SI
SI
discoversearch

We've detected that you're using an ad content blocking browser plug-in or feature. Ads provide a critical source of revenue to the continued operation of Silicon Investor.  We ask that you disable ad blocking while on Silicon Investor in the best interests of our community.  If you are not using an ad blocker but are still receiving this message, make sure your browser's tracking protection is set to the 'standard' level.
Technology Stocks : Nokia (NOK) -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: S100 who wrote (12140)6/4/2001 12:16:48 AM
From: S100  Respond to of 34857
 
Lex: European telecoms
Published: June 3 2001 19:26GMT | Last Updated: June 3 2001 19:28GMT




Much fuss has been made about network sharing as the way to sort out the mess left by Germany's mobile licence auction. On Tuesday the regulator will decide just how much co-operation will be allowed. There is the whiff of bail-out in the air, and every chance that foolish new entrants who paid E8.5bn for third generation licences will be given more scope to cut costs through sharing infrastructure than they can reasonably have expected at the time of the auction.

This would benefit Sonera, Telefonica, KPN, British Telecommunications and France Telecom (Mobilcom) at the expense of the established Vodafone and Deutsche Telekom. Sharing base stations and radio access equipment might save each new entrant between 20 per cent and 30 per cent of capital expenditure, with a net present value of E1.5bn to E2bn. However, Germany would still have too many operators (six) chasing uncertain revenues. Network sharing does not remove the big obstacle to consolidation: the requirement for merging operators to give up one of their E8.5bn licences. Allowing companies to trade spectrum would, but this would involve rewriting licence terms. Better to allow market forces to rule, and let the weakest operator go out of business.

That said, network sharing could ease the way for some mooted cross- border mergers, by allaying fears that German 3G will be a black hole. It would also allow "three into one" rationalisation: two operators merge, give up one licence, and share their network with another company. Telefonica Moviles/BT Wireless, Telecom Italia Mobile/KPN Mobile and Telia/Sonera might all reward a second look.


news.ft.com

More whining, too much GSM.

One.Tel's Billion-Dollar Baby Likely To Remain An Orphan
Tools
• Add Your Comments
• View Community Comments



BY DAVID BRAUE (profile) | June 02, 2001

The extent of the strife surrounding the collapse of number-four wireless carrier One.Tel is still unfolding, but one thing is certain: the company's downfall will disrupt competition in the mobile space and leave $1 billion worth of Australia's newest mobile network rusting on its supports.

One.Tel's demise, coupled with the slow slide of cost-cutting reseller WorldxChange last week, may well indicate that the competition-driven free-for-all in Australia's telecommunications market is coming to a close. Fixed-line communications prices are so low that extracting viable margins from customers requires careful management and, often, subsidisation from far more-profitable mobile calls.

Yet even mobile calls are far less profitable for a company with a $1 billion monkey on its back, particularly since One.Tel had to trim its margins to make a convincing play in the ultra-competitive mobiles market. Had One.Tel survived until mobile number portability is introduced in September, those margins would have shrunk even more as assumed competition for mobile customers increases.

After the One.Tel network's launch last August, One.Tel chief technology officer Stephen Moore acknowledged to Wireless Authority that the company was venturing into a potentially harsh environment, but was confident that higher-margin value-added services would spawn a profitable mobile business.

Yet this strategy clearly didn't produce the results the company was hoping for, with 20/20 hindsight confirming that Australia probably really didn't need a fourth GSM network. And as Optus savages One.Tel's chances at redemption by grabbing the more than 220,000 One.Tel customers who were still using One.Tel's resold Optus services, it's clear that none of the top three mobile telcos have much use for One.Tel's GSM infrastructure.

This will inevitably force One.Tel to either heavily discount the network until someone picks it up, or to sell off its network in bits complementary to existing GSM networks run by Telstra, Optus and Vodafone.

But since all four GSM mobile networks basically replicate the same coverage areas, this approach may not win many takers. This tilts the balance instead towards a massive $1 billion fire sale for the company, which could potentially see the network become a target for AAPT/Telecom New Zealand or Hutchison Telecommunications, both of which have been developing mobile strategies and may benefit from One.Tel's existing network.


