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Pastimes : Book Nook -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: Ilaine who wrote (182)4/5/2001 10:24:10 PM
From: JF Quinnelly  Respond to of 443
 
"In October 1930, the monetary character of the contraction changed dramatically- a change reflected in Chart 30 by the extraordinary rise in the deposits of suspended banks. Before October 1930, deposits of suspended banks had been somewhat higher than during most of 1929 but not out of line with experience during the preceding decade. In November 1930, they were more than double the highest value recorded since the start of monthly data in 1921. A crop of bank failures, particularly in Missouri, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, Arkansas, and North Carolina, led to widespread attempts to convert demand and time deposits into currency, and also, to a lesser extent, into postal savings deposits. A contagion of fear spread among depositors, starting from the agricultural areas, which had experienced the heaviest impact of bank failures in the twenties. But such contagion knows no geographical limits. The failure of 256 banks with $180 million of deposits in November 1930 was followed by the failure of 352 with over $370 million of deposits in December (all figures seasonally adjusted), the most dramatic being the failure on December 11 of the Bank of United States with over $200 million of deposits. That failure was of especial importance. The Bank of United States was the largest commercial bank, as measured by volume of deposits, ever to have failed up to that time in US history. Moreover, though an ordinary commercial bank, its name led many at home and abroad to regard it somehow as an official bank, hence its failure constituted more of a blow to confidence than would have been administered by the fall of a bank with a less distinguished name. In addition, it was a member of the Federal Reserve System. The withdrawal of support by the Clearing House banks from the concerted measures sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to save the bank- measures of a kind the banking community had often taken in similar circumstances in the past- was a serious blow to the System's prestige."

There's a very long footnote associated with this paragraph describing the efforts of the NY Fed to organize a rescue, but you're just going to have to pony up the cash and buy the book. It's a gold mine of information. The 1930 banking crisis was just the first a series of waves of bank failures in the early 30s that finally culminated in the "banking holiday of 1933".

. Back then, people didn't take out 30 year mortgages on their houses, it was like a balloon - one to three year term, and when they came due, you paid the full amount or tried to refinance.

Very true. This led to the 30 year mortgage, so that people wouldn't lose their homes quite so easily.

Revolutionary War pensions. War of 1812 Pensions. Will Books, 1742-1924. George Washington's will.

I have copies for a number of my ancestors. My dad went out to the Library of Congress a few years ago and tracked down a lot of the documents. Now, if you could find any records of George Stubblefield, Jr, who was in the Virginia Revolutionary Convention with that other George you named, I'd be real interested.



To: Ilaine who wrote (182)4/6/2001 12:05:25 AM
From: JF Quinnelly  Respond to of 443
 
Someone commenting on David Dremen's book Contrarian Investment Strategies:

"Dreman says he looked at actual volume during the great depression when prices were low. If I remember correctly, he said prices were low as there were no buyers. IF a buyer had shown up and tried to take a large position, the lack of liquidity would have brought the prices up as those that held were not selling. He says much of the statistics from the depression are way out of whack on small cap returns due to liquidity... Interesting read."

amazon.com