clamoring to get into the act. They are starting their own funds, setting up funds of funds, or taking equity positions in hedge funds. ''Pension money is far more likely to go with a hedge fund with institutional standards,'' says Carrie McCabe, a hedge-fund consultant.

To cater to institutional investors, in the past year Merrill Lynch & Co. (MER) formed an alternative-investments division. Its first hedge fund, Merrill Lynch Equity Arbitrage, has $1 billion in assets. Merrill now has six hedge funds worldwide. The Bank of New York Co. (BK) purchased Ivy Asset Management last year, a firm that specializes in funds of funds. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette (DLJ), now Credit Suisse First Boston, got into hedge funds in 1994 and is now ramping up its offerings.

LOST EDGE. But there are drawbacks to funds run by brokerages, mutual-fund companies, and the like. The managers aren't as likely to have much of their own money tied up in the fund, as opposed to indie funds, where the bulk of the manager's money is typically invested. ''The manager simply isn't on the line in terms of performance,'' says Tremont's Ruehl. And many don't know how to hedge. Also, a corporate parent can interfere too much and insist on group decision-making so that hedge funds lose that maverick-like quality that has often allowed them to reap superior gains. What's more, the tendency of these funds is to grow larger and larger, much like mutual funds, making money off asset fees rather than focusing on top-notch performance. Says Jim Berens, managing director at Pacific Alternative Asset Management Co., a fund of funds in Irvine, Calif.: ''The whole lure of hedge funds is that they provide a break from the traditional asset-management business, where often there's more of a focus on getting money to manage than actually managing money.''

Not only are brokerages and fund companies going after the big guys, they are beginning to tailor hedge funds to the smaller investor. PaineWebber (PWJ), CIBC Oppenheimer, and others now have programs where investors pool their money, investing as little as $100,000 in hedge funds. PaineWebber now manages $2.5 billion in pooled hedge-fund investments, up from just $220 million in mid-1999. ''If a PaineWebber client has, say, half a million in U.S. equities, we will introduce hedging strategies to reduce overall portfolio volatility,'' says Gregory Brousseau, co-head of PaineWebber's alternative-investment group, who says it provides clients access to top managers that they otherwise wouldn't have. And mutual-fund companies like MFS and Strong Capital Management have started hedge funds. In fact, there's a whole new crop of hedge funds that are structured more like mutual funds: They have restrictions on the amount of leverage or short positions they can use, require as little as $10,000 to get in, generally don't require lock-up periods for investors, and don't impose hedge-fund fees.

All this sounds inviting. And with the market in the doldrums, investors may be tempted to give hedge funds a try, especially considering their track record. But as individuals and institutions pile in, demanding more oversight and stricter standards, hedge funds may end up little more than exotic, superexpensive mutual funds. And investors like Sillerman may not find those hot new managers with an edge after all.

By Marcia Vickers, with Debra Sparks and Heather Timmons, in New York

Copyright 2000-2001, by The McGraw-Hill Companies Inc. All rights reserve.

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To: Marty Rubin who wrote (92)2/20/2001 7:23:19 PM
From: Marty Rubin  Respond to of 120
 
BUSINESSWEEK ONLINE : FEBRUARY 26, 2001 ISSUE

COVER STORY

Hedge Funds 101

WHAT ARE HEDGE FUNDS?
Private pools of capital usually limited to 100 investors and run by a money manager, who has his own money in the fund.

WHY ARE THEY CALLED "HEDGE" FUNDS?
A misnomer, really. True hedging recalls the practice among commodity producers and processors of buying or selling futures contracts to limit or ''hedge'' exposure to price movements. Most hedge funds don't hedge in the strict sense. Rather, they use a variety of trading strategies to limit exposure to the overall market.

WHAT STRATEGIES DO THEY USE?
Everything from sophisticated arbitrage to growth-stock picking. While some funds invest only in ordinary stocks and bonds, others focus on arcane derivatives. What is common to almost all of them is the use of leverage and shorts.

