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Strategies & Market Trends : ahhaha's ahs -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: gpowell who wrote (1575)3/14/2001 7:27:17 PM
From: ahhahaRead Replies (1) | Respond to of 24758
 
I note from that testimony from Greenspan:

It was the judgment of officials at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, who were monitoring the situation on an ongoing basis, that the act of unwinding LTCM's portfolio in a forced liqudiation would not only have a significant distorting impact on market prices but also in the process could produce large losses, or worse, for a number of creditors and counterparties, and for other market participants who were not directly involved with LTCM. In that environment, it was the FRBNY's judgment that it was to the advantage of all parties--including the creditors and other market participants--to engender if at all possible an orderly resolution rather than let the firm go into disorderly fire-sale liquidation following a set of cascading cross defaults.

As President McDonough has detailed, officers of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York contacted a number of creditors and asked if there were alternatives to forcing the firm into bankruptcy. At the same time, FRBNY officers informed some of their colleagues at the Federal Reserve Board, the Treasury, and other financial regulators of their ongoing activities.
The troubles of LTCM were not a complete surprise to its counterparties. After all, LTCM's earlier statements regarding its August losses were well known, and sophisticated counterparties understood the difficulties in closing out large losing positions. In addition, the commercial banks among its creditors had already begun taking normal precautionary measures associated with exposure to counterparties whose condition is deteriorating. Still, creditors as a whole most likely underestimated the size and scope of the market bets that LTCM was undertaking, an issue that is currently under review.


Those of you who have doubted my claims over the years about the extent to which the NY Fed is in control better take the above under advisement. Greenspan and the Board only paint in broad strokes. The fine tuning that causes much of the problem is relegated to liberal money pumpers.



To: gpowell who wrote (1575)3/14/2001 7:51:12 PM
From: IlaineRespond to of 24758
 
I take them at their word. LTCM had derivitive liability in excess of $1 trillion when it started to default. The Russian Government had already defaulted on its payment to IMF and there was the Asian crisis, too. Not enough liquidity, there was the risk of bank failures and currency collapses, which it is the job of the Fed to prevent. They were well aware of the moral hazard problem.

Message 15504877