"I perceive myself as a self- aware being capable of choice. I am surer of that than of the evidence of my senses, which seem to me less reliable... The primary locus of experience is my body, particularly the senses and the place where they are processed (the brain)."
Is there something besides your brain that you are proposing as processing information here? Otherwise, I fail to see how the processing of unreliable data could lead you to experience a somewhat sure conclusion.
Perhaps you are preparing to assert that there is another part of you, separate from the brain which processes data? Otherwise, I fail to grasp your distinction between the unreliability of your senses versus the reliability of your perception.
"I assume that they, like me, have "selves" underlying their empirical selves"
Here it is again. You appear to be trying to insert the idea of a self separate from what you term empirical or evidenced self. For what purpose? And if you have not experienced this self empirically, then on what evidence do you assert it as underlying your "empirical self"? Is this solipsism necessary to justify something in your experience? And if these perceptions are in your experience or empirical, then what justifies your cerebral machinations?
"One of the characteristics of persons is that they... introduce ideas of beauty and goodness, and treat them as qualities one can discern in things, as important ways of ordering experience"
I have seen gang members whose only goal in life is to take whatever they can, with absolutely no concern for what some of us think of as "rights", and without any consideration whatsoever for any intended or incidental harm which might attach to others from their behaviour. If there is beauty and goodness in this, then it must be admitted that the concepts of these qualities that you are espousing are notable for their vapidness and imprecise focus.
But perhaps you were meaning to suggest only that some people introduce ideas of beauty and goodness. More precisely, what is considered beautiful or good is not universal, but relative to (as the word "considered" ought to make plain), the point of view of the person contemplating the matter. Values (like meaning) can only come from the MIND. They are distinctions, not objects; they are relationships of thought and feeling, not light spectra, or ears of corn.
"Certain things, or actions, seem worthy of admiration and praise, and we call them good. The perception of things as beautiful or good precedes choice and acculturation, and are spontaneous responses upon which acculturation and choice depend."
Two things here: Firstly, your introduction of "we" signals your final withdrawal from the attempt to argue the objective and universal, and signals your retreat to the subjective and particular. I have no problem with an argument that is simply an instancing of subjective opinion from yourself and one or more others, but if you were intending to present your essay in a serious manner to invite objective criticism--may I gently suggest that a more reasonable path to such a goal would be to avoid the narrowing of the argument to the subjective expression of this presumed group of which you are (one may presume?) the spokesperson. Secondly, do you really believe the reduced ability to choose or to evaluate (such as we find in young children), can be said to generate perceptions of beauty, or good--at a level commensurate with a meaningful regard for language?
"We care about those things that arouse our admiration, whether aesthetic or moral, and feel called upon to cultivate them or defend them. Love arises from the sentiment of admiration, and those things we do not love directly, we love for the sake of something we value, as when we cherish keepsakes.
Love seems to be as central to the development of a fully formed person as the urge to understand things......."
I don't know who "we" refers to, but I think it possible that some people might care about what they admire--or about what they hate or fear or desire. I know people who claim to love natural or supernatural things or entities--such entities being anything but admirable, in any rational sense of the word "admirable". So although you are asserting a relationship between admiration and love, that you claim holds true for you and at least one other--your assertion, as it is subjective and particular, holds little interest for me--besides which it offers no justification, but only a boldly stated presumption.
As an aside, let me note that the consideration of the meaning of love has resulted in a significant variance of opinion over time and between people. As regards your rather bold assertion that we love what we admire...this seems to be a very reflective and primitive conception of love. There are many people who consider unconditional love, which addresses the NOT admirable and the NOT deserving--as being the quintessential essence of the expression of love. Some even assert that it is this conception of love which is commanded by God: Ergo, we ought to turn the other cheek to a bastard.
"When we talk about the colour blue, we are referring to something which has a basis in the object, but is only experienced "as such" within the framework of our sensory apparatus. It has what one might call a subjective element, and yet it is grounded in the way we are constructed to experience certain things.
In the same way, beauty seems to be a quality belonging to objects as we experience them. It is a commonplace of connoisseurship that greater experience with art tends towards a convergence of taste, even if disagreement still remains. Taste is not subject to definitive criteria, and yet it seems to be capable of refinement and even meaningful discussion."