HOW MANY ARE THERE?
No one knows; the guess is 4,000 hedge funds controlling about $400 billion.

WHO CAN INVEST IN THEM?
''Accredited'' investors, those who have $1 million or more in investable assets or an annual income of $200,000 for the past two years--although some funds, structured more along the lines of traditional mutual funds, have lowered the bar.

WHAT'S THE MINIMUM INVESTMENT?
Until recently, it was $1 million; however, some funds accept as little as $100,000, and that number is coming down.

WHAT ARE THE FEES?
Funds charge 1% to 2% management fees and around 20% of the profits a year.

HOW LONG IS MONEY TIED UP FOR?
A year, usually, but up to three years at some firms.

ARE THE FUNDS REGULATED?
They are largely unregulated, on the assumption that wealthy investors are also sophisticated and can do their own due diligence. In fact, hedge-fund investors are limited partners in the fund. However, the SEC can become involved in the event of fraud.

WHAT'S THE "HIGH-WATER MARK"?
An incentive for performance. Suppose a fund begins with $100 million and grows to $200 million. Result: 99 happy investors and a manager $20 million richer. The next year, the fund sinks and assets shrink. Result: 99 angry investors and a manager who won't see another dime until assets top $200 million, the high-water mark.

By Robert J. Rosenberg

Copyright 2000-2001, by The McGraw-Hill Companies Inc. All rights reser.

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To: Marty Rubin who wrote (92)2/20/2001 7:25:24 PM
From: Marty Rubin  Respond to of 120
 
BUSINESSWEEK ONLINE : FEBRUARY 26, 2001 ISSUE

COVER STORY

Intrepid Capital Management

George Soros has made some great bets over the years. Backing Intrepid Capital Management, set up in July, 1998, to specialize in tech stocks, was one of them. The fund, run by two unassuming fund managers, Steve Shapiro, 39, and Mike Au, 32, had no trouble beating the Nasdaq in 2000. It's up 9.5% so far this year.

Shapiro began investing in technology just as the bull market in the stocks took off in 1991 when he ran Fidelity's Select Electronics fund in Boston. He later joined Tiger Management before heading out on his own with $25 million from Soros. Au, who joined in March, is an alum of two other big funds, Maverick Capital and Moore Capital Management.

The aim, says Shapiro, is to generate superior returns while minimizing volatility. That means avoiding both the heavy-leverage and tech fads, such as Internet mania. ''We're more conservative than many tech funds,'' says Au.

Indeed, the fund was an early skeptic of Net stocks, which it shorts. ''We got killed for a while,'' says Shapiro. ''But we stuck to our convictions. We focused on shorting second- and third-tier players where we didn't think there would be as much risk.'' Early picks included Ventro, Garden.com, and Bid.com, all currently trading around $1. The fund remains well-hedged, but Shapiro and Au won't say what they're shorting now nor how big their short position is.

When they're buying, the two look for companies that are down on their luck but still have great technologies. Currently, they own Legato Systems Inc., a maker of storage software, which has doubled in value so far this year. Back in April, Shapiro and Au made a big bet on PeopleSoft Inc., a former highflier hit by the Y2K slowdown, buying at $14. The stock now trades at $37.

Macro investing may be making a comeback. But for Soros, his Intrepid bet never went out of style.

By Debra Sparks

Copyright 2000-2001, by The McGraw-Hill Companies Inc. All rights reserved.

businessweek.com
_____

COVER STORY

Intrepid Capital Management

ASSETS: $900 MILLION

2000 PERFORMANCE: 63% RETURNS

STYLE: TECHNOLOGY SECTOR FUND

Copyright 2000-2001, by The McGraw-Hill Companies Inc. All rights reserved.

businessweek.com



To: Marty Rubin who wrote (92)2/20/2001 7:26:58 PM
From: Marty Rubin  Respond to of 120
 
BUSINESSWEEK ONLINE : FEBRUARY 26, 2001 ISSUE

COVER STORY

Viking Global Investors

Fronting the offices of Viking Global Investors high above Park Avenue is a solid, 12-foot-wide wall of clear glass. Still, no matter how you position yourself, the inner workings of the hedge fund are invisible. No chance sightings of Andreas Halvorsen, 39, the chisel-featured Norwegian chief investment officer, or one of the other two partners, David Ott, 37, or Brian Olson, 35--the three former Tiger cubs who run the fund.

