Silicon Investor (SI) -- The First Internet Community

STOCKTALK

We've detected that you're using an ad content blocking browser plug-in or feature. Ads provide a critical source of revenue to the continued operation of Silicon Investor. We ask that you disable ad blocking while on Silicon Investor in the best interests of our community. If you are not using an ad blocker but are still receiving this message, make sure your browser's tracking protection is set to the 'standard' level.

Gold/Mining/Energy : Lundin Oil (LOILY, LOILB Sweden) -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: Tomas who wrote (2310)	4/20/2001 7:50:45 AM
From: Greywolf	Read Replies (2) \| Respond to of 2742

New concession offshore Vietnam! Bordering the PM-3 Malaysia/ Vietnam concession. Lundin is operator with a 33.15% share, other partners are Petronas Carigali Overseas Sdn Bhd with 36.85% and Petrovietnam Exploration and Production with 30%. Part of the concession is in the Cai/Kekwa field which today has a production of 18.000 bopd.

To: Tomas who wrote (2310)	4/20/2001 1:02:57 PM
From: Tomas	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 2742

Libya: Excerpt from US "Strategic Energy Policy Challenges for the 21st Century", Report of an Independent Task Force More oil could likely be brought into the market place in the coming years if oil-field development could be enhanced by participation of U.S. companies in countries where such investments are currently banned, particularly in Libya where frozen U.S. assets remain in limbo. Resources are large and, with major contributions of foreign investment capital, large additions to production rates could be accrued in the coming two to three years. Efforts should be made through cooperation and collaboration with Congress to phase out or drop sanctions that are no longer relevant to U.S. strategic objectives. Sanctions regimens that are ineffective should be reevaluated and restructured to increase their chances of producing the desired outcomes. An easing of sanctions in any particular country might conflict with other U.S. policy goals and must be reviewed in this context. However, the costs of prolonging these sanctions, both in terms of energy policy and foreign policy, must also be taken into account. The government needs to weigh arguments that sanctions are needed to restrain revenues of regimes whose policies are hostile to U.S. interests against the reality that imposition of oil sanctions on too many regimes at once can be ineffective and can have cumulative adverse effects. When they are effective they can also reduce market competition and contribute to overall higher oil price levels, higher U.S. vulnerability to disruption, and higher revenues for the very same adversaries. The latter can especially be the case when world markets are tight and other suppliers will not or are unable to increase supply to make up for the loss from the sanctioned country. Full report: cfr.org