From today's WSJ:
March 9, 2001
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The American Exception
By Nicholas Eberstadt, a fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.
Last week the United Nations Population Division released highlights of a major new report on world population prospects for the next half century. Obviously, many of the computed outcomes pivot on the assumptions embodied within them. The UNPD, for example, offers diverse scenarios in which the global population in the year 2050 happens to be shrinking or instead growing vigorously. To opt among them, just choose the postulated future "fertility variant" you prefer.
A number of the report's prospective trends, however, are decidedly less dependent upon specific or debatable assumptions. Four of these more "invariant" results deserve special attention.
Four Trends
- Global aging.
Since the coming wave of population aging is mainly the consequence of world-wide "health explosions" -- global life expectancy jumped by almost two decades over the past half century, and is expected to continue upward over the next 50 years -- it would take a catastrophe of truly Biblical proportions to forestall this trend.
Thus we are positioned for a new type of population explosion: a global surge in the number of older people. By the UNPD's "medium" scenario, the pace of growth for the world's 60-plus group would be almost three times the overall rate of population growth between now and 2050; for the 80-plus cohort, roughly four times the overall rate. Europe's median age half a century hence would be just shy of 50.
In 2050 Africa's median age may still be under 30. But in other low-income areas social aging will hurtle forward with breathtaking speed. China's median age in 2050 is placed at about 45 years -- roughly a decade and a half higher than today. Over a third of the citizens of that future China would be 60 or older.
This unprecedented, and virtually unavoidable, "aging explosion" will doubtless strongly shape social relations in rich and poor countries alike. No less important will be its economic consequences. All around the world, enhancing the potential of older citizens to contribute economically will almost surely be a key to material progress in the decades ahead.
- The decline of the West.
For the past quarter century, fertility levels in the "more developed" regions -- Europe (including Russia), Northern America, Japan, Australia and New Zealand -- have been below the level necessary for long-term population stability. Under current patterns, each generation would be 25% smaller than the one before it. Even with an upswing in fertility and continuing immigration from abroad, the population of the more developed countries might well be lower in 2050 than it is today.
In the late 1990s, according to the UNPD, the current "total fertility rate" for Western countries averaged 1.57 births per woman per lifetime. (Roughly 2.1 births per woman per lifetime are required for population stability.) The UNPD's medium scenario posits a 25% increase in Western fertility over the coming half century -- without any supporting evidence, we might note. Even so, today's more developed populations would register 125 million more deaths than births over the next 50 years. Under such circumstances, only massive immigration could stave off long-term population decline. But immigration flows may not do the trick. Even though the medium scenario presumes net inflows averaging two million immigrants a year as far as the eye can see, total Western population falls between now and 2050.
Remember though that the number of old folks in developed countries is poised to swell. Barring monumental upheaval, a demographic "twilight of the West" would seem to glimmer on the horizon.
- The eclipse of Russia.
While more developed countries as a grouping are positioned for decline, Russia is slated for an especially brutal descent.
Today the Russian Federation displays one of the world's lowest fertility levels: an estimated rate of 1.14 births per woman per lifetime. Its appalling mortality levels, by UNPD estimates, currently hover between those of the Dominican Republic and North Korea. Even with the UNPD medium scenario's presumed increases in life expectancy and fertility levels for Russia over the next 50 years, the country's population plummets precipitously.
By that telling, the Russian Federation's population falls to a mere 104 million in 2050 from 146 million in 2000 -- roughly the same level recorded in 1950. Only half as many people in the younger working ages (15-59) would be in Russia in 2050 as live there now. And whereas Russia is the world's sixth most populous country today, it would be only number 17 in 2050 -- smaller than Vietnam, Iran or even demographically-challenged Japan; only slightly larger than Turkey. Demography may not be destiny, but Russia's adverse population prospects will hardly aid the Kremlin's ongoing campaign against geopolitical irrelevance.
- American exceptionalism.
Given the almost gravitational pull of social aging and population decline on Western population profiles over the coming generations, one of the most surprising findings of the UNPD report is how very resistant the U.S. looks to these common trends.
For a developed country, U.S. fertility levels today are remarkably high. Apart from tiny Iceland, the estimated U.S. total fertility rate in the late 1990s was actually the highest in the developed world: just over 2 births per woman per lifetime, compared to an average of 1.4 births per lifetime for the rest of the grouping. America's changing ethnic composition (Hispanic-Americans now equal African-Americans in total numbers, the Census Bureau just announced) accounts for part of this difference -- but only part. "Non-Hispanic White" American women are currently having 1.7 births per lifetime.
By historical tradition and current practice, the U.S. is favorably disposed toward immigration. In the late 1990s, America took in almost half of all the newcomers absorbed by the developed countries. Thanks to these twin characteristics -- relatively high fertility and relatively high levels of immigration -- the U.S. is set to chart a different course from the rest of the Western world over the decades ahead.
For one thing, America's population, while aging, is still likely to remain distinctly younger than the rest of the West's. The UNPD's medium scenario illustrates the point. In 2050, median age in America would be about 41 years (it's currently 36) -- but in the rest of the West, it would be over 49 years. No other now-developed country would have such a young populace. In fact, in these projections America's age profile would be far closer to that of the future Mexico than that of the future Europe. If social aging is a worry, the U.S. will have to worry that much less.
Unlike the rest of the West, moreover, the U.S. is poised for continued population growth over the coming decades. Again, the medium scenario is illustrative. Where other developed countries as a group shrink by 15% between now and 2050, the U.S. grows by about 40% -- more than any other now-developed nation.
American Influence
Today America is the world's third largest country; 50 years from now, in the UNPD's medium scenario, it is still third (after only India and China). But the relative balance between the U.S. and other areas would also shift in interesting directions. There are now two Americans for every Russian. In 2050, the ratio would be four to one -- and there would also be almost four Americans for every Japanese. Even if the current European Union were to form a single state, its projected 2050 population would be significantly smaller than America's. To the extent that population matters in international affairs, America's demographic prospects would seem to support -- or even enhance -- U.S. global influence in the years ahead.
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