Neo,
The plant emitted 3X the particulates of the entire city of Los Angeles.
THE FOUR CORNERS STORY
by Mike Williams, Nancy Bartlit and John Bartlit
When we formed New Mexico Citizens for Clean Air & Water (NMCCA&W) about 25 years ago, we didn't have a clear idea what we were going to do or how we were going to do it. We did know the problem we wanted to solve; there was a visible haze that a lone pilot, tracking the plume, had traced to the Four Corners Power Plant, the first of several large coal-fired powerplants to be located in the Southwest. There were also new sources of pollution slated for our state. We wanted to prevent new air pollution and clean up existing sources.
We could see a layered haze on many days which obscured the mountains across the Rio Grande Valley. Layered hazes are not that uncommon, but these had some important differences. Frequently, there was relatively clean air below the haze layer which suggested that the pollution had been transported into the Rio Grande Valley from somewhere else. Later, studies confirmed that at least some of the haze came from a coal-fired power plant. Samples were taken by aircraft on nine hazy days. In four of the samples tiny spheres, characteristic of fly ash from a coal-fired power plant, dominated the samples. In a fifth, there were approximately equal amounts of the tiny spheres and irregular particles characteristic of wind blown dust.
We began by trying to elicit help from a New Mexico state legislative committee. However, at a meeting in 1968 the legislators were much more interested in saying kind words to the officials of Arizona Public Service Company (APS), which operated the plant, than they were interested in listening to us. As a result we turned to other means: letters to the editor of newspapers, talks to clubs and organizations, and a notable forum with company officials sponsored by the League of Women Voters. The scientists among us searched the technical literature for information about the effects of pollution and the possible techniques for controlling pollution.
The First Debate
In the meantime, company officials, including William Reilly the president of APS, assured the public that the pollution was innocuous, rarely reached the Rio Grande Valley, and that they were doing everything possible to control the pollution. Lest some doubt their reasonableness, they suggested that high levels of control would force them to build their new plants in other states.
As the level of debate increased over the powerplant, a new forum for the discussion arose. New Mexico had passed a state clean air act in 1967 and it became time to develop the regulations and standards to implement the new law. A hearing was set in 1969 to consider a wide range of standards and regulations. Regulations define the legally allowable emissions from facilities, while ambient standards define the magic legal dividing line between clean air and dirty air. In theory, regulations are supposed to be sufficiently stringent that the standards (which apply at ground level where people breathe the air) will be achieved.
Prologue To The First Hearing
Before the hearing, the debate became more focused. Those of us with a science background developed information on levels of control of particulate matter available and levels that interfered with visibility. We developed information on the emissions from the powerplant. The controls at the plant were primitive and the coal was dirty. The estimated emissions, based on coal characteristics, were about 350 tons of particulate matter per day. The term particulate matter includes any small particles or non-water droplets suspended in the air. Fly ash from a power plant is one kind of particulate matter, while wind-blown dust and sulfuric acid mist are other kinds. Our research showed that other installations achieved particulate matter removal efficiencies of over 99%, while the older units at the powerplant achieved about 80% and the newest and largest units were to achieve 97% when they came on line. While 97% appears close to 99%; a 97% collector lets three times as much material escape to the environment as does a 99% collector. This is the difference between 30 tons and 100 tons per day.
Both the company and ourselves attempted to put the numbers in perspective. The company cited the size of the collector, "bigger than the Farmington city hall" and the cost of the collector, "millions of dollars." We pointed out that the ash released to the atmosphere in a single year equaled the volume of "six city halls." However, by far our most successful effort was when we discovered that the entire city of Los Angeles had estimated particulate matter emissions of only 110 tons per day. The idea that a single facility could emit three times as much particulate matter as one of our smoggiest cities was repugnant to many people.
Before the hearing, the state health department people proposed a regulation which would require over 99% control of particulate matter from large, coal-fired powerplants. They also proposed a strict ambient standard for the sulfur compounds emitted by paper mills. We supported the state, while the industries proposed much more lax regulations.