There's considerable buzz within the industry that Viking, cloaked in secrecy, is one of the hottest funds around. But sources say the most auspicious fact about the $2 billion fund is that it was up 89% last year after fees. That's killer performance in light of 2000's dismal stock market. Viking, a long-short equity fund that primarily invests in the U.S. and Europe, employs a ''bottom-up'' fundamental stock-picking strategy. It focuses on financials, telecommunications, media, technology, and consumer stocks. The fund's nine analysts meet with some 1,000 companies a year. ''Their core strength is that they're fantastic business analysts. They can really determine good companies from bad,'' says an investor.

Viking's principals learned their stock-picking skills from Tiger Management Corp., where Halvorsen worked for seven years and was director of global equities his last three. Halvorsen, Ott, and Olson all left Tiger in early 1999, more than a year before the fund imploded. ''They had pretty good timing,'' says a source. Each considered starting his own hedge fund until Halvorsen contacted them and suggested they try a team approach. Since Viking was launched in October, 1999, they have recruited 15 of their former Tiger colleagues. Their investors include ''very sophisticated businesspeople who can provide insight in the areas in which they invest,'' says an insider.

By Marcia Vickers

Copyright 2000-2001, by The McGraw-Hill Companies Inc. All rights reserved.

businessweek.com
_____

COVER STORY

Viking Global Investors

ASSETS: $2 BILLION

2000 PERFORMANCE: 89% RETURNS

STYLE: LONG/SHORT EQUITIES

Copyright 2000-2001, by The McGraw-Hill Companies Inc. All rights reserved

businessweek.com



To: Marty Rubin who wrote (92)2/20/2001 7:28:06 PM
From: Marty Rubin  Respond to of 120
 
BUSINESSWEEK ONLINE : FEBRUARY 26, 2001 ISSUE

COVER STORY

SAC Healthco

Arthur Cohen and Joseph Healey have taken health-care investing by storm with two hedge funds. One, called SAC Healthco, set up in August, is open to the public and is up 34%. The other, run exclusively for SAC Capital Management LLC, is up over 80% since February (after fees of 50%). ''It's like combining Michael Jordan and Shaquille O'Neal in one team,'' says Joseph L. Dowling, managing partner at Narragansett Asset Management LLC in New York.

Cohen, 39, and Healey, 34, learned the business at such giant funds as Tiger Management Corp., where Cohen was managing director, and Kingdon Capital Management, where Healey managed a health-care portfolio. Last year, Cohen and Healey partnered with SAC Capital, a $3 billion hedge fund that is Healthco's largest investor.

When looking for stocks to short, Cohen and Healey seek out companies that have poorly designed clinical trials or weak business models. Genomics, the new Holy Grail in genetic research, is the pair's focus at present. ''It's very similar to the Internet bubble,'' says Healey. ''There will be a lot of companies that just go away.''

Still, there are plenty of healthcare companies with lots of potential. One of their big winners last year was Cell Therapeutics Inc., which has a new leukemia drug. They bought at $12 a share in a private placement, and the stock eventually reached $74. ''There are phenomenal opportunities in health care,'' says Cohen. ''It's one-seventh of the economy, and it's not going away.''