You are linking two disparate phenomena without providing any objective basis. The perception of colour is different for all people and is strictly an intrapyschic phenomenon. Visible light is electromagnetic energy. The smaller the wave length the greater the energy force and the more intense the interaction. The experience of colour depends on an actual energy that interacts with the human brain. There is absolutely no evidence that conceptions of beauty, goodness, or other conceptual judgements, depend from the nature of particular matter or energy. The skin can see colour by virtue of the fact that it reacts to electromagnetic energy in scientifically verified and consistent ways. There is no evidence that I am aware of, that proves either beauty or goodness as having any material existence as energy or matter. So far as is known, these concepts are simply that. They exist as ideas or thoughts.
"We are capable of recognizing that certain things are supposed to be such- and- such, although individuals may not conform to the pattern"
Again, your subjective "we" may be meaningful to you and at least one other, but the universal, objective, or scientific application of your statement eludes my understanding. All people have different ideas of what things are "supposed" to be like. The very word "supposed"--again ought to provide you with a clue here. It is true that humans share a commonality of physical structure and evolutionary results that would scientifically predict substantial agreement on a great many matters. Most people abhor rotting food, for instance, even when they are forced to eat it for survival. Formal education and socialization rewards similar outlooks, beliefs, and judgments--so it is not surprising to see groups of people gravitating toward values and judgements that facilitate goals of mutual interest.
"This world contrasts with the world of "matter in motion", where persons are merely automata, where beauty is solely in the eye of the beholder, and where goodness is a matter of choice, or grounded in evolutionary exigencies. The reason that most people, in most places, at most times, believe in God or the gods, is that it makes sense, based upon the human world, a world is altogether surer and better founded than the inhuman one speculated upon by scientism."
How reasonable for you to proclaim that the world (if it is not based on the absolutism of an absolute god) is somehow mindless and meaningless (I assume this is the intent of your "merely automata"). How very absolute of you to assert that my appreciation of Monet, or my experience of love, is somehow less valid than yours merely because you happen to believe in the supernatural. I am not surprised to find such a statement marking the conclusions of your "arguments".
"The reason that most people, in most places, at most times, believe in God or the gods, is that it makes sense, based upon the human world"
Of course, the fact of supernatural belief is a sensible one to most scientists. There is a great deal of fear and helplessness inherent in the human condition. Our power is extremely limited. The attempt to gain greater power by appealing to imaginary and all powerful beings is extremely well evidenced and understood by many philosophers, scientists, and ordinary folk from all walks of life.
"The bottom line, then, is that in the world of human experience, acknowledgment of some sort of Deity makes sense.......
If there were "some sort of deity", then it might make sense to acknowledge it. If there were not "some sort of deity" then it might make sense to acknowledge that. And if one did not know whether or not there was "some sort of deity", then it might make sense to acknowledge that.
Now, let me make some general observations around the subject matter of your essay. So far as is known, human gods have reflected the desires of particular human groups for favoured treatment--both in this life and the next. These gods exhibit powers relative to the level of sophistication enjoyed by the priestly caste of the cult in question. They also exhibit the devils common to the particular moral flaws and prejudices enjoyed by this caste.
Some of these gods we know were vain imaginations. For example, Cortes was not a God, nor were his men. He was not really Quetzalcoatl, born of the virgin goddess Coatlicue. Likewise, an honest look at the myriad other gods who have informed the cultures of a developing human race, exposes the amusing reifications of human imagination--the attributes of power and cunning housed in bodies that share the power attributes of fearsome animals.
What can we note as common features of gods whom have been petitioned by various cultures across time? Well, perhaps the most striking fact that assails our sense is how utterly parochial and self serving they are. In this regard, it may be noted how this self serving relationship between a people and their god, included by its nature a decidedly immoral stance as regards the people of other cultures and their deities.
Are there any reasonable expectations that would suggest that the cruelties and ugliness, absurdities and periodicity's, that we witness in religious history--are anything other than what they appear to be: the contradictory and exclusive imaginings of prejudiced groups of frail humans seeking to petition the unknown for the selfish ends of their particular families?
The existence of so many ridiculous gods argues against the belief in a rational or considerate deity. A god who would hide from his creation, while impostors strut the earth--- would seem to be neither rational nor considerate. Of course, one could argue that the motives of God are beyond the capacity of humans to understand. But those who wish to set aside reasonable discourse in favour of imagination must understand that their imagination of supernatural activity cannot be evaluated by anyone else, and is meaningless to everyone but the visionary and his assistant.
Well, this is already more than four paragraphs so I will bring it to a close. |
