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Politics : Impeach George W. Bush -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: Don Hurst who wrote (2657)	4/23/2001 3:25:49 PM
From: Neocon	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 93284

Well, an interesting little tid- bit, but not exactly relevant. Consumer welfare was not high on the list of the Politburo until Gorbachev made it so. "They pretend to pay us, and we pretend to work" is an OLD joke. The system had been "falling apart" for quite awhile, except in the military sector, which absorbed about a quarter of GDP. North Korea has been in a crisis for years, unable to keep its people fed, and the regime continues to hold power. Besides, Reagan had been in office more than a term when you were there. Maybe it had had an effect. Anyway, the main thing that happened was that the Politburo supported reform for two reasons:1) because they needed to make a "peace offensive" to counter Reagan's hawkishness; and 2) because they were afraid the base economy could not support further military development. I think Gorbachev was a sincere reformer, although he evolved in office, but Khruschev only went so far before the Politburo put him out to pasture and Breshnev initiated neo- Stalinism. Anyway, the fact that Reagan liked Gorby, but would not drop his strategic guard, kept Gorby in office long enough to make the situation difficult to reverse. When the Politburo finally moved on him, the Moscow populace, under the leadership of Yeltsin, was bold enough to mount a significant protest. Even before that, conscripts were fleeing the army, and satellites were challenging the empire. Everything was getting out of hand. Probably the most significant strategic move, on Reagan's part, was the promotion of SDI, which scared the Soviet's badly. When Reagan refused a comprehensive settlement on strategic force reduction because Gorbachev insisted upon trying to kill SDI, in Reykjavik, domestic support for the program went sky high, and the Soviets became really agitated about it. But I guess you know more standing on a street corner in Petersburg than I do reading the journals.......

To: Don Hurst who wrote (2657)	4/23/2001 3:51:39 PM
From: Neocon	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 93284

UNCLASSIFIED -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Possible Soviet Responses to the US Strategic Defense Initiative Interagency Intelligence Assessment APPROVED FOR RELEASE CIA HISTORICAL-REVIEW PROGRAM Secret NIC M 83-10017 12 September 1983 copy 458 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- POSSIBLE SOVIET RESPONSES TO THE US STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE Information available as of 12 September 1983 was used in the preparation of this Assessment. APPROVED FOR RELEASE CIA HISTORICAL-REVIEW PROGRAM -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- CONTENTS Page PREFACE....................................................................v SUMMARY..................................................................vii DISCUSSION.................................................................1 Political Pressure......................................................1 Active Measures.........................................................2 Potential Soviet Military Approaches....................................2 Soviet R&D Processes and Timelines......................................5 Technical Responses.....................................................6 Land-Based Ballistic Missile Systems...............................6 Sea-Based Ballistic Missile Systems................................8 Cruise Missiles....................................................8 Bombers............................................................9 Conventional ABM Systems..........................................10 Directed Energy Systems...........................................10 Space Systems.....................................................11 iii -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- PREFACE On 23 March 1983, President Reagan called for a comprehensive and intensive effort to define a long-term research and development program to begin to achieve the ultimate goal of eliminating the threat posed by strategic nuclear missiles. Though the media have given considerable attention to the issue and have focused attention on exotic space-based beam weapons -- the so-called Star Wars systems -- the President did not specifically mention any weapon concepts or basing: Ballistic missile defense systems could be on air, ground, and submarine platforms as well as on satellites; high-energy lasers, particle beams, or microwave systems could become elements of a national ballistic missile defense (BMD) system along with improved conventional-technology systems. It appears likely that any strategic defense scheme will involve some combination of systems in a layered defense. A space-based directed energy weapon may be used to destroy enemy ballistic missiles in their boost phase; ground-based or space-based lasers or conventional weapons may be used to destroy buses and reentry vehicles in midcourse; ground-based beam weapons, missile interceptors, and other weapons may be used to provide terminal defense. In attempting to neutralize the development and deployment of a ballistic missile defense by the United States, the Soviets will be able to select from a range of technical, diplomatic, military, political propaganda, and clandestine measures. Since this range is broad, and since the time scale (2O to 30 years) of the proposed US BMD effort extends well beyond anyone's ability to make accurate forecasts, we can claim no precision in evaluating the Soviets' course of action. We have instead focused on general principles and constraints in the areas of politics, military doctrine,and Soviet research and development practices that will influence their response to a US BMD system. Subsequently, we identified a variety of military and technological options the Soviets could make at various times in the future. No attempt has been made to perform evaluations as to the relative advantages of one kind of system or device over another. Note: This paper was prepared under the auspices of the National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs. [Information has been deleted] This paper was coordinated at the working level by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency. v SUMMARY In the near term, we expect the Soviets to rely principally on a concerted political and diplomatic effort first to force the United States to drop its ballistic missile defense (BMD) plans or, failing that, to negotiate them away. There are also certain limited military steps the Soviets could take initially for the purpose of improving their bargaining position and for preparing them for initial US deployment should it occur. Over the long term, if the United States goes ahead with plans to develop and deploy its defensive system the Soviets will have a different set of problems. Assuming they know the likely structure and capabilities of US defensive forces, they will look for effective technical countermeasures. It appears that there will be a large variety of possible measures the Soviets can choose from to preserve the viability of their ballistic missile forces. Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMS) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMS) can be upgraded with new boosters, decoys, penetration aids, and multiple warheads. The signatures of these systems can be reduced and new launch techniques and basing schemes can be devised which make them less vulnerable to US missile warning and defensive weapon systems. These systems can also be hardened or modified to reduce their vulnerability to directed energy weapons. The Soviets can employ other offensive systems, particularly manned bombers and long-range cruise missiles with improved penetration aids and stealth technologies, to assume a greater burden of the strategic offensive strike role and to exploit the weaknesses in US air defense capabilities. The Soviets can continue development and deployment of their own ballistic missile defense systems. The Moscow antiballistic missile system can be expanded and improved, and a more widespread system deployed, with additional launchers, improved missile detection and tracking capabilities, and more capable interceptors. The Soviets can expand their ongoing efforts on directed energy weapons, weapons which also provide antisatellite capabilities which could be used against some space-based elements of a US BMD system. In most of the directed energy weapons technologies, the Soviets are now on a par with, or lead, the United States. They are likely to pursue these efforts vii regardless of whether the United States sustains its strategic defense initiative. We believe it is highly unlikely that the Soviets will undertake a "crash" program in reaction to US BMD developments, but rather will seek to counter them by steadily paced efforts over the decades the United States will need to develop and deploy its overall defense. They will look for solutions that are least disruptive to their way of doing business and involve the least possible change to their planned programs. The Soviets are not likely to embrace a fundamental shift in the strategic environment entailing reliance on strategic defenses by both sides. The Soviets could choose to allocate the necessary R&D resources and could obtain some flexibility for new types of deployment by adjusting other programs. They are likely to encounter technical and manufacturing problems in developing and deploying more advanced systems. If they attempted to deploy new advanced systems not presently planned, while continuing their overall planned force modernization, significant additional levels of spending would be required.(1) This would place substantial additional pressures on the Soviet economy and confront the leadership with difficult policy choices. If, through some set of circumstances, the Soviets were faced with actual or impending deployment of a US system and had no effective military counter to it, we think there are various possibilities for Soviet actions, ranging from major arms control concessions, to threats of military action in other areas, to threatened attacks on space-based components of a US system, to sabotage against US facilities. In some extreme scenarios, the Soviets could carry out a massive attack against the US defensive system, although we think that to be highly unlikely, given the near certainty of thereby initiating general war with the United States. fas.org