By Debra Sparks

Copyright 2000-2001, by The McGraw-Hill Companies Inc. All rights reserved.

businessweek.com
_____

COVER STORY

SAC Healthco

ASSETS: $350 MILLION

2000 PERFORMANCE (5 mos.): 34% RETURNS

STYLE: LONG/SHORT HEALTHCARE EQUITIES

Copyright 2000-2001, by The McGraw-Hill Companies Inc. All rights reserved.

businessweek.com



To: Marty Rubin who wrote (92)2/20/2001 7:28:49 PM
From: Marty Rubin  Respond to of 120
 
BUSINESSWEEK ONLINE : FEBRUARY 26, 2001 ISSUE

COVER STORY

You're Entering a Regulator-Free Zone

On the surface, Laser Advisers Inc., a group of hedge funds that Michael L. Smirlock ran from tony Short Hills, N.J., was as respectable as could be. Yes, some of the securities purchased for the three hedge funds were somewhat exotic: options on interest-rate swaps--known as swaptions--that are thinly traded and difficult to value. But Smirlock, a former Goldman Sachs & Co. trader, seemed to have the right credentials to manage the $600 million that investors entrusted to him.

Yet on Dec. 21, the Securities & Exchange Commission sued Smirlock for overstating the value of his funds and hiding losses of more than $71 million. Smirlock denies the SEC allegations, and the case is pending. As it turns out, that's not the first time Smirlock has tangled with the feds. In 1993, Goldman executives discovered that Smirlock, a fixed-income trader, had falsified books and records. Smirlock was fined $50,000 and suspended from the securities industry for 90 days. He left Goldman at that time.

OPEN INVITATION. Welcome to the lightly regulated world of hedge funds. The huge amounts of money at stake and relative lack of oversight are an open invitation to fraud by unscrupulous operators. While fraud is still relatively rare, it does seem to be growing. Last year, the SEC and the U.S. Attorney's office sued five hedge funds for securities fraud involving more than $500 million in investor losses, says William R. Baker III, associate director of the SEC's Division of Enforcement. Though the number of suits may sound small, the pace of enforcement is stepping up: There were as many last year as in the entire previous decade.

The common thread in the cases: managers who bloat their returns and lie about losses. In the largest case, Michael W. Berger, founder of Manhattan Investment Fund, hid losses of almost $400 million from his investors. He pled guilty on Nov. 28 and is awaiting sentencing.

Why does it happen? Hedge funds are expected to outperform in down markets, and that puts pressure on money managers to cheat. ''Unfortunately, it's a fact of life,'' says John D. Finnerty, a partner at PricewaterhouseCoopers corporate-investigations practice. And once a fraud starts, it can be a lot harder to pin down than in other investment vehicles. Hedge funds are not subject to routine oversight by the SEC. ''They're not examined the way broker-dealers are, and they don't have the same reporting requirements as mutual funds,'' says the SEC's Baker.

Don't look to Capitol Hill to enact tougher anti-fraud laws, though. ''It has long been recognized that it's difficult, if not impossible, to legislate against fraud,'' says securities attorney Kenneth M. Raisler of Sullivan & Cromwell. If hedge-fund investors want more protection, they had better stick to more regulated products, such as mutual funds, he says.

Even if hedge-fund investors avoid outright fraud, other hazards await them. Unscrupulous hedge-fund managers who operate personal accounts can be tempted to book their most profitable trades to those accounts rather than the fund. ''There can be real serious conflicts if money managers have separate accounts and are not above-board about it,'' says Jane Buchan, managing director at Pacific Alternative Asset Management Co., a fund of funds based in Irvine, Calif.

The same risk applies to mutual-fund companies that are offering hedge funds to tap into a richer vein of fees. Unlike mutual funds, hedge-fund managers keep 20% of the profits they make each year, as well as charging expenses. So the temptation to flip the best trades into their hedge funds could be overwhelming. ''It's a problem waiting to happen. It's such an obvious area for abuse,'' says Barry P. Barbash, a securities attorney at Sherman & Sterling in Washington.

Hedge funds may be the hot new thing. But the way investors can get scammed couldn't be older.