The network could, potentially, be a major benefit for those companies if the price is right. After all, the two recently joined forces in a potentially $1.25 billion deal to build 3G networks in Australia and New Zealand. One.Tel's Moore, however, last year said the Lucent Technologies network would have been able to be upgraded to support 3G for under $10 million; if this is true, and if One.Tel is forced to sell off its network for the $250 million or so it's probably worth on the market, it could substantially reduce the cost of entry into 3G for Hutchison and AAPT/TNZ.

This, of course, is pure speculation; for now, the fate of One.Tel's network rests in the hands of those charged with mopping up the financial disaster that the company's collapse has created.

Whatever becomes of the company, many observers were hardly surprised at the company's collapse. "The market in Australia is such that it's highly unlikely that a new player will come in and give it a go, [buying One.Tel's network] to start competing with Telstra and Optus," says telecommunications analyst Paul Budde of Paul Budde Communication, who blames the company's costly mobile network build for its financial implosion and expects it will be lucky to fetch $300 million when the network is sold off.

"A network like that needs at least one million users to be [viable], but to get one million customers you need to sell under cost price to attract customers to you in the hope they stay with you. That business model might have looked attractive four or five years ago, but very few players are willing to do that anymore. Buying a $1 billion network did not add any value to One.Tel's business, nor will it add any value to AAPT, Hutchison, Vodafone, Optus or Telstra's business. A network is a minor sort of thing; getting a customer base and looking after them is ten times as important."

australia.internet.com



To: S100 who wrote (12140)6/4/2001 5:06:13 AM
From: 49thMIMOMander  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 34857
 
UK, Vodafone, Chris Gent could consider that as UK
is in a "special position" he could try to reflect
that in is announcements and interviews.

for example

-EU tried, for a long time, to have member nations
agreeing on a common policy, strategy for telecommunication
and 3G roll out, 2 nations made a lot of problems, no agreement.

-EU agreed to break the existing local monopolies based on
the wired lines and through the wireless sevices and
licenses, to have min 3-4 competing operators everywhere.

-local loops should be rented for high speed DSL connections
(as mine is), access to telephone exchanges,etc, compare
US R-box.
(where UK has been doing their best not to implement it)

- masts should be shared or owned by third parties, so that
competition isn't based on a mast and site war, but on
providing the actual service.

- note that Finland as the first to issue 3G licenses
made a clear strategy known, a strategy not to collect
indirect,privatized taxes by auctions, inflate service
prices, not allow "after auction trade" of the license
to collect, more like renting.
This based on the goal that the frequencies of
the people should be used to provide for high quality
services for the people through efficient competition
and regulation. (the debate on regional issues
was also important, the quality in rural regions)

UK's auction system was heavily critized from the very
start, but the rethoric of "free market forces" went
down on the "potato famine level". It was clear it would
become a system for incumbent monopolies to keep
competition out due to lower costs due to already existing
infrastructure.

Germany fixed some mechanisms on how both the auction was
done and how the licenses are written, but was under
heavy pressure go on with a UK style auction.

That is, regular mechanisms for the big ones to
attempt to avoid competition, nothing new, although
this game of poker obviously is slightly different
than earlier ones.

What pixxes me off is how little the articles go into
these factors, tactics and mechanisms, or even give a hint
of them (except now the small comments on what
mechanisms favors the big ones and what the small ones).

Especially as guys like Gent and his managers, bankers,etc
obviously have and still spend most their time doing it.

Just to pick one old example, not one has yet mentioned
that the proposed network sharing solution is limited in
time, although that is one of the most important factors.

Ilmarinen

P.S. My guess is that Blair just has to raise taxes and brits
have to pay double prices per fewer minute, as well as limp
along with old technology outside London..
(although bundling handset and service seem to show
some improvement, same for locked handsets,etc other signs of undeveloped, dysfunctional markets)