The First Hearing
The state law had been written by attorneys with considerable input from business interests. One key provision allowed anyone to examine any witness. Immediately, attorneys representing business interests bore in on hapless state witnesses. The state climatologist was so intimidated that he was unwilling to say anything about pollution. He was even unwilling to agree that high emissions were more likely to cause pollution than low emissions. One result was that we became angry and determined that business witnesses would not go unquestioned. Corporate presidents were asked about pollution controls and costs. Frequently, these corporate officials proved to be rather ignorant about air pollution and its controls.
There were, of course, very knowledgeable outside experts brought in by corporate interests. However, they proved to have chinks in their armor which could be exploited. One expert testified at length about how 97% was the very best control that could be done with an electrostatic precipitator. One of the health department's people asked what would happen if you put two 97% precipitators end to end. The answer: over 99% control but less than 99.9% control. We found that the cross examination provision allowed us to make key points in the hearing record. Many times we were able to use the expert witnesses' credentials to support our case.
Another industry witness, famous in the field of air pollution, argued that a particulate matter standard of 150 micrograms per cubic meter above background would be appropriate as an annual average. The number of 150 micrograms/m3 is very dirty. Even without the additional amount equal to the background, this would leave us with a visual range, the greatest distance at which a dark object can be seen against the sky, averaging 6 miles. He thought the visibility at this level would be fine, since it would allow one to drive a car or fly an airplane. He proposed to define background as the concentration which occurred less than 5% of the time. With this definition, the "background" could already include significant pollution and could increase with time. This would make the proposed standard even worse.
This argument was not popular with the many people who voiced their concern about being unable to see across the Rio Grande valley occasionally. Many spoke of the past when features on the Sangre de Cristo range were easily distinguished at the 35 mile distance across the valley. Objects at the visual range are just barely distinguishable, hazy outlines. When people can see an object clearly at 35 miles, the distance to an object which could just barely be distinguished against the sky would be much greater; probably 80 to 100 miles.
Many people testified about how important clean air and good visibility were to them. A developer who designed upscale housing developments described the importance of clean air and distant vistas. Officials from Los Alamos National Laboratory talked about how important clean air and scenic vistas were in recruiting and retaining scientists. We also spoke of the control technologies which were demonstrated in other areas such as New York state.
The hearings lasted more than a week and turned out to be an ambitious court recorder's dream of over 1300 legal sized pages of testimony and stacks of exhibits. Our somewhat amateurish cross examinations added considerably to the length. One can probably understand why court recorders were always very cordial to us.
The Decision
Eventually, the health board waded through the voluminous documents and adopted regulations which required over 99% control of particulate matter, set stringent ambient standards for sulfur compounds from paper mills, and adopted stringent regulations for paper mills. In the aftermath of the adoption of the regulations, the utility announced that a "breakthrough in particulate matter control had occurred" and they installed controls of over 99%. The hearing gained recognition and credibility for NMCCA&W. The hearings also demonstrated how citizen participation is very important to defining the values people attach to visibility and clean air. NMCCA&W also played a vital role as a counterbalance to business interests, which permitted state officials to take strong actions.
The Aftermath
The aftermath of the hearing was a much different atmosphere; now we were talking to engineers rather than public relations personnel. We also found ourselves being occasionally consulted on specifications for control equipment.
There were, however, many things yet to do. We were now seeing plans for a major expansion in coal-fired powerplant capacity in the Southwest. It was also clear that the current plans under the new 1970 federal Clean Air Act would afford little protection for visibility. We had come to realize the importance of gaseous pollutants such as sulfur dioxide. Sulfur dioxide in the pure form has no effect on visibility; however, once in the atmosphere much of the sulfur dioxide converts to particulate sulfates. Particulate sulfates are responsible for much of the visibility impairment throughout the country. Most of the sulfur emissions in the Southwest were from copper smelters and coal-fired powerplants.
We began to urge our fellow conservation organizations, many with similar concerns, to help us protect the best visibility in the contiguous states which is found in the Southwest. This region also has one of the largest concentrations of national parks in the U.S. A powerful argument on our side was that the federal standards which defined acceptable purity of the air, would permit the visual range to shrink from its 80 mile average in the Southwest to only 15 miles.