By Debra Sparks

Copyright 2000-2001, by The McGraw-Hill Companies Inc. All rights reserved.

businessweek.com



To: Marty Rubin who wrote (92)2/20/2001 7:30:23 PM
From: Marty Rubin  Respond to of 120
 
BUSINESSWEEK ONLINE : FEBRUARY 26, 2001 ISSUE

COVER STORY

Commentary: The Wrong Way to Regulate Hedge Funds

Banks bear plenty of blame for the 1998 crisis over Long-Term Capital Management, the overleveraged Greenwich (Conn.) hedge fund. They loaned it too much money, demanded too little collateral, and knew too little about its huge, risky bets. When its collapse jeopardized the world financial system, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York had to broker a $3.6 billion takeover by creditors.

Regulators think they know how to avoid a repeat of the LTCM debacle. Although they don't regulate hedge funds, they think they can discipline them through the banks that supply them with credit. Regulators hope to reduce risk two ways: First, by requiring more disclosure of risks by banks and their clients. Second, by demanding the use of risk controls that force leveraged players to sell assets when prices fall.

But beware the law of unintended consequences. In trying to increase stability, regulators could inadvertently destabilize markets. Market-savvy critics argue that regulators put too much faith in fallible risk-management systems--and don't understand how markets operate in the chaotic periods that put regulatory systems to their ultimate test.

WORK IN PROGRESS. The controversy centers on the proposed new Basel Capital Accord, known as Basel II, which tells commercial banks how much capital they need to back up loans of all kinds. (Investment banks, which also lend to hedge funds, aren't covered.) It was issued last month by an international committee of banking regulators under the chairmanship of New York Fed President William J. McDonough, who was instrumental in brokering LTCM's takeover. The Basel committee is taking public comments until May 31. More than 100 countries, including the U.S., are expected to bring their national rules into compliance with the accord once the final version is issued later this year.

Leading the criticism of the Basel accord is a mild-mannered banker, Avinash D. Persaud, the London-based managing director of global research for Boston's State Street Bank. State Street doesn't lend to hedge funds, and Persaud says he finds hedge-fund operators a bit arrogant. But he believes that efforts to rein them in via their lenders could backfire. And his views are getting attention everywhere from Basel to London to Washington.

Start with disclosure. Some is essential, but Persaud says too much can be dangerous. If lenders know that a hedge fund needs to sell something quickly, they will sell the same asset--driving the price down even faster. Goldman, Sachs & Co. (GS) and other counterparties to LTCM did exactly that in 1998. (Goldman admits it was a seller but says it acted honorably and had no confidential information.) Persaud says disclosure would be less destabilizing if borrowers had to disclose their positions only once a month or so. ''Disclosure,'' he says, ''must not be a religion.''

ON AUTOPILOT. Even more destabilizing, says Persaud, are ''value-at-risk'' systems that prompt players to sell assets when their portfolio's riskiness hits a trigger level. These systems, required under Basel II, force players to sell into a down market. If only one company used the strategy, it might work. But when everyone uses it, they all try to sell at the same time. Persaud blames value-at-risk systems for exacerbating panics like the Asian contagion of 1997. He should know: State Street Bank is the world's largest custodian of financial assets, so it sees who's trading what and when.

Hedge funds are often operated by contrarians who buy when everyone else is selling or vice versa. But they can't perform that stabilizing function if their banks--following the dictates of value-at-risk models--snatch away loans right when the money is needed most. Persaud says value-at-risk models lead banks to overlend in good times and cut back too drastically when things go sour. He says Basel II, by relying on banks' own risk models, abdicates regulatory responsibility. To him, trusting the banks to calibrate their own risks is ''putting the inmates in charge of the asylum.'' He prefers old-fashioned government supervision that's less concerned with momentary trends in asset prices and more concerned with risky practices--such as having your assets in one currency, your liabilities in another.

Defenders of the Basel II accord say that Persaud exaggerates the dangers and understates the benefits of disclosure and value-at-risk methods. But even they admit he has a point: The International Institute of Finance, a financial-industry group, gave him its first prize last year for an essay called Sending the Herd Off the Cliff Edge. Yes, hedge funds can wreak havoc. But let's make sure the cure isn't worse than the disease.

By Peter Coy
Coy is associate economics editor.

Copyright 2000-2001, by The McGraw-Hill Companies Inc. All rights reserved.

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