To: Bob Kim who wrote (91395 ) 5/26/2001 1:42:15 PM From: John Koligman Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 97611 *OT* Bob - Right on time <ggg>, the lead Barron's article this week is on 'Wall Street's dubious research machine', and this excerpt contains their recipe for 'repair'... Prescription For Repair If Wall Street's analysts are to regain investors' trust, the industry's approach to research will need to change. Here are set of five suggested practices that research departments should consider adopting to reduce real and perceived conflicts of interest and generate more valuable investment analysis: Disclose prominently on research reports specific links between an analyst's firm and corporate issuers, such as investment-banking clients, and note whether analysts personally own securities they are rating. Reduce or eliminate that portion of analysts' bonuses based heavily on investment banking work, and discourage large guaranteed pay packages that presume that a high level of banking fees will be generated by research. Set detailed standards governing the point in the deal-making process at which an analyst can be brought 'over the wall' as part of a banking team, and suspend coverage on the companies involved at that time. Pursue broader, deeper industry research that offers proprietary information and insights, while reducing dependence on companies themselves for guidance. Link Buy, Hold and Sell ratings more directly to an analyst's current view of a stock's prospects and establish valuation disciplines that make the opinion on a stock transparent to investors and the analyst accountable for all calls Blodget also got a mention... They Dared to Differ On Wall Street, where analysts rarely make bearish declarations, taking negative positions can be unpopular and hazardous to one's job security. These sell-siders made iconoclastic calls and have since moved on, voluntarily or otherwise, from the firms at which they took their bearish stance. Michael Mayo What he said: As a Credit Suisse First Boston analyst, issued a sweeping recommendation to sell bank stocks in May 1999. What happened: The call proved timely, as bank shares weakened throughout that year. But when his firm acquired Donaldson Lufkin & Jenrette, he lost his job to his DLJ counterpart. Mayo says it's because of the sell call, the firm denies that. Mayo is now bank analyst for Prudential Securities. Marvin Roffman What he said: Issued a report for Janney Montgomery Scott in 1990 predicting that Donald Trump's Taj Mahal would go bankrupt. What happened: Taj Mahal did indeed go bankrupt shortly thereafter, but not before Trump threatened a lawsuit and Janney dismissed Roffman. He now is a partner in Roffman-Miller, a research firm in Philadelphia. Jonathan Cohen What he said: As a Merrill Lynch Internet analyst, he was dubious of the wild valuations afforded Web stocks such as Amazon.com during the tech-stock mania of 1999. What happened: Amazon and other Web darlings kept rising, and he was replaced by Internet bull Henry Blodget. Since then, Cohen's skepticism has been vindicated. He later was director of research at Wit Soundview but has since moved on. Tom Brown What he said: While at DLJ he was a persistent critic of First Union's voracious acquisition strategy, raising the ire of the company. What happened: First Union eventually sagged under the weight of its acquisition binge and had a period of poor performance. Brown left DLJ in 1998 amid the controversy and later joined Tiger Management before starting his own investment firm, Second Curve Capital.