The Fight Over PSD
The 1970 Clean Air Act defined as its goal the protection and enhancement of air quality in the country. However, the EPA was clearly trying to solve the problems of the cities by denying the location of new polluting industries in the cities. One of the consequences of this strategy was an export of pollution to rural areas. While we didn't like this strategy because of the contamination of the countryside, the major cities didn't like it either because it meant an export of jobs to the countryside. The Sierra Club and others sued the EPA on the grounds that its implementation of the 1970 Clean Air Act was inconsistent with the stated goals of the act. Many states and our organization, among others, joined as amicus curiae to the suit. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in our favor and ruled that the EPA had to develop regulations which would "prevent significant deterioration (PSD) of the air." EPA adopted regulations which restricted the increase in ground level concentrations of pollution in areas currently cleaner than the standards. They provided much more stringent regulations for so-called Class I Areas which were large National Parks and National Wilderness Areas.
Industrial and business interests then launched a major campaign to amend the Clean Air Act to eliminate the PSD provisions. Environmentalists fought back. Congressmen toured the Southwest and saw what was at stake. Consultants for industry argued that PSD would shut down the country, while we argued that the use of ground-level concentrations for regulatory purposes failed to protect against visible plumes produced by large emissions from tall stacks. We also argued that the installation of better pollution controls meant more jobs. Ultimately, Congress adopted the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments which included the PSD regulations and added a specific clause to protect visibility in Class I areas. Of course, NMCCA&W alone would not have been able to achieve the PSD and visibility amendments, but by joining with other environmental groups, we were able to help get the job done.
Major studies began on the value of visibility and the possible methods of protecting it. In the Southwest, one major study estimated that a moderate reduction in visibility in the National Parks of the Southwest would amount to 5 billion dollars in damages a year. These damages were estimated by asking people what they would be willing to pay on their utility bills to prevent pollution which reduced visibility.
At the state level, we were instrumental in amending the state law to mention visibility explicitly as one item to be protected. In the political arena, we published a newsletter with the environmental voting records of the candidates. We deliberately did not endorse candidates, but we worked hard to get good environmental positions included in the platforms of both parties. We also played a role in another air quality hearing which set stricter controls on particulate matter emissions. Visibility considerations played a major role in this hearing.
Once More Into The Breach
We then moved on to a more difficult issue; the control of sulfur dioxide emissions from major coal-fired power plants. In the Southwest most facilities burned low sulfur coals, so that the federal emission regulations had little effect. However, many of our facilities were large, about 2000 Megawatts or more, and the sulfur emissions were substantial. Sulfur controls are more expensive than particulate controls, so the task was a more difficult one. The only tool available to force reduced emissions was the ambient standards; if we could show that the ambient standards were being exceeded, we could use the law to force new regulations to control sulfur emissions.
When a hearing was set the industry accepted a 60% control efficiency while we argued for a much higher level based on recent studies of the dispersion in the mountainous West. The state agency sided with the industry in this instance. A young attorney, Grove Burnett, had joined us and put on a very effective case while being paid a pittance. We presented testimony on air dispersion and the costs of control. The industry argued that it would cost hundreds of millions of dollars to control sulfur emissions, but we were able to show that those costs amounted to less than a dollar on an average consumer's monthly bill of $70 (Bartlit, 1979). We pointed to the importance of visibility damages and argued that cost benefit ratios supported better controls.
An important plus for us was that our in-state utility, Public Service Company of New Mexico (PNM) had already decided to put 90% controls on their coal-fired powerplants. They had surveyed their customers and had found that their customers were willing to pay the costs of keeping the skies blue. Thus New Mexicans were paying for clean power while the other customers of the Four Corners Power Plant in California and Arizona were not. California regulations would not permit such high emissions. We argued that coal powered plants could be made almost as clean as natural gas fired plants which were permitted in California. Even with very good controls, coal-fired power would be much cheaper than gas-fired power.
The hearing took a week and APS spent over $250,000 while we spent $2,500. We originally proposed a regulation for 90% control of SO2, but in the course of our testimony, we indicated that the range of uncertainty in the modeling might permit control levels as low as 75%. Accordingly, we put in a second proposal for a minimum of 75% control. During our testimony on the air dispersion (by Williams) the attorney representing Arizona Public Service asked for a short recess and approached our attorney and threatened to prove that Williams was a liar unless we withdrew our 75% proposal. The Arizona Public Service attorney had put all of Williams' previous public testimonies into a computer database. We responded by telling him to feel free to try and prove that Williams was a liar and we said we would not withdraw our proposal. There followed about 4 hours of extensive cross examination that went nowhere. The attorney thought that William's was lying because he had used a much faster rate of conversion of SO2 to particulate sulfate in calculating Denver emissions than he had used for the emissions near Farmington. The different conversion rates are appropriate because the high levels of hydrocarbons in urban areas produce much faster conversion of SO2 to sulfates in urban plumes than in rural plumes where the nitric oxide emissions temporarily destroy oxidants and reduce the free radicals that promote conversion of SO2 to sulfates. In fact, of course, sulfates are more dangerous to health and welfare than is SO2, and a faster conversion would be more damaging, although it would produce lower levels of SO2 and thus make it more likely that the emissions would comply with a SO2 standard. The board ruled that they needed more information and set a reopening of the hearing for a later date.
After the hearing reopened APS offered improved control and a substantial monitoring program, which we accepted. We put together a substantial monitoring protocol, but during the key test period, the utility operated the plants at very low capacity and little useful information was obtained.
The Backslide
The utility argued that the results showed that little control was needed and asked for a new hearing to reduce the requirements. We sued for breach of contract. We were able to obtain pro bono services from a major Chicago-based law firm. We jointly arrived at a settlement. As part of the settlement we extracted a higher level of control, legal fees, and a kitty for future actions. We found out later that a vice-president of APS, whose integrity we respected, had been on the verge of retirement, because a less credible vice-president had been gaining influence in the utility. After the less credible executive's plans failed, the man we respected stayed with the organization and prospered.
The Development of Public Information
Legal forums are not designed automatically to develop full information. To the contrary, most practitioners consider that their task is to impede all adverse information. We developed or used the following techniques to increase public and regulatory understanding of all relevant facts:
comparing emission tonnages with emissions from other cities and sources
quantifying control efficiencies (percent removal) to debate industry's general statements that their plant "has pollution controls"
citing specific similar plants operating at higher control efficiencies
contacting manufacturers of pollution control equipment for information
putting total (30 year) costs of control into perspective (as a percentage increase in total cost of power production)
quantifying jobs created by installation and operation of pollution controls
quantifying increased tax base due to value of installed pollution controls
comparing "legally acceptable" visibility to actually experienced visibility conditions (for example seeing a particular mountain from a particular town or park; visibility reduced by actual forest fires, such as the Yellowstone Fire)
reading industry articles or statements published in industry journals and contrasting this information with statements by the same industry or company given at regulatory hearings
using industry's experts (and thus their professional credentials) to testify to key points at hearing through the use of legal cross-examination of industry witnesses at hearings
hiring or inviting technical experts to testify on our behalf
working with company's technical, economic, and administrative officers to tell the whole story publicly and to congressional leaders (including the facts a company typically does not include in press releases)
When new restrictions were placed on sulfur emissions from coal-fired powerplants in the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, most of the Southwestern powerplants were already controlling their emissions at stricter levels than those specified in the law. Two major facilities, the Navajo Generating Station (NGS) in Northern Arizona and the Mohave Generating Station in Nevada are currently uncontrolled, but the operators of the NGS have agreed to clean up to protect visibility. The Mohave plant is the subject of further studies.
Reference
Bartlit, John R., 1979, "Putting Environmental Economics in Perspective: Case Study of Four Corners Power Plant, New Mexico," American Journal of Public Health, Vol. 69, no. 11, pp 1160-1163